The enthusiastic welcome he received in Viet-Nam reflected a deep sense of common cause in the fight for freedom in Southeast Asia and around the world.

This recognition of mutual objectives resulted in concrete understandings between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States. It is clear to the Government and the people of Viet-Nam and to the United States that the independence and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam are being brutally and systematically violated by Communist agents and forces from the north.

It is also clear to both Governments that action must be strengthened and accelerated to protect the legitimate rights and aspirations of the people of free Viet-Nam to choose their own way of life.

The two Governments agreed that this is the basic principle upon which their understandings rest.

The United States, for its part, is conscious of the determination, energy and sacrifices which the Vietnamese people, under the dedicated leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, have brought to the defense of freedom in their land.

The United States is also conscious of its responsibility and duty, in its own self-interest as well as in the interest of other free peoples, to assist a brave country in the defense of its liberties against unprovoked subversion and Communist terror. It has no other motive than the defense of freedom.

The United States recognizes that the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam, Ngo Dinh Diem, who was recently reelected to office by an overwhelming majority of his countrymen despite bitter Communist opposition, is in the vanguard of those leaders who stand for freedom on the periphery of the Communist empire in Asia.

Free Viet-Nam cannot alone withstand the pressure which this Communist empire is exerting against it. Under these circumstances the need of free Viet-Nam for increased and accelerated emergency assistance and the will and determination of the United States to provide such assistance to those willing to fight for their liberties-it is natural that a large measure of agreement on the means to accomplish the joint purpose was found in high-level conversations between the two Governments.

Both Governments recognize that under the circumstances of guerrilla warfare now existing in free Viet-Nam, it is necessary to give high priority to the restoration of a sense of security to the people of free Viet-Nam. This priority, however, in no way diminishes the necessity, in policies and programs of both Governments, to pursue vigorously appropriate measures in other fields to achieve a prosperous and happy society.

The following measures, agreed in principle and subject to prompt finalization and implementation, represent an increase and acceleration of United States assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam. These may be followed by more far-reaching measures if the situation, in the opinion of both Governments, warrants.

First, it was agreed by the two Governments to extend and build upon existing programs of military and economic aid and to infuse into their joint actions a high sense of urgency and dedication.

Second, it was agreed that regular armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam should be increased, and that the United States would extend

its military assistance programs to include support for an additional number of regular Vietnamese armed forces.

Third, it was agreed that the United States would provide military assistance program support for the entire Vietnamese civil guard force. Fourth, it was agreed that the two Governments should collaborate in the use of military specialists to assist and work with Vietnamese armed forces in health, welfare and public works activities in the villages of free Viet-Nam.

Fifth, it was agreed that the assistance of other free governments to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in its trouble against Communist guerrilla forces would be welcome.

Sixth, it was agreed that, to achieve the best possible use of available resources, the Vietnamese and the United States, in prosecution of their joint effort against Communist attacks in Viet-Nam, a group of highly qualified economic and fiscal experts would meet in Viet-Nam to work out a financial plan on which joint efforts should be based.

Seventh, it was agreed that the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam would discuss new economic and social measures to be undertaken in rural areas, to accompany the anti-guerrilla effort, in order that the people of Viet-Nam should benefit promptly from the restoration of law and order in their villages and provinces.

Eighth, it was agreed that, in addition to measures to deal with the immediate Viet-Nam guerrilla problem, the two Governments would work together toward a longer range economic development program, including further progress in the fields of agriculture, health, educations, fisheries, highways, public administration, and industrial development.

These longer range plans and programs would be developed in detail after further consideration and discussion.

Their goal would be a Viet-Nam capable of a self-sustained economic growth.

President Ngo Dinh Diem and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, on behalf of President Kennedy, established a sense of mutual confidence and respect which both believe essential to fulfillment of their objectives.

(In October 1961 President Kennedy sent General Maxwell D. Taylor to Vietnam for consultations and recommendations, which resulted in the decision to bolster military strength of South Vietnam.)

26. SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE,
NOVEMBER 17, 1961 (Excerpt)1

Insofar as Viet-Nam, one of our other principal points of concern involved, I should like to just make a few comments on that. The determined and ruthless campaign of propaganda, infiltration, and subversion by the Communist regime in north Viet-Nam to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam and subjugate its peoples is a threat to the peace. The independence and territorial integrity of that free country is of major and serious concern not only to the people of Viet-Nam and their immediate neighbors but also to all other free nations.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 4, 1961, pp. 920-922.

The accelerated assault in carrying out the orders of the Communist Party of north Viet-Nam to "liberate" the south-overthrow the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam-is of particular concern to the United States. As President Kennedy assured President Diem last October 24th, the United States is determined to help Viet-Nam preserve its independence, protect its people against the Communist assassins, and build a better growth.

In that same letter the President noted that we would be consulting with the Vietnamese Government about what additional measures we might take to assist the Republic of Viet-Nam in its struggle against the Communist aggressors. These consultations to coordinate our activities with those of the Vietnamese Government, to find the most effective means of sustaining the social and economic progress of the people of Viet-Nam and of protecting their liberty, are now under way in Saigon.

In the meantime there has been an acceleration of deliveries under our mutual defense assistance program. It can be expected that in order to help the Government of Viet-Nam meet increased Communist attacks some changes in the type of equipment delivered and in the nature of our training under the military advisory and training program will be required. Perhaps you would appreciate that there are reasons why I cannot go into detail about some of these matters at this time.

Now, I shall try to answer your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to Viet-Nam and the acceleration and the possible changes in our aid there, and so forth, are we asking or receiving any assurances from President Diem as to the steps that he is willing to take to make the effort against the Communists there more efficient?

A. These are questions which are being discussed with him at the present time, and, of course, in a nation of 14 million people, with a substantial army and military establishment there, there is a major job to be done by the peoples and the Government of the country concerned. But the precise relationship between their effort and our effort is now being discussed with them, and I would not-indeed I do not have at the moment reports on those discussions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what can be done about the increasing use of Laos as a Communist base in violation of the Soviet pledges that this would be made a neutral area?

A. This is one of the subjects which have been discussed at Geneva, and certainly if there is to be any substance whatever in the notion of a neutral and independent Laos, then any arrangements for Laos must insure that Laos not itself be used as a route of penetration and infiltration and subversion against south Viet-Nam. This is, in fact, only one of three of the principal routes for the supply of agents, cadres, and arms from the north into south Viet-Nam. The other is across the 17th parallel. Part of it is in difficult and mountainous country where that kind of traffic can occur and can be dealt with only with the most strenuous measures. The third route is by sea. As you know, there are very large numbers of coastal junks and small

vessels plying along there, and we have very specific information that some of this traffic has been utilized for the kind of penetration to which we are now objecting.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when Prime Minister Nehru was here, he said that the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam had been ineffective because of the impediments placed in its way by the south Vietnamese Government. We had beeen under the impression that it was ineffective because of the impediments placed in its way by the north Vietnamese government. That has been repeated 2 days ago in statements from New Delhi. Can you straighten us out, please? A. During a period when people in south Viet-Nam found themselves under pressure and did not feel that they were getting adequate assistance from the ICC, irritations did develop, and I think that it would be only fair to say that the ICC has not had, in some problems of detailed arrangements, facilities, and support, all of the cooperation which it needs, and that situation has now been, I think, largely rectified. But the first task, as we see it, of the ICC is to take up in the most serious terms the letter which was recently filed with the ICC by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam charging large-scale infiltration and subversion by illegal intrusion from the north. These intrusions are not something that are done just secretly. They are a part of the proclaimed policy of the Communist Party of north Viet-Nam. They have spoken about them openly and quite publicly for several months. We believe that these charges are sound, that they are well supported in fact, and that they deserve the immediate and full investigation and report to the world by the ICC.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you stated that what is being done in Viet-Nam is in our view a threat to the peace. Is what we are doing to aid the Government of south Viet-Nam being done within the limitations, and will continue to be, if so, of the Geneva Accords, or are we moving toward denouncing those accords as a breach of the peace under the terms of General Walter Bedell Smith's statement at the time of the 1954 agreements?

A. Well, at this stage, the primary question about the Geneva Accords is not how those accords relate to, say, our military assistance program to south Viet-Nam. They relate to the specific, persistent, substantial, and openly proclaimed violations of those accords by the north Vietnamese.

Now the status of those accords will be determined more by the attitude of the north, which has been, is, and so far as we know continues to be ready to disregard them in their own attacks against the south Vietnamese. The first question is, what does the north do about those accords?

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the complaints laid before the ICO, I think more than 700 specific charges and letters and complaints have been laid before the ICC by south Viet-Nam over the years. During the conversations here with the Prime Minister of India, did we get any kind of assurances that, now that south Viet-Nam apparently is willing to cooperate with the ICC, it will in fact act vigorously to put the Commission into operation there?

A. I would not wish to attribute this specifically to a conversation with Prime Minister Nehru, but we have indications that the ICC does expect to take up these questions, and I believe a new chairman has

been appointed. I think there is some real prospect that they will go vigorously into these questions that have been raised.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have referred to this situation in south VietNam as a threat to the peace. What are the prospects of taking this to the United Nations?

A. I think there is a possibility that this question will come to the United Nations at some stage. I think at the present time we believe that the consultations with other governments in which we are now engaged and our consultations with the Government of south VietNam would be the most immediate steps to be taken up.

(At this news conference Secretary of State Rusk announced the release of a State Department report "A Threat to the Peace," which stated that South Vietnam was threatened by "clear and present danger" of Communist conquest.)

27. SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE,

DECEMBER 8, 1961 (Excerpts)1

The last time we met, I discussed with you the ruthless campaign by which the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam has been trying to conquer South Viet-Nam. I said then that this campaign posed a threat to the independence and territorial integrity of a free country and its people and was a serious threat to the peace. I want to underline that earlier statement.

We are releasing today a report on what is happening in Viet-Nam. It documents the elaborate program of subversion, terror, and armed infiltration carried out under the direction of the authorities in Hanoi.

It points out-with extensive documentation for the world to seethe methods by which North Viet-Nam has introduced its espionage agents, military personnel, weapons, and supplies into the south in recent years. This report shows that this already considerable effort by North Viet-Nam has been accelerated sharply in recent months. Kidnapings, assassinations of public officials, and other forms of terrorism have increased. The number and size of armed engagements have grown. The pace of infiltration from the north, across the demilitarized zone, through Laos, and by sea, has been stepped up. These documents show clearly that the North Vietnamese Communists have repeatedly violated the Geneva Accords. I believe that this report makes it clear that South Viet-Nam needs additional help in defending itself.

The Government of South Viet-Nam realizes this and has welcomed support from the non-Communist world. The United States is now taking steps to help South Viet-Nam develop the military, economic, and social strength needed to preserve its national integrity. It is our hope that other nations will join us in providing assistance to South Viet-Nam until such time as the Communists have halted their acts of violence and terror.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 25, 1961, pp. 1053, 1055, 1958.