57. SERIOUS VIETCONG ATTACKS: Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, February 7, 19651

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. In describing certain of the events which have taken place in South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam during the past 24 hours, I'll refer to this map which stands in front of On it we have shown the relative positions of China, Laos, North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Thailand, and the South China Sea.

us.

Approximately 24 hours ago, at 2 a.m. Sunday morning, February 7, Saigon time, the Viet-Nam Communist guerrillas carried out three attacks, one against installations in the Pleiku area, which is in the central part of South Viet-Nam, a second at Tuy Hoa, with an airstrip adjacent to it, an area near the coast, and a third aginst Viet-Nam villages near Nha Trang.

The first attack in the Pleiku area was carried out by a company of Viet Cong using 81-mm. mortars, the mortar fire was directed against the United States military compound at the Second Corps Headquarters of the South Vietnamese military forces, and simultaneously elements of the same company attacked the airstrip at Camp Holloway, at which were located United States helicopter forces on the outskirts of Pleiku.

This latter attack on the airstrip was accompanied by a ground probe during which small-arms fire was used, rifle grenades, demolition charges, and recoilless rifles. Following completion of the attacks a Viet Cong four-tube, 81-mm. mortar position was located outside the perimeter defense of the airstrip. Nearby were containers for 61 mortar rounds. The United States casualties in the Pleiku area were 7 killed, 109 wounded, and, of the 109, 76 of the wounded required evacuation.

În addition 5 United States helicopters were destroyed, 9 to 11 damaged, and 6 United States fixed-wing aircraft were damaged.

The second attack at Tuy Hoa was directed against Vietnamese villages in the area and against the storage tanks for aviation gas for the Vietnamase Air Force stationed at the Chop Chi Airfield. Again, 81-mm. fire was used, the storage tanks of aviation gas were set on fire. There were no United States casualties in that area.

The third attack, as I mentioned earlier, was against a village or series of villages about 15 miles northeast of Nha Trang. The reports of operations in this area are fragmentary, and I can't give you the results other than to say that we believe that there were no United States casualties there. Immediately following, the United States representatives in Saigon met with representatives of the South Vietnamese Government. They jointly agreed that joint retaliatory action was required. The President's approval of this action was given after the action was discussed with and recommended by the National Security Council at a meeting held between 7:45 p.m. and 9 p.m. last night.

As a result of this action, elements of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces were directed to launch joint retaliatory attacks against barracks and staging areas in the southern portion of North Viet-Nam.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 22, 1965, p. 239.

On this map you see Hanoi, the capital of North Viet-Nam, Saigon, the capital of South Viet-Nam, the line of demarcation between the two countries at the 17th parallel. The targets agreed upon for the joint retaliatory attacks were barracks areas and staging areas in the southern portion of North Viet-Nam. As I say, elements of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces were directed to launch joint retaliatory attacks against those targets. These are the areas which Hanoi has used as bases for the infiltration of men and equipment out of the southern portion of North Viet-Nam across the border into Laos, down the corridor through Laos, and into South Viet-Nam. The infiltration routes are picturized on the map. One comes into the Pleiku area in the central part of Viet-Nam, and others come further south.

U.S. aircraft took off from three U.S. carriers that were steaming in the South China Sea. These carriers were steaming south of the 17th parallel, which is the line of demarcation between North and South Viet-nam, about 100 miles off the coast of South Viet-nam. The three carriers were the U.S.S. Ranger, U.S.S. Hancock, and U.S.S. Coral Sea.

Of the aircraft which took off from the carriers, 49 struck the Dong Hoi barracks and staging area in the southern part of North VietNam. Certain other U.S. aircraft and certain South Vietnamese aircraft aborted because of adverse weather conditions and did not proceed to their target areas. Photo reconnaissance of the results of the strike is not yet available, but the combat crews upon their return to the carriers reported seeing heavy fires, heavy smoke, and substantial damage to military targets in the target area. One U.S. aircraft, an A-4 from the carrier Coral Sea, was lost. The pilot was seen to eject into the sea. Air-sea rescue operations are underway. All other aircraft returned safely to their bases.

58. COMPLAINT TO UNITED NATIONS: U.S. Letter to President of Security Council, February 7, 19651

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to inform you of the following acts which have further disturbed the peace in Viet-Nam.

In the early morning of February 7th, Vietnamese time, Viet Cong forces carried out coordinated attacks on South Vietnamese air bases in Pleiku and Tuy Hoa, on two barracks installations in the Pleiku area, and on a number of villages in the area of Tuy Hoa and Nha Trang. Numerous casualties were inflicted, and at least one village was burned.

These attacks by the Viet Cong, which operates under the military orders of North Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi, were a concerted and politically timed effort to sharpen and intensify the aggression at a moment designed for broader effect in the field of international politics, and to test the will of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States to resist that aggression.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 22, 1965, pp. 240–241.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the Government of the United States immediately consulted and agreed that it was necessary to take prompt defensive action. Accordingly, on the afternoon of February 7th, Vietnamese time, United States and South Vietnamese air elements were directed to take joint action against certain military facilities in the southern area of North Viet-Nam. An attack was carried through against Dong Hoi, which is a military installation and one of the major staging areas for the infiltration of armed cadres of North Vietnamese troops into South Viet-Nam in violation of international law and of the Geneva Accords of 1954.

The Viet Cong attacks of February 7th related directly to the central problem in Viet-Nam. That central problem is not one of a struggle by one element of the population in South Viet-Nam against the Government. There is, rather, a pattern of military operations directed, staffed, and supplied in crucial respects from outside the country. Up to 34,000 armed and trained soldiers have infiltrated into South Viet-Nam from the north since 1959. In addition, key items of equipment, such as mortars of the type employed in the attacks of February 7th, have come from North Viet-Nam. During 1964, the infiltration of men and equipment has increased sharply, and virtually all of those now coming in are natives of North Viet-Nam.

Infiltration in such numbers can hardly be labeled "indirect aggression"-though that form of aggression is illegal too. What we are witnessing in Viet-Nam today is a sustained attack for more than six years across a frontier set by international agreement.

Members of the Security Council will recall that we discussed in the Council, in August 1964, aggression by the Hanoi regime against naval units of the United States in the Gulf of Tonkin. At that time we described these attacks as part of a pattern which includes the infiltration of armed personnel to make war against the legitimate government of South Viet-Nam, the arming of terrorist gangs in South VietNam, the assassination of local officials as an instrument of policy, the continued fighting in Laos in violation of the Geneva agreements,a pattern, in short, of deliberate systematic and flagrant violations of international agreements by the regime in Hanoi which signed them and which by all tenets of decency, law, and civilized practice, is bound by their provisions.

The Republic of Viet-Nam, and at its request the Government of the United States and other governments, are resisting this systematic and continuing aggression. Since reinforcement of the Viet Cong by infiltrators from North Viet-Nam is essential to this continuing aggression, counter-measures to arrest such reinforcement from the outside are a justified measure of self-defense.

Mr. President, my Government is reporting the measures which we have taken in accordance with our public commitment to assist the Republic of Viet-Nam against aggression from the North.

We deeply regret that the Hanoi regime, in its statement of August 8, 1964, which was circulated in Security Council Document S/5888, explicitly denied the right of the Security Council to examine this problem. The disrespect of the Hanoi regime for the United Nations adds to the concern which any United Nations member state must feel about Hanoi's violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Nevertheless I would remind you, and through you other members of the Security Council and of the United Nations, that our mission in Southeast Asia is peace and that our purpose is to ensure respect for the peace settlement to which all concerned are committed.

We therefore reserve the right to bring this matter to the Security Council if the situation warrants it.

In a statement issued this morning on behalf of President Johnson, the United States Government once again emphasized that "we seek no wider war. Whether or not this course can be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese aggressors. The key to the situation remains the cessation of infiltration from North Viet-Nam and the clear indication by the Hanoi regime that it is prepared to cease aggression against its neighbors."

Our objective is a peaceful settlement. This would require both the self-restraint of the regime to the north and the presence of effective international peacekeeping machinery to make sure that promises are kept.

This is our purpose. But we will not permit the situation to be changed by terror and violence and this is the meaning of our action this weekend.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

59. JOINT U.S.-SOUTH VIET-NAM STATEMENT ON ATTACKS ON NORTH VIET-NAM, SAIGON, FEBRUARY 11, 1965 1

Since February 8, there have been continued acts of aggression by the Communist Viet Cong under the direction and with the support of the Hanoi regime against the Vietnamese people and installations in South Viet-Nam and against their American advisers. For example, these aggressive acts have included the following:

The mining of 13 bridges and 7 separate acts of sabotage against the railroads resulting in death and injury to 18 Vietnamese civilians and 2 escort soldiers in addition to the material damage;

Attacks on hamlets and convoys resulting in death or injury to many Vietnamese civilians and the kidnaping of others in addition to substantial military casualties;

The vicious attack and related actions involving the American enlisted men's quarters at Qui Nhon by Viet Cong terrorist demolition teams resulting in 12 known Vietnamese and American dead, and including more than 40 others wounded and missing. Many of the latter must be supposed dead.

In response to these continued attacks by the Communists, South Vietnamese and American air elements today carried out air operations against selected military installations in the southern part of North Viet-Nam which have been used by the Hanoi regime for training and support of the Viet Cong personnel carrying out these acts.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 1, 1965, p. 291.

60. U.S. AND SOUTH VIET-NAM HIT NORTH VIETNAMESE TARGETS: White House Statement, February 11, 1965 1

1

On February 11, U.S. air elements joined with the South Vietnamese Air Force in attacks against military facilities in North Viet-Nam used by Hanoi for the training and infiltration of Viet Cong personnel into South Viet-Nam.

These actions by the South Vietnamese and United States Governments were in response to further direct provocations by the Hanoi regime.

Since February 8, a large number of South Vietnamese and U.S. personnel have been killed in an increased number of Viet Cong ambushes and attacks. A district town in Phuoc Long Province has been overrun, resulting in further Vietnamese and U.S. casualties. In Qui Nhon, Viet Cong terrorists in attack on an American military billet murdered Americans and Vietnamese. In addition, there have been a number of mining and other attacks on the railway in South VietNam as well as assassinations and ambushes involving South Vietnamese civil and military officials.

The United States Government has been in consultation with the Government of South Viet-Nam on this continuation of aggressions and outrages. While maintaining their desire to avoid spreading the conflict, the two Governments felt impelled to take the action described above.

61. U.S.

AND VIET-NAM INITIATE COMBINED AIRSTRIKES: U.S. Embassy Statement, February 24, 1965 2

At the request of the Government of Viet-Nam, U.S. Air Force F-100 and B-57 aircraft from Bien Hoa and Da Nang participated in a combined airstrike west of An Khe in Binh Dinh Province on the afternoon of February 24. This strike was launched in order to assist in an attack against large Viet Cong forces in the mountain pass between An Khe and Pleiku and to assist in the extrication of an isolated unit under heavy attack.

U.S. jet aircraft have participated in similar combined operations on a number of occasions during the past week. Use of American aircraft stationed in Viet-Nam to reinforce the capability of the Vietnamese Air Force is in keeping with the announced U.S. policy of providing maximum assistance to the Government of South Viet-Nam in its effort to repel the Communist aggression directed and supported by the Hanoi regime.

62. SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Secretary Rusk's News Conference of February 25, 1965 3

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I should like to take a few moments of your time to try to draw together in the simplest and most fundamental way our attitude toward the situation in Southeast Asia.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 1, 1965, p. 290.

2 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 15, 1965, pp. 371-382. 3 Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 15, 1965, pp. 362–371.