A. I think the effects are quite clear, the physical effects are clear, and the obvious effects on the rate of infiltration and the increased effort that these strikes are causing the North Vietnamese are much to our advantage.

Q. How much is our effort currently costing us in South Viet-Nam? A. It is extremely difficult to estimate the cost of this operation, simply because we are dealing with costs that are difficult to allocate. How would you allocate the Pentagon, for example, between all of our other operations, worldwide and those in South Viet-Nam? But making the best allocation we can, it is something on this order:

Economic aid is probably running $300 million a year. I will check the accuracy of this for you a little later. P.L. 480 contributions these are contributions of food and agriculture productsprobably running on the order of $70 million a year. It seems likely that the military assistance program for South Viet-Nam for fiscal 1965, our current fiscal year, will approximate $330 million. And very, very roughly, I would estimate the cost of the U.S. forces operating in the waters of South Viet-Nam and in the air and the cost of our advisory and logistical support, is running on the order of $800 million a year. So that we have a cost approximating a billion and a half dollars at the present time.

I think that is all, gentlemen. Thank you very much.
The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

73. REVIEW OF SITUATION IN VIET-NAM: Statement by the President, April 27, 19651

We are engaged in a crucial struggle in Viet-Nam.

Some may

consider it a small war. But to the men who give their lives, it is the last war. And the stakes are huge.

Independent South Viet-Nam has been attacked by North VietNam. The object of that attack is conquest.

Defeat in South Viet-Nam would be to deliver a friendly nation to terror and repression. It would encourage and spur on those who seek to conquer all free nations within their reach. Our own welfare and our own freedom would be in danger.

This is the clearest lesson of our time. From Munich until today we have learned that to yield to aggression brings only greater threats and more destructive war. To stand firm is the only guarantee of lasting peace.

At every step of the way we have used our great power with the utmost restraint. We have made every effort to find a peaceful solution. We have done this in the face of the most outrageous and brutal provocation against Vietnamese and Americans alike.

Through the first 7 months of 1964, both Vietnamese and Americans were the targets of constant acts of terror. Bombs exploded in helpless villages, in downtown movie theaters, even at a sports field. Soldiers and civilians, men and women, were murdered and crippled.

1 Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1965, pp. 748-749.

Yet we took no action against the source of this brutality-North Viet-Nam.

When our destroyers were attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin, we replied with a single raid. The punishment was limited to the dead. For the next 6 months we took no action against North Viet-Nam. We warned of danger; we hoped for caution in others.

The answer was attack, and explosions, and indiscriminate murder. It soon became clear that our restraint was viewed as weakness. Our desire to limit conflict was viewed as a prelude to surrender. We could no longer stand by while attack mounted, and while the bases of the attackers were immune from reply.

And so we began to strike back.

But we have not changed our essential purpose. That purpose is peaceful settlement. That purpose is to resist aggression. That purpose is to avoid wider war.

I say again that I will talk to any government, anywhere, and without any conditions; if any doubt our sincerity, let them test it.

Each time we have met with silence, slander, or the sound of guns. But just as we will not flag in battle, we will not weary in the search for peace.

I reaffirm my offer of unconditional discussions. We will discuss any subject, and any point of view, with any government concerned.

This offer may be rejected, as it has been in the past. But it will remain open, waiting for the day when it becomes clear to all that armed attack will not yield domination over others. And I will continue along the course we have set: firmness with moderation, readiness for peace with refusal to retreat.

For this is the same battle which we have fought for a generation. Wherever we have stood firm, aggression has been halted, peace restored, and liberty maintained."

This was true under President Truman, President Eisenhower, and President Kennedy. And it will be true again in Southeast Asia.

74. ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS TO MEET MOUNTING MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN VIETNAM: Message From the President of the United States, May 4, 19651

To the Congress of the United States:

I ask the Congress to appropriate at the earliest possible moment an additional $700 million to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam.

This is not a routine appropriation. For each Member of Congress who supports this request is also voting to persist in our effort to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam. Each is saying that the Congress and the President stand united before the world in joint determination that the independence of South Vietnam shall be preserved and Communist attack will not succeed.

In fiscal year 1965 we will spend about $1.5 billion to fulfill our commitments in southeast Asia. However, the pace of our activity is steadily rising. In December 1961, we had 3,164 men in South Viet

1 H. Doc. 157, 89th Cong., 1st sess.

nam. By the end of last week the number of our Armed Forces there had increased to over 35,000. At the request of the Government of South Vietnam in March, we sent Marines to secure the key Damang/Phu Bai area; 2 days ago, we sent the 173d Airborne Brigade to the important Bien Hoa/Vung Tau area. More than 400 Americans have given their lives in Vietnam.

In the past 2 years, our helicopter activity in South Vietnam has tripled from 30,000 flying hours in the first quarter of 1963 to 90,000 flying hours in the first quarter of this year.

In February we flew 160 strike sorties against military targets in North Vietnam. In April, we flew over 1,500 strike sorties against such targets.

Prior to mid-February we flew no strike sorties inside South Vietnam. In March and April, we flew more than 3,200 sorties against military targets in hostile areas inside the country.

Just 2 days ago, we dispatched Gen. C. L. Milburn, Jr., Deputy Surgeon General of the Army, to assist U.S. representatives in Vietnam in formulating an expanded program of medical assistance for the people of South Vietnam. We are contemplating the expansion of existing programs under which mobile medical teams travel throughout the countryside providing on-the-spot medical facilities, treatment, and training in rural areas.

The additional funds I am requesting are needed to continue to provide our forces with the best and most modern supplies and equipment. They are needed to keep an abundant inventory of ammunition and other expendables. They are needed to build facilities to house and protect our men and supplies.

The entire $700 million is for this fiscal year.

The Secretary of Defense will today support this request before the appropriate congressional committees.

Nor can I guarantee this will be the last request. If our need expands I will turn again to the Congress. For we will do whatever must be done to insure the safety of South Vietnam from aggression. This is the firm and irrevocable commitment of our people and Nation.

I have reviewed the situation in Vietnam many times with the Congress, the American people and the world. South Vietnam has been attacked by North Vietnam. It has asked our help. We are giving that help because our commitments, our principles, and our national interest demand it.

This is not the same kind of aggression with which the world has been long familiar. Instead of the sweep of invading armies, there is the steady, deadly stream of men and supplies. Instead of open battle between major opposing forces, there is murder in the night, assassination, and terror. Instead of dramatic confrontation and sharp division between nationals of different lands, some citizens of South Vietnam have been recruited in the effort to conquer their own country. All of this shrouds battle in confusion. But this is the face of war in the 1960's. This is the "war of liberation." Kept from direct attack by American power, unable to win a free election in any country, those who seek to expand communism by force now use subversion and terror. In this effort they often enlist nationals of the countries they wish to conquer. But it is not civil war. It is sustained by power and resources from without. The very object of this tactic is

to create the appearance of an internal revolt and to mask aggression. In this way, they hope to avoid confrontation with American resolution.

But we will not be fooled or deceived, in Vietnam or any place in the world where we have a commitment. This kind of war is war against the independence of nations. And we will meet it, as we have met other shifting dangers for more than a generation.

Our commitment to South Vietnam is nourished by a quarter century of history. It rests on solemn treaties, the demands of principle, and the necessities of American security.

A quarter century ago it became apparent that the United States. stood between those who wished to dominate an entire continent and the peoples they sought to conquer.

It was our determined purpose to help protect the independence of the Asian peoples.

The consequence of our determination was a vast war which took the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans. Surely this generation will not lightly yield to new aggressors what the last generation paid for in blood and towering sacrifice.

When the war was over, we supported the effort of Asian peoples to win their freedom from colonial rule. In the Philippines, Korea, Indonesia, and elsewhere we were on the side of national independence. For this was also consistent with our belief in the right of all people to shape their own destinies.

That principle soon received another test in the fire of war. And we fought in Korea, so that South Korea might remain free.

Now, in Vietnam, we pursue the same principle which has infused American action in the Far East for a quarter of a century.

There are those who ask why this responsibility should be ours. The answer is simple. There is no one else who can do the job. Our power is essential, in the final test, if the nations of Asia are to be secure from expanding communism. Thus, when India was attacked, it looked to us for help, and we gave it gladly. We believe that Asia should be directed by Asians. But that means each Asian people must have the right to find its own way, not that one group or nation should overrun all the others.

Make no mistake about it. The aim in Vietnam is not simply the conquest of the South, tragic as that would be. It is to show that American commitment is worthless. Once that is done, the gates are down and the road is open to expansion and endless conquest. That is why Communist China opposes discussions, even though such discussions are clearly in the interest of North Vietnam.

Moreover, we are directly committed to the defense of South Vietnam. In 1954 we signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. That treaty committed us to act to meet aggression against South Vietnam. The U.S. Senate ratified that treaty and that obligation by a vote of 82 to 1.

Less than a year ago the Congress, by an almost unanimous vote, said that the United States was ready to take all necessary steps to meet its obligations under that treaty.

That resolution of the Congress expressed support for the policies of the administration to help the people of South Vietnam against attack—a policy established by two previous Presidents.

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Thus we cannot, and will not, withdraw or be defeated. The stakes are too high, the commitment too deep, the lessons of history too plain. At every turning point in the last 30 years, there have been those who opposed a firm stand against aggression. They have always been wrong. And when we heeded their cries, when we gave in, the consequence has been more bloodshed and wider war.

We will not repeat that mistake. Nor will we heed those who urge us to use our great power in a reckless or casual manner. We have no desire to expand the conflict. We will do what must be done. And we will do only what must be done.

For, in the long run, there can be no military solution to the problems of Vietnam. We must find the path to peaceful settlement. Time and time again we have worked to open that path. We are still ready to talk, without conditions, to any government. We will go anywhere, discuss any subject, listen to any point of view in the interests of a peaceful solution.

I also deeply regret the necessity of bombing North Vietnam.

But we began those bombings only when patience had been transformed from a virtue into a blunder-the mistaken judgment of the attackers. Time and time again men, women, and children-Americans and Vietnamese were bombed in their villages and homes while we did not reply.

There was the November 1 attack on the Bien Hoa airfield. There was the Christmas Eve bombing of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon. There was the February 7 attack on the Pleiku base. In these attacks 15 Americans were killed and 245 were injured. And they are only a few examples of a steady campaign of terror and attack.

We then decided we could no longer stand by and see men and women murdered and crippled while the bases of the aggressors were immune from reply.

But we have no desire to destroy human life. Our attacks have all been aimed at strictly military targets not hotels and movie theaters and embassy buildings.

We destroy bridges, so it is harder to convey the instruments of war from north to south. We destroy radar stations to keep our planes from being shot down. We destroy military depots for the infiltration of men and arms to the south. We patrol routes of communications to halt the invaders. We destroy ammunition dumps to prevent the use of explosives against our men and our allies.

Who among us can feel confident that we should allow our soldiers to be killed, while the aggressor sits smiling and secure in his sanctuary, protected by a border which he has violated a thousand times. I do not believe that is the view of the American people or of the Congress.

However, the bombing is not an end in itself. Its purpose is to bring us closer to the day of peace. And whenever it will serve the interests of peace to do so, we will end it.

And let us also remember, when we began the bombings there was little talk of negotiations. There were few worldwide cries for peace. Some who now speak most loudly were quietly content to permit Americans and Vietnamese to die and suffer at the hands of terror without protest. Our firmness may well have already brought us closer to peace.

Our conclusions are plain.