But the military effort was and is only one aspect of the struggle. The economic front was equally important, and a smaller but extraordinarily dedicated group of civilian Americans went into the dangerous countryside, unarmed and often unescorted, to help in the creation of the fortified hamlets that soon became, and remain, a key feature of strategy, and to bring to the villages the schools, fertilizer, wells, pigs, and other improvements that meant so much and would serve to show the Government's concern for its people.

The basic strategy adopted in early 1962 was sound and was, indeed, in key respects the same as the strategy that prevailed against communism in Malaya, Greece, and the Philippines. It is a strategy that takes patience and local leadership and that takes learning and experience as well. The Vietnamese and we are still learning and changing today and will go on doing so.

Under the advisory concept, the American strength in South VietNam rose to 12,000 by mid-1962 (eventually to the present 23,000), and with our help the South Vietnamese began to reverse the slow tide of growing Communist gains. By the spring of 1963, things seemed to be on the upswing, not only in the judgment of senior Americans but in that of experienced observers from third countries.

Yet the unhappy tendencies of the Diem government had persisted, despite all the quiet advice we could give in favor of reforms. The stubbornness and inflexibility which had been his great assets in the early days after 1954 had now become serious drawbacks. The Buddhist uprisings of the spring of 1963 brought the political situation to the forefront again. Now, Buddhism as a religion is not nearly as dominant in South Viet-Nam as it is elsewhere in Southeast AsiaThailand, Laos, and Cambodia. The adherents of Buddhism may not be even a majority of South Vietnamese, and there are significant Catholic and other groups as well as large numbers of adherents to older religious beliefs. Nonetheless, Buddhists are the most numerous faith, they are entitled to fair treatment, and they had some case against the Diem government for personal discrimination, though little, according to the findings of a United Nations Commission, for true religious persecution. But these grievances might have been met without serious trouble if they had not been fanned by a small group of leaders who were and are, in fact, politically motivated.

Unfortunately the Diem government refused to compromise or to redress the areas of legitimate grievance and in August sent the army into the pagodas of Saigon and other cities, following up with a drastic campaign of suppression against students and a wide circle of political opponents. As a result, by late September-when I personally accompanied Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara to Saigonit was clear that Diem and his brother Nhu had aroused wide popular opposition and, perhaps most crucial, had alienated almost to the breaking point the key trained elements within the Government structure itself, both civilian and military.

Although Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge continued to urge reforms that might still have saved the government, Diem did not respond, and on November 1, 1963, he was overthrown, he and Nhumost unfortunately-killed, and a new military government installed by force.

No one could then tell whether the new government would be better. Clearly, it had to be military in the first instance, and the first military group, under General [Duong Van] Minh, had considerable popular backing. Yet it was ineffective and tended to throw out the baby with the bath, replacing so many military and provincial officials that the way was open for major Viet Cong gains. Then, in January, General [Nguyen] Khanh took control in a bloodless coup. He showed ability on the military and economic front, but he, in turn, decided to turn over the government to civilian leaders to be selected by consultation among representatives of the key groups-the Buddhists, the Catholics, the military, labor, the religious sects, the various areas including the considerable body of refugees from the north, past political groupings, and so on.

The result was the present government under Prime Minister [Tran Van] Huong, a man of determination and character, dedicated to fairness to all groups. He is wrestling today essentially with the same kind of problems that Diem faced and overcame in 1954, but in the far more difficult internal security crisis brought on by the Viet Cong aggression, which has been slowly extending the areas of Communist control in the countryside and the pace of guerrilla and terrorist activity, even to Saigon itself.

So the political situation today is critical, and its resolution is central to turning the war around and restoring an independent and secure South Viet-Nam. That task must essentially be done by the Vietnamese people, under Vietnamese civilian and military leaders, all under a government that unites the divergent political-interest groups and that gives orders that can be carried out.

I have dwelt at such length on the political history because it is this aspect that is today in the headlines, as it is the greatest concern of our representatives in Saigon and of the Vietnamese leaders themselves, who must find the answer.

And may I pause here, apropos of the headlines, to say that I think the American people are getting the facts. We in Government follow closely what is said in the newspapers and magazines and on TV; part of our job is to see that these media are properly informed and given access to everything except for those few details that are necessarily matters of security in what is, after all, a war situation. I think we are doing our job and that the media are doing theirs. The picture that you, as thoughtful citizens, get is in fact the picture that we have on all essential points. If that picture is complex or not entirely clear, believe me our picture is the same, for that is the nature of the situation.

The real point of the political history in South Viet-Nam is that it should cause us no amazement and no despair. Was it not 7 years between the end of the American Revolution and the making of a lasting Constitution, even for a new nation which had united to fight a war and had centuries of British evolution toward democratic selfgovernment behind it? And how many new nations in the world today have found lasting stability in a decade, especially where there had been little preparation under colonialism, where the national historic tradition was remote, and, above all, where a violent aggressor was striking constantly at the very fabric of government? Take, if you will, one fact alone that in the first 8 months of 1964 the Viet

were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions: 1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

2. The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

3. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.

4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence. The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations—all in direct violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attack on armed forces of the United States.

As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

As to our basic policy, the alternatives to our present course might be, on the one hand, to withdraw or to negotiate on some basis such as what is called "neutralization,' or, on the other hand, for the Vietnamese and ourselves to enlarge the war, bringing pressure to persuade Hanoi, by force, that the game they are playing is not worth it. It is also suggested that the United Nations might be of help. There may emerge possibilities for a U.N. role, but it is not clear that the U.N., which has been unable to carry through commitments such as the Congo, would be able to act effectively to deal with this far more difficult situation in its present form. And this has been the public judgment of the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. U Thant.

As to the basic alternatives, so long as South Viet-Nam is ready to carry on the fight, withdrawal is unthinkable. A negotiation that produced a return to the essentials of the 1954 accords and thus an independent and secure South Viet-Nam would of course be an answer, indeed the answer. But negotiation would hardly be promising that admitted communism to South Viet-Nam, that did not get Hanoi out, or that exposed South Viet-Nam and perhaps other countries of the area to renewed Communist aggression at will, with only nebulous or remote guarantees.

As for enlarging our own actions, we cannot speak surely about the future, for the aggressors themselves share the responsibility for such eventualities. We have shown in the Gulf of Tonkin that we can act, and North Viet-Nam knows it and knows its own weaknesses. But we seek no wider war, and we must not suppose that there are quick or easy answers in this direction.

The root of the problem, to repeat, is in South Viet-Nam. We must persist in our efforts there, with patience rather than petulance, coolness rather than recklessness, and with a continuing ability to separate the real from the merely wished-for.

As a great power, we are now and will continue to find ourselves in situations where we simply do not have easy choices, where there simply are not immediate or ideal solutions available. We cannot then allow ourselves to yield to frustration but must stick to the job, doing all we can and doing it better.

The national interests that have brought us into the Viet-Nam struggle are valid, and they do not become less so just because the going gets rough and the end is not yet in sight. President Johnson said in his state of the Union message:

"Our goal is peace in Southeast Asia. That will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace.

What is at stake is the cause of freedom, and in that cause America will never be found wanting."

55. JOINT U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE RETALIATORY ATTACKS AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM: White House Statement, February 7, 1965 1

1

On February 7, U.S. and South Vietnamese air elements were directed to launch retaliatory attacks against barracks and staging areas in the southern area of North Viet-Nam which intelligence has shown

1 Department of State Bulletin Feb. 22, 1965, pp. 238–239.

to be actively used by Hanoi for training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Viet-Nam.

Results of the attack and further operational details will be announced as soon as they are reported from the field.

Today's action by the U.S. and South Vietnamese Governments was in response to provocations ordered and directed by the Hanoi regime. Commencing at 2 a.m. on Feruary 7th, Saigon time (1 p.m. yesterday, eastern standard time, two South Vietnamese airfields, two U.S. barracks areas, several villages, and one town in South Viet-Nam were subjected to deliberate surprise attacks. Substantial casualties resulted.

Our intelligence has indicated, and this action confirms, that Hanoi has ordered a more aggressive course of action against both South Vietnamese and American installations.

Moreover, these attacks were only made possible by the continuing infiltration of personnel and equipment from North Viet-Nam. This infiltration markedly increased during 1964 and continues to increase.

To meet these attacks the Government of South Viet-Nam and the U.S. Government agreed to appropriate reprisal action against North Vietnamese targets. The President's approval of this action was given after the action was discussed with and recommended by the National Security Council last night [February 6].

Today's joint response was carefully limited to military areas which are supplying men and arms for attacks in South Viet-Nam. As in the case of the North Vietnamese attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin last August, the response is appropriate and fitting.

As the U.S. Government has frequently stated, we seek no wider war. Whether or not this course can be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese aggressors. The key to the situation remains the cessation of infiltration from North Viet-Nam and the clear indication by the Hanoi regime that it is prepared to cease aggression against its neighbors.

56. WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN DEPENDENTS: Statement by President Johnson, February 1, 19651

Following meetings with the National Security Council, I have directed the orderly withdrawal of American dependents from South Viet-Nam.

It has become clear that Hanoi has undertaken a more aggressive course of action against both South Vietnamese and American installations, and against Americans who are in South Viet-Nam assisting the people of that country to defend their freedom. We have no choice. now but to clear the decks and make absolutely clear our continued determination to back South Viet-Nam in its fight to maintain its independence.

In addition to this action, I have ordered the deployment to South Viet-Nam of a Hawk air defense battalion. Other reinforcements, in units and individuals, may follow.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 22, 1965, p. 239.