It is an unlimited commitment of our resources. There is no limit that either you or General Taylor or anyone else has put on it. Perhaps I am wrong, but I begin to think that there is no such thing as a limited war in the sense that you go into it with any reservation as to the degree of your resources you are going to put into it. I just want to know whether this, in your judgment, is a correct understanding or analysis of the situation, a war with limited objectives but no limit on the resources and the extent to which our resources may become involved. Secretary RUSK. Senator, I don't want to conjure up the picture of a major conflagration in the answer that I give. Senator CASE. No; I don't want you to. Secretary RUSK. Because, as you pointed out, we have a most limited objective here in terms of denying to the other side its attempt to seize Vietnam by force. Therefore, the scale of the action, in a rather specific sense, turns to a considerable extent on how much of an effort the other side is going to use to try to take over South Vietnam by force. Now, we have tried to make it very clear-and we hope very much the other side will be under no misapprehension on this that we consider that our commitment is such that they cannot be permitted to take over South Vietnam by force. What that means no one can surely say. We hope, as it has meant in other situations, that that will mean that they will come to the conference table and make peace. Senator CASE. I understand. Now, I promised to take only a couple of minutes. WINNING BY DESTROYING VIETNAM Senator CASE. Perhaps you saw the Times story this morning which suggested that the only way this can be won is by destroying Vietnam. This is not something we should look forward to. Do you have any comment on that statement, because it keeps coming up again and again? Secretary RUSK. Well, still the principal problem is to find the enemy-it is not the mass destruction of massed divisions in its present situation. Defections from the Vietcong are multiplying rapidly. They are having very considerable difficulties on their side. I don't know what is meant by winning by destroying Vietnam. We are not trying to win anything except Senator CASE. In order to prove they can't win. Secretary RUSK (continuing). The rejection of aggression, that is what we are after. When we say victory over aggression, we mean by that that we repel this aggression, and that we prevent it. Senator CASE. Our objective is limited to that? Secretary RUSK. As stated in the congressional resolution. Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all. 58-320 0-66-pt. 1- 44 COMMENDATION OF WITNESS Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, you have been down here all day. We have been holding these hearings for the past 3 weeks. If I could think of any additional question that I could ask or that you could answer or any comment that you could make that would bring us 1 day closer to the solution to this problem, I am sure both you and I would be glad to stay here all night. But I have no such words of wisdom so rather than ask a question I am merely going to wish you Godspeed. I hope that we can all of us achieve the objective that this committee and the country and all of us are working for and that is a solution to this dilemma. I wish I could give it to you, but I can't. Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator Williams. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper? Senator HICKENLOOPER. I just want to say, because apparently this testimony is coming to a close, that while it is possible and probable that you and I haven't always agreed on every point in the past several years, Mr. Secretary, I have agreed with you on a great many. know of no man with greater fortitude or physical strength to do the job which you are doing under all pressures from all of the world— and under the stirrings and restlessness that is occurring in the world today-who has a greater grasp of the basic facts and the incidents, the situations which are moving in the world today. I frankly say I don't know how you stand it physically. I think we are fortunate in having a man whose physical endurance is such as yours. I think, as public servants go this is aside from the fact whether anybody agrees always or disagrees-I think you bring to the Government and to your responsibilities the highest degree of devotion-at least as high a degree as any man could bring to the intelligent discharge of his duties in the interest of his country and his responsibilities. Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Senator. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I also wish to say that I appreciate your patience here, and I admire your vitality and vigor, as I have for a long time. I think you have done an extraordinary job in defending a position and explaining it. I know the committee, and I am sure the country, have benefited a great deal by your testimony today. I agree with Senator Gore. I think this has been a very fine meeting to end up these hearings. I hope we end them up, and that we can proceed in executive session and consider this matter. I appreciate very much the devotion that you have given to us today and the time that you have given as you have in the past. Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The committee is recessed. Secretary RUSK. Thank you. (Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.) APPENDIX FEBRUARY 7, 1966. Mr. JOHN FISCHER, Editor, Harper's Magazine, New York, N.Y. DEAR JOHN: I was shocked to see the advertisement in yesterday's book review section of the New York Times. I am enclosing the upper part of it so there may be no question in your mind about the ad to which I refer. It seems to me to be clearly misleading and implies that your February issue has an article in which I challenge Mr. Johnson's strategy. As you may recall from our phone conversation, I thought so well of my proposal, which in essence recommended a thorough appraisal of where we are, what it is costing us, and what the alternatives are, and then making up our own minds rather than leaving the initiative with the Vietcong, that I considered sending a copy of it to Jack Valenti for the President. I presumed that I could be of help to him. You told me that you sent a copy of the article to Bill Moyers. Since then, Harper's has, through its advertising, exploited the idea that my views are entirely in opposition to those of Mr. Johnson, which isn't true. though in saying this, of course, I am not sure of the detailed thinking of Mr. Johnson. As you may imagine, this has been a matter of some embarrassment to me and a great deal of misunderstanding, particularly in the highest places in Washington. I will appear before Senator Fulbright's committee tomorrow morning and at that time I hope I may clarify the entire situation. However, your ads continue to be read by people and I am afraid that the harm cannot be undone. Al You now have a review of four books about De Gaulle. It seemed to me, when I completed it, to be a good review without any unusual implications vis-a-vis national policy. I would be grateful if you would handle this in a straightforward manner, simply as a book review. Sincerely, JAMES M. GAVIN. 685 AMERICAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM IN LIGHT OF OUR CONSTITUTION, THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS, AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY MEMORANDUM OF LAW Prepared by LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM HON. ROBERT W. KENNY, Honorary Chairman Executive Committee WILLIAM L. STANDARD, Chairman CAREY MCWILLIAMS, Vice-Chairman JOSEPH H. CROWN, Secretary LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWards VietnaM* 38 Park Row New York, N. Y. 10038 * (In formation) 687 |