with the French High Commissioner in developing and carrying out a coordinated program of economic aid designed to assist the three countries in restoring their normal economic life. The members of the American economic mission will, at all times, be subject to the authority of the Government of the United States and will not become a part of the administrations of the Associated States.

The Government of the United States recognizes that this American assistance will be complementary to the effort made by the three Associated States and France, without any intention of substitution. American aid is designed to reinforce the joint effort of France and the Governments and peoples of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, on whom rests the primary responsibility for the restoration of security and stability.

United States economic aid will be granted in accordance with separate bilateral agreements between each of the Associated States and the United States of America. The approval of these agreements will be subject to legal conventions existing between the Associated States and France. Initial economic aid operations, however, may begin prior to the conclusion of these agreements.

The United States Government is of the opinion that it would be desirable for the three governments and the French High Commissioner to reach agreement among themselves for the coordination of those matters relating to the aid program that are of common interest. The American economic mission will maintain contact with the three Associated States, with the French High Commissioner in Indochina and, if desired, with any body which may be set up by the Associated States and France in connection with the aid program.

Mr. Robert Blum has been appointed Chief of the United States special economic mission to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

Identical letters are being addressed today to the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and the President of the French Union.

4. THE MILITARY AID PROGRAM: Statement by the Departments of State and Defense, September 23, 1951 1

1

Discussions which have been going on for the past week between General of the Army, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, French High Commissioner in Indochina, and Commander in Chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina, and officials of the Departments of Defense and State were concluded September 22 in an atmosphere of cordiality and unity of purpose.

The participants were in complete agreement that the successful defense of Indochina is of great importance to the defense of all Southeast Asia. United States officials stated that General de Lattre's presentation of the situation in that area had been invaluable to them and had demonstrated that United States and French policies in the Associated States were not at variance.

In the course of the discussions with the Department of Defense, the military-aid program for Indochina was reexamined, with the

1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 8, 1951, p. 570.

result that considerable improvement will be made in the rate of deliveries of many items of equipment. General de Lattre has been advised that the question of additional aid for the French and Vietnamese forces in Indochina in the fiscal year 1952 program is under study by the United States Government.

5. THE DEFENSE OF INDOCHINA: Communiqué Regarding Discussions Between Representatives of the United States, France, Viet-Nam, and Cambodia, June 18, 19521

Mr. Jean Letourneau, Minister in the French Cabinet for the Associated States in Indochina, has just concluded a series of conversations with U.S. Government officials from the Department of State, Department of Defense, the Office of Director for Mutual Security, the Mutual Security Agency, and Department of the Treasury. The Ambassadors of Cambodia and Viet-Nam have also participated in these talks.

The principle which governed this frank and detailed exchange of views and information was the common recognition that the struggle in which the forces of the French Union and the Associated States are engaged against the forces of Communist aggression in Indochina is an integral part of the world-wide resistance by the Free Nations to Communist attempts at conquest and subversion. There was unanimous satisfaction over the vigorous and successful course of military operations, in spite of the continuous comfort and aid received by the Communist forces of the Viet-Minh from Communist China. The excellent performance of the Associated States' forces in battle was found to be a source of particular encouragement. Special tribute was paid to the 52,000 officers and men of the French Union and Associated States' armies who have been lost in this six years' struggle for freedom in Southeast Asia and to the 75,000 other casualties.

In this common struggle, however, history, strategic factors, as well as local and general resources require that the free countries concerned each assume primary responsibility for resistance in the specific areas where Communism has resorted to force of arms. Thus the United States assumes a large share of the burden in Korea while France has the primary role in Indochina. The partners, however, recognize the obligation to help each other in their areas of primary responsibility to the extent of their capabilities and within the limitations imposed by their global obligations as well as by the requirements in their own areas of special responsibility. It was agreed that success in this continuing struggle would entail an increase in the common effort and that the United States for its part will, therefore, within the limitations set by Congress, take steps to expand its aid to the French Union. It was further agreed that this increased assistance over and above present U.S. aid for Indochina, which now approximates one third of the total cost of Indochina operations, would be especially devoted to assisting France in the building of the national armies of the Associated States.

1 Department of State Bulletin, June 30, 1952, p. 1010.

Mr. Letourneau reviewed the facts which amply demonstrate the determination of the Associated States to pursue with increased energy the strengthening of their authority and integrity both against internal subversion and against external aggression.

In this connection Mr. Letourneau reminded the participants that the accords of 1949, which established the independence within the French Union of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, have been liberally interpreted and supplemented by other agreements, thus consolidating this independence. Mr. Letourneau pointed out that the governments of the Associated States now exercise full authority except that a strictly limited number of services related to the necessities of the war now in progress remain temporarily in French hands. In the course of the examination of the Far Eastern economic and trade situation, it was noted that the Governments of the Associated States are free to negotiate trade treaties and agreements of all kinds with their neighbors subject only to whatever special arrangements may be agreed between members of the French Union.

It was noted that these states have been recognized by thirty-three foreign governments.

The conversations reaffirmed the common determination of the participants to prosecute the defense of Indochina and their confidence in a free, peaceful and prosperous future for Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam.

Mr. Letourneau was received by the President, Mr. Acheson, and Mr. Foster, as Acting Secretary of Defense. Mr. John Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, acted as Chairman of the U.S. Delegation participating in the conversations.

6. SUPPORT BY NATO OF THE FRENCH UNION DEFENSE EFFORTS IN INDOCHINA: Resolution Adopted by the North Atlantic Council, December 17, 19521

The North Atlantic Council

Recognizes that resistance to direct or indirect aggression in any part of the world is an essential contribution to the common security of the free world;

HAVING BEEN INFORMED at its meeting in Paris on the 16th December of the latest developments in the military and political situation in Indo-China;

Expresses its wholehearted admiration for the valiant and long continued struggle by the French forces and the armies of the Associated States against Communist aggression; and

Acknowledges that the resistance of the free nations in South-East Asia as in Korea is in fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic Community;

And therefore agrees that the campaign waged by the French Union forces in Indo-China deserves continuing support from the NATO governments.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 4.

48-857-65- 3

7. ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES AID FOR FRANCE AND INDOCHINA: Joint Franco-American Communiqué, September 30, 1953 1

1

The forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina have for 8 years been engaged in a bitter srtuggle to prevent the engulfment of Southeast Asia by the forces of international communism. The heroic efforts and sacrifices of these French Union allies in assuring the liberty of the new and independent states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam has earned the admiration and support of the free world. In recognition of the French Union effort the United States Government has in the past furnished aid of various kinds to the Governments of France and the Associated States to assist in bringing the long struggle to an early and victorious conclusion.

The French Government is firmly resolved to carry out in full its declaration of July 3, 1953, by which is announced its intention of perfecting the independence of the three Associated States in Indochina, through negotiations with the Associated States.

The Governments of France and the United States have now agreed that, in support of plans of the French Government for the intensified prosecution of the war against the Viet Minh, the United States will make available to the French Government prior to December 31, 1954 additional financial resources not to exceed $385 million. This aid is in addition to funds already earmarked by the United States for aid to France and the Associated States.

The French Government is determined to make every effort to break up and destroy the regular enemy forces in Indochina. Toward this end the government intends to carry through, in close cooperation with the Cambodian, Laotian, and Vietnamese Governments, the plans for increasing the Associated States forces while increasing temporarily French forces to levels considered necessary to assure the success of existing military plans. The additional United States aid is designed to help make it possible to achieve these objectives with maximum speed and effectiveness.

The increased French effort in Indochina will not entail any basic or permanent alteration of the French Government's plans and programs for its NATO forces.

(On May 7, 1954 Dien Bien Phu fell to Viet Minh Forces after a long siege. This development led France to submit armistice proposals to the Geneva Conference convened the previous month to discuss Korea and "peace in Indochina." This statement sets forth the United States position on the Geneva negotiations.)

*

8. THE THREAT OF DIRECT CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA: Address by the Secretary of State, June 11, 1954 (Excerpt) 2

At the moment, Indochina is the area where international communism most vigorously seeks expansion under the leadership of Ho

1 Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 12, 1953, pp. 486-487.

2 Delivered before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, Department of State Bulletin, June 28, 1954, pp.971-973.

Chi-Minh. Last year President Eisenhower, in his great "Chance for Peace" address, said that "aggression in Korea and Southeast Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met by united action." But the French were then opposed to what they called "internationalizing" the war. They preferred to treat it as a civil war of rebellion. However, on July 3, 1953, the French Government made a public declaration of independence for the three Associated States, and in September it adopted the so-called Navarre plan, which contemplated a rapid buildup of national native forces. The United States then agreed to underwrite the costs of this plan.

But last winter the fighting was intensified and the long strain began to tell in terms of the attitude of the French people toward a war then in its eighth year. Last March, after the siege of DienBien-Phu had begun, I renewed President Eisenhower's proposal that we seek conditions which would permit a united defense for the area. I went to Europe on this mission, and it seemed that there was agreement on our proposal. But when we moved to translate that proposal into reality, some of the parties held back because they had concluded that any steps to create a united defense should await the results of the Geneva Conference.

Meanwhile, the burdens of a collective defense in Indochina have mounted. The Communists have practiced dilatory negotiating at Geneva, while intensifying their fighting in Indochina. The French and national forces feel the strain of mounting enemy power on their front and of political uncertainty at their rear. I told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week that the situation is grave but by no means hopeless. The future depends largely on decisions awaited at Paris, London, and Geneva.

The situation in Indochina is not that of open military aggression by the Chinese Communist regime. Thus, in Indochina, the problem is one of restoring tranquillity in an area where disturbances are fomented from Communist China, but where there is no open invasion. by Communist China. This task of pacification, in our opinion, cannot be successfully met merely by unilateral armed intervention. Some other conditions need to be established. Throughout these Indochina developments, the United States has held to a stable and consistent course and has made clear the conditions which, in its opinion, might justify intervention. These conditions were and are (1) an invitation from the present lawful authorities; (2) clear assurance of complete independence to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam; (3) evidence of concern by the United Nations; (4) a joining in the collective effort of some of the other nations of the area; and (5) assurance that France will not itself withdraw from the battle until it is won.

Only if these conditions were realized could the President and the Congress be justified in asking the American people to make the sacrifices incident to committing our Nation, with others, to using force to help to restore peace in the area.

Another problem might, however, arise. If the Chinese Communist regime were to show in Indochina or elsewhere that it is determined to pursue the path of overt military aggression, then the situation would be different and another issue would emerge. That contingency has already been referred to publicly by the President and myself. The President, in his April 16, 1953, address, and I myself, in an ad