Senator SYMINGTON. They feel some think it better to pursue hostilities primarily on the ground, because there we give the enemy a break, even Stephen; in fact, they have a little advantage, because they have the most numbers of bodies. Do you think that is what we should do, even including full utilization of what you call sky cavalry? General GAVIN. Oh, no. Let us understand each other, Senator. I would never give an opponent any break in combat. The best break he can get as far as I am concerned is to be dead. I would not give him a break. Senator SYMINGTON. Then you do not agree with that? General GAVIN. I do not believe we are doing this to give him a break. I think it is the limitations on that type of power. Senator SYMINGTON. Well, some people who believe in airpower, and I am not only talking about Air Force airpower but also naval airpower-they say, first they give us a job to do, which is to take out military installations in North Vietnam, then they give us very heavy target restrictions, restrictions against military targets. General GAVIN. Certainly. Senator SYMINGTON. They stopped entirely for 37 days. I am not criticizing that, but it did permit a heavy buildup in the flak potential, and the Sam sites, and the antiaircraft guns. General GAVIN. Yes, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. Now that the bombing has started again it is my understanding the target restrictions are more tight than they were when it was stopped in December. General GAVIN. It seems to be. Senator SYMINGTON. Therefore, our combined airpower says: "First, they put us in the ring, tell us to do a good job. Then they tie one hand behind our back. Then they criticize us for the job we have done as not being effective." Does this follow your philosophy about airpower? General GAVIN. Well, the Senator uses this peculiar description. Senator SYMINGTON. I am only asking. General GAVIN. Airpower should be used to attack military targets, period. Senator SYMINGTON. You believe airpower should be used to attack military targets, even if it is not supporting ground troops? General GAVIN. Well, every military target, I presume, will have some direct contribution to the effort of the ground forces. Otherwise it would not be a target. Senator SYMINGTON. I agree wholeheartedly. Would you advocate continuing bombing military targets, but with the restrictions on power and petroleum this morning you nevertheless advocate? General GAVIN. Yes. Senator SYMINGTON. Limited bombing of limited military targets. General GAVIN. As we have described what I would bomb I would say, yes, and that continuously is OK with me. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General Gavin. We will now recess until 2:30. (Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee was in recess, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., the same day.) AFTERNOON SESSION The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The next gentleman I recognize is the Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES M. GAVIN-Resumed Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share the admiration of my colleagues for you, General, as I think you well know. Most of the questions that I had in mind asking you I think have been asked, and I think you have rendered a great service by your testimony here today. I think it has helped all of us to benefit from your views. General GAVIN. Thank you very much. AGGRESSION OR CIVIL WAR IN VIETNAM Senator DODD. I have one or two questions I would like to ask. They may have been asked when I had to step out, I am not sure. From your knowledge of that part of the world, southeast Asia, and of this particular difficulty in Vietnam, do you consider that struggle there a civil war or a war of aggression? General GAVIN. It started, I would say, as a civil war and it is certainly now a war of aggression. Senator DODD. I didn't hear the last part. General GAVIN. It started as a civil war. It started after the Geneva settlement of 1954 with the people in southern Vietnam trying to establish a government of their own choosing meeting an increasing difficulty with the inroads of the Vietcong, and then with the continuous growth of the Vietcong effort and the support they received from outside, it has become of a different character entirely. Underneath that the hope is always underlying it as a civil war, but now it is much more than that in my opinion. It is a war of aggression. EFFECT OF A WITHDRAWAL Senator DODD. Secondly, have you thought about-I am sure you have even though I ask it that way-the implications of any withdrawal? I know you don't favor a withdrawal, but any movement that might be considered as a withdrawal to what we have been calling here today the enclave? General GAVIN. Yes. Senator DODD. Has it occurred to you that this might cause the South Vietnamese people and other people in other countries to doubt thereafter our word, our credibility, our reliability? General GAVIN. Yes, I would. Senator DODD. Don't you think it would discourage them if we did that? General GAVIN. I would think a retrograde movement of any perceptive sort would absolutely have an impact, sure. Senator DODD. That would be harmful to our best interests? Senator DODD. I don't think I have anything else. I think much that I had in mind was asked by other members. I want to say to you that I have a much better understanding of your view than I had this morning General GAVIN. Thank you very much. Senator DODD (continuing). When I first came here, and I have the idea that other members do, too. That is why I said it has been a good thing for all of us, and I think it is good for the country as well. General GAVIN. Thank you, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark? Senator CLARK. General, I would like to associate myself with the many nice things that have been said about you here today. I think you have shown a great deal of courage, and have made a very real contribution to this problem. MAKING DO WITH WHAT WE HAVE IN VIETNAM You have said several times this morning that you thought that we ought to make do with what we have. I think I took down accurately the statement "we can't afford to pull out. We should not escalate." Is that a fair statement of what you have said? General GAVIN. Yes. As I expressed it in that article, let's stay where we are, do what we can do with what we have. Senator CLARK. What concerns me, and a lot of the rest of us, is whether if we make do with what we have, we aren't going to get chased out. What is your view on that? My point is the other side has escalated. That great military strategist, Joseph Alsop, has written about the buildup of the North Vietnamese Army, and indicated that because they have escalated to such an extent, we must escalate too, or else we will be chased out. What is your view on that? General GAVIN. Yes. Specifically about that article, it is a strange article. Senator CLARK. It is indeed. General GAVIN. I suspect what he is going to say next is we should probably double our strength there. I think this is what he is leading to. Senator CLARK. I have no doubt. I suspect, and I have no reason to say this other than that I know Joe Alsop pretty well, he would be dropping bombs on China pretty soon. But let's get back to the main problem here. General GAVIN. Yes, sure. Senator CLARK. Can we afford to do with what we have got, or are we going to have to put more troops in because we can't hold what we have got with what is there now? General GAVIN. I don't know, and of course this is very much up to the Vietcong and the Chinese backing them. To the extent they want to commit their own resources, they are tough decisions we have to face up to. But I hope that we will make the decisions ourselves, and not be forced to make them to match what the other side does. This is my point of view at the moment. Senator CLARK. What bothers me is that we may have passed the point where we can make the decision. I assume that you would not want to go on record as to what you think are the capabilities of our present 200,000 men there now, without knowing a lot better than I do, maybe a lot better than you do, what we are up against. General GAVIN. I couldn't give you anything more. It would be quite improper for me to second-guess what General Westmoreland can do with what he has. I do know we have certain resources there not long ago that were looked upon as quite adequate. We are doing quite well with them today. I would hesitate to speculate beyond that. I would be loath to see us escalate indefinitely and double, and double again what we have. Senator CLARK. In other words, you would go pretty slow on escalation in terms of both men and material? General GAVIN. I would do what? Senator CLARK. Go pretty slow? General GAVIN. Oh, indeed, absolutely. A VIETNAMESE OR AMERICAN WAR Senator CLARK. It was in September 1963 that President Kennedy said, and I think I quote fairly accurately, that this is their war. We can help as advisers, we can help with money, but they have to either lose it or win it. In your opinion are we beyond that point now, and unless we put substantial additional American forces into that war, are we going to be chased out? General GAVIN. Yes, I certainly think we are beyond that point. I base this upon my conversations with Mr. McNamara about a week or so ago in the limitations now, the availability of certain Vietnamese manpower are very, very severe. They can't do much more. Senator CLARK. Do you think the South Vietnamese-I don't want to overstate it-you don't think they can do much more? General GAVIN. Not an awful lot more. This I believe now. MINIMIZING THE OFFENSIVE EFFORT Senator CLARK. Now have you been able to make any estimateor on the basis of your military experience is it possible to make an estimate of the costs in terms of men and money of, (a) staying where we are, and (b) regaining substantial parts of the territory we have lost? Would not the latter be much more expensive, both in terms of casualties and money? General GAVIN. Well, I would think so, yes. I would think so despite the opening paragraphs of Mr. Alsop's article, whereby by falling back to the areas you hold, you can reduce your casualties and do more with less troops. No, I would think the logic would be that if you were going to extend your search-and-destroy effort, you have to have more manpower. Senator CLARK. And if you extend your search-and-destroy efforts, are you not inevitably going to run up casualties? General GAVIN. Oh, I would think so, sure. |