events of the Gospel history, there is no real gradation of the probability of facts when seen across a great number of successive generations," because the line of testimony continues unbroken through each. But it has been doubted (and this is the second objection to the admission of the truth of the Apostolic testimony, however appa rently credible), whether the same reasoning will apply to events of an extraordinary nature, and whether the improbability of miraculous facts is not superior to that of every other evidence, and to that of historical events, the best established.— Events," observes the author to whom I have before referred, may be so extraordinary that they can hardly be established by testimony." This is but in other words to urge the celebrated argument of Hume in his Essay,* and to insinuatë that no testimony, however derived, even from a professed eye-witness, is able to overcome the natural incredibility of miracles. To this author therefore I shall turn, and endeavour to lay before you such a statement of his reasoning as may enable you to appreciate its truth and force under every circumstance.

In the first part of this Essay, which relates exclusively to the principles upon which the credibility of miraculous facts, in géneral, depends, Hume's Essays, Vol. II. p. 109–132.

nothing can be more desultory and unconnected than the arrangement of the matter, nor any thing more loose and vague than the application of the terms; and as this want of order and precision is peculiarly calculated to confuse and mislead, I shall, before I proceed to reason at all upon the subject, lay before you that methodical series in which, as it appears to me, the premises, upon which the fallacious conclusion against the credibility of human testimony to miraculous facts is founded, should follow each other.

The first and fundamental proposition of Mr. Hume is this, that "a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence," and that the credibility of the fact, together with the credibility of the testimony by which it is supported, are what in every case compose the whole of the evidence. Whenever, therefore, there is any incredibility in a fact itself, he holds that this incredibility must be subtracted from the credibility of the testimony, and the balance being struck between them, will give the degree of evidence in favour of or against the fact.

Having admitted this reasoning, than which nothing can seem to be more correct, we must next examine what it is that, in his opinion, constitutes both the credibility of facts and the

credibility of testimony. Now upon these points Hume lays it down as a certain principle, that

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experience is our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact," whether we are reasoning concerning the nature of the facts themselves or the nature of the testimony which supports them. For with regard to the testimony by which any fact is supported, he asserts, that it is only from our observation and experience of the conformity of facts to the declarations of witnesses that we acquiesce in their truth at all. And with regard to the facts themselves he maintains that their credibility is to be measured by their analogy to our past experience of the same or similar facts having occurred. If no such fact, therefore, as that which is declared to have happened, has ever happened before, he considers experience, the measure of credibility, to amount in that case to a direct and full proof against its occurrence. If it has been known to have happened but rarely, then the probability of its occurrence is in proportion to that rarity. Hence, if uniform experience be against the occurrence of any alleged fact, whilst the testimony is exceedingly strong in its favour, "in that case," he says, "there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force in proportion to that of its antagonist."

He therefore concludes that as a firm and

unalterable experience is against the occurrence of miracles, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined," and he deduces, as a plain and necessary consequence, this general and important maxim; "that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact it endeavours to establish." And even in that case he maintains, that "there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior,"

To the whole of this reasoning I deem it sufficient to reply by denying that experience is in all cases the measure of the intrinsic credibility of facts, and more especially by denying that any presumption can be formed against the reality of the Christian miracles, because miracles have never been known to be wrought upon any other occa-. sion. It appears to me that this proposition of Hume is of too general a nature, and that he was only authorized to assume, that "the intrinsic credibility of facts is to be measured by their analogy to our past experience of the same or similar facts having occurred under the same or similar circumstances." Hence, though we should allow that a firm and invariable experience is against

the occurrence of miracles in all other religions in favour of which they have been alleged, it will. not follow that the same experience is against their occurrence in favour of the Gospel, unless we can prove such a resemblance between the cases as to justify the application to the one of the rules deduced from the other. With this important limitation the principle may be adopted both as innocent and correct, and the propriety of this limitation will, I trust, appear evident to all, who will accompany me with impartiality through the following illustrations.

It is the opinion of Hume that "the Indian prince who refused to believe the first effects of frost reasoned justly," because those effects "arose from a state of nature with which he was unacquainted;" but those who reflect with attention upon his conduct, will rather, I should think, be inclined to imagine that he reasoned weakly and concluded hastily. That on a subject upon which he was ignorant he should withhold the fulness of his assent, until he had examined into every thing connected with the evidence, was reasonable and right; and if after due investigation he had found. that the circumstances under which the novel fact was stated to have occurred, were altogether and every respect the same with those in which he had uniformly observed a different result, he would

in