internationally agreed demarcation line of 1954 between North and South Viet-Nam, and across international frontiers between Viet-Nam and Laos.

III. INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE UN CHARTER

As has been seen, North Viet-Nam is engaged in a continuing armed aggression against South Viet-Nam in violation of international agreements and international law.

This being the case, what are the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States entitled to do under international law by way of response?

Under international law, the victim of armed aggression is obviously permitted to defend itself and to organize a collective self-defense effort in which others who are willing may join. This right is recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Article 51 states that

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by the members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such actions as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

As has been shown above, the whole course of conduct of North VietNam, particularly as it has evolved in recent months, adds up to open armed attack within the meaning of Article 51. Indeed it is more than a single armed attack; it is a continuing program of armed aggression carried on across international frontiers and established demarcation lines. In these circumstances, South Viet-Nam has requested and received assistance from the United States and other nations in a collective defense effort.

Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter is also relevant to the VietNam situation. Article 2, paragraph 4, provides that

All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

In the first place, it is plain that the use of force against territorial integrity and political independence has been initiated by North VietNam and not by anyone else. Secondly, paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter does not place an absolute prohibition on the use of force. It permits the use of force in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Moreover, the Charter itself specifically provides for the use of force in certain circumstances-action through the United Nations itself, action through regional arrangements, and action in self-defense. The actions of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam, being defensive in character and designed to resist armed aggression, are wholly consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter and specifically with Article 2, paragraph 4.

It was as a measure of self-defense under Article 51 that the United States responded in August 1964 to the North Vietnamese attack on

our vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin. Those measures were immediately reported to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51. The Security Council did not see fit to take any action to maintain or restore international peace and security in the area. Indeed, North Viet-Nam refused to participate in the deliberations of the Security Council and explicitly denied the right of the Council to examine this question.

The attacks against South Viet-Nam have mounted in intensity since August. In these circumstances, it has been mutually agreed between the Government of South Viet-Nam and the United States Government that further means of providing for the collective defense of South Viet-Nam are required. Prompt defensive action has been decided upon, and airstrikes have been made against military installations and facilities in North Viet-Nam which support the aggression against the South. The actions taken constitute a limited and measured response, fitted to the situation that called for it. Again, these measures have been reported to the Security Council in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. As yet, the Council has taken no action to maintain an effective peace in the area. Until the regime in Hanoi decides to cease its aggressive intervention in South Viet-Nam, or until effective steps are taken to maintain international peace and security in the area, the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam have every right to continue their individual and collective self-defense against the Communist armed aggression coming from North Viet-Nam.

IV-THE GENEVA ACCORDS

It has been demonstrated that the North Vietnamese have repeatedly violated the 1954 Geneva Accords in a most serious and flagrant manner. In so doing, of course, North Viet-Nam is ignoring an international Agreement which it signed and by which is is bound. In addition, by the continued presence in neighboring Laos of North Vietnamese forces and their use of Laotian territory for infiltration into South Viet-Nam, North Viet-Nam is violating solemn commitments which it undertook in the 1962 Geneva Agreements to refrain from such activities.

In these circumstances, international law recognizes the principle that a material breach of a treaty by one party entitles other parties at least to withhold compliance with an equivalent, corresponding or related provision until the other party is prepared to observe its obligations.

The actions of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States are fully consistent with this principle. North Vietnamese violations of the Geneva Agreements have created an immediate danger to the continued independence and integrity of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The response of South Viet-Nam and the United States is designed to meet this threat created by North Viet-Nam's disregard of the Accords. The extensive North Vietnamese violations certainly justify South Viet-Nam at least to withhold compliance with those provisions of the Accords which limit its ability to protect its very existence. Both South Viet-Nam and the United States have made clear that the actions which they have taken will no longer be necessary if North Viet-Nam would comply with the Accords.

67. PRESIDENT REITERATES U.S. POLICY ON VIET-NAM: Statement by the President, March 25, 19651

1. It is important for us all to keep a cool and clear view of the situation in Viet-Nam.

2. The central cause of the danger there is aggression by Communists against a brave and independent people. There are other difficulties in Viet-Nam, of course, but if that aggression is stopped, the people and Government of South Viet-Nam will be free to settle their own future, and the need for supporting American military action there will end.

3. The people who are suffering from this Communist aggression are Vietnamese. This is no struggle of white men against Asians. It is aggression by Communist totalitarians against their independent neighbors. The main burden of resistance has fallen on the people and soldiers of South Viet-Nam. We Americans have lost hundreds of our own men there, and we mourn them. But the free Vietnamese have lost tens of thousands, and the aggressors and their dupes have lost still more. These are the cruel costs of the conspiracy directed from the North. This is what has to be stopped.

4. The United States still seeks no wider war. We threaten no regime and covet no territory. We have worked and will continue to work for a reduction of tensions on the great stage of the world. But the aggression from the North must be stopped. That is the road to peace in Southeast Asia.

5. The United States looks forward to the day when the people and governments of all Southeast Asia may be free from terror, subversion, and assassination when they will need not military support and assistance against aggression but only economic and social cooperation for progress in peace. Even now, in Viet-Nam and elsewhere, there are major programs of development which have the cooperation and support of the United States. Wider and bolder programs can be expected in the future from Asian leaders and Asian councils—and in such programs we would want to help. This is the proper business of our future cooperation.

6. The United States will never be second in seeking a settlement in Viet-Nam that is based on an end of Communist aggression. As I have said in every part of the Union, I am ready to go anywhere at any time and meet with anyone whenever there is promise of progress toward an honorable peace. We have said many times-to all who are interested in our principles for honorable negotiation-that we seek no more than a return to the essentials of the agreements of 1954-a reliable arrangement to guarantee the independence and security of all in Southeast Asia. At present the Communist aggressors have given no sign of any willingness to move in this direction, but as they recognize the costs of their present course, and their own true interest in peace, there may come a change-if we all remain united.

Meanwhile, as I said last year and again last week, "It is and it will remain the policy of the United States to furnish assistance to support South Viet-Nam for as long as is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control." The military actions of the United States will be such, and only such, as serve that purpose-at

1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 12, 1965, pp. 527-528.

the lowest possible cost in human life to our allies, to our own men, and to our adversaries too.

68. USE OF TEAR GAS IN VIET-NAM: Statement Made by Secretary Rusk, March 24, 1965 1

1

Some of you have asked me for some comment as to the policy aspects of the use in Viet-Nam of gases of the tear-gas family, back in December and January. And I am very glad to respond to those questions. The shadow of gas warfare has been raised in connection with these incidents. That is not involved. We are not embarking upon gas warfare in Viet-Nam. There has been no policy decision to engage in gas warfare in Viet-Nam. We are not talking about agents or weapons that are associated with gas warfare in the military arsenals of many countries. We are not talking about gas that is prohibited by the Geneva convention of 1925 or any other understandings about the use of gas.

Now, we can understand the concern around the world and in this country about the specter of gas warfare. These memories go back to World War I, when tens of thousands were killed or maimed by what might be called "military gases."

This is not involved here. We are talking about a gas which has been commonly adopted by the police forces of the world as riotcontrol agents-gases that are available commercially and have been used on many occasions, some in this country, and on many occasions in other countries.

Now, why is tear gas a part of the equipment of police forces? It is because police forces would like to be able to use the minimum force that is required for the maintenance of law and order. It is a minimum instrument. And my information is that certain situations arose in South Viet-Nam where this problem presented itself.

On one occasion, for example, the Viet Cong had seized a village, was holding the villagers in hostage, and was firing through these villagers at mixed crowds outside the village. The decision was made to employ tear gas to try to deal with that situation as a riot-control type of problem in order to avoid the problem of whether to use artillery or aerial bombs that would inflict great damage upon innocent people.

There is no question here about gas warfare and gas in contravention of established conventions.

Now, it may be that there was a failure in full explanation, in briefing or in reporting, from Saigon on this matter. The initial reports tended to stimulate problems which were not present; for example, the use of the word "experimentation" suggested that something new and esoteric and weird might be involved here. This is not the case.

What has been involved has been well-known, traditional agents, in the hands of police forces in many parts of the world. And under the circumstances in which this gas was used in Viet-Nam, the desire was to use the minimum force required to deal with the situation to avoid death or injury to innocent people.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 12, 1965, pp 528-532.

Now, that is at the heart of the policy question. We are not engaged in gas warfare. It is against our policy to do so, as it is against the policies of most other governments that I know about.

But we are reminded, when something of this sort comes up, of the nature of the war in South Viet-Nam. It isn't a comfortable and easy war. It isn't a war that is going to be decided by troops on parade with blank cartridges. It is a mean, dirty struggle carried out without regard to ordinary norms of conduct by the Viet Cong.

Those who are concerned about tear gas I would hope would be concerned about the fact that during 1964 over 400 civilian officials were killed and over a thousand were kidnaped in South Viet-Namvillage chiefs, schoolteachers, public-health officers. Among other civilians, 1,300 were killed, over 8,000 were kidnaped, and entire villages have been burned to the ground, and families of those who were in the armed forces were kidnaped and held as hostages.

There is nothing more urgent, from the point of view of the United States, than that peace be restored to that country as quickly as possible. And peace can be restored if Hanoi would stop infiltrating militarily trained personnel into South Viet-Nam, stop the sending of arms into South Viet-Nam, and stop directing these operations aimed at taking over South Viet-Nam against the wishes of the people of that country.

Now, these are the essential policy aspects of the problem. We do not expect that gas will be used in ordinary military operations. Police-type weapons were used in riot control in South Viet-Namas in many other countries over the past 20 years-and in situations analogous to riot control, where the Viet Cong, for example, was using civilians as screens for their own operations.

But this does not represent a new departure of policy, the introduction of new weapons, the introduction of any new approach to the very difficult problems in that country.

69. PATTERN FOR PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: Address by President Johnson, Johns Hopkins University, April 17, 1965 1

Last week 17 nations sent their views to some two dozen countries having an interest in Southeast Asia. We are joining those 17 countries and stating our American policy tonight, which we believe will contribute toward peace in this area of the world.

I have come here to review once again with my own people the views of the American Government.

Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change. This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is a principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Viet-Nam. Viet-Nam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is burst

1 Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 26, 1965, pp. 606-610.