CHAP. VIII. 1792. garrison of Mayence, was reduced to 15,000 men, seemed more intent upon pillaging the palaces which fell in his way, and establishing Jacobin clubs in Frankfort and Mayence, than on prosecuting the military movements of the campaign. Mean while, the Prussians, observing the inactivity of the army of Kellerman, secretly drew their forces round Custine's corps, in the hope that, unsupported as it was, and far in advance, it might be made prisoners before any effectual succour could be detached to its support. The design, owing to the supineness of the commander of the French forces, had very nearly succeeded. For long Custine disregarded the Prussian corps, which were gradually drawing round him, and was only awakened from his dream of security upon finding his sole remaining line of retreat threatened Nov. 9. by the enemy. He then detached General Houchard Nov. 13. with three thousand men, who had an unsuccessful Jom. ii. action with the Prussians near Limbourg; but short- 280. St ly after, the arrival of twelve thousand men from the Cyr, i. 9army of the Upper Rhine put him in a condition to iii. 108. resume offensive operations.' 1 275, 278, 12. Toul. French re cross the Mean while the King of Prussia, finding himself at the head of a noble force of fifty thousand Dec. 2. men, now in some measure recovered from their disasters, resolved to anticipate the enemy, and Rhine. drive them from the right bank of the Rhine, in order to give his troops secure cantonments for the winter. With this view he put his army in motion, and directing the bulk of his forces against Custine's right flank, obliged him to retire to an intrenched camp behind the Nidda, leaving a garrison of 2000 men in Frankfort in a most precarious situation. The King immediately attempted a coup de main against that city, which completely succeeded, CHAP. VIII. 1792. J Jom. ii. 282, 292. Toul. iii. 116, 117. St Cyr, 11, 12, 16. Hard. ii. 77, 93. ↑ Jom. ii. 192. the whole garrison, with the exception of 200 men, being either killed or made prisoners. Custine, upon this disaster, after making a feeble attempt to defend the course of the Nidda, repassed the Rhine, and cantoned his troops between Bingen and Frankendal, leaving a garrison of ten thousand men to defend the important fortress of Mayence. On their side, the Allies also put their troops into winter quarters, of which they stood so much in need, the line of their cantonments extending through Frankfort and Darmstadt, with an advanced guard to observe that frontier city.1 Thus terminated the campaign of 1792, a period fraught with the most valuable instruction to the statesman and the soldier. Already the desperate and energetic character of the war was made manifest; the contagion of republican principles had gained for France many conquests, but the severity of republican rule had rendered the delusion, in the countries which they had overrun, as short-lived as it was fallacious. In many places their armies had been welcomed, upon their arrival, as deliverers; in none had they been regretted, on their departure, as friends. The campaign, which opened under such untoward auspices, had been marked by the most splendid successes on the part of the Republicans; but it was evident that their conquests had exceeded their strength, and it was remarked that at its close their affairs were declining in every quarter. In the north, the army of Dumourier, which had just completed the conquest of Flanders, had fallen into the most disorderly state; whole battalions had left their colours, and returned home, or spread themselves in bands of robbers over the conquered territory; the horses and equipments were in wretched condition, VIII. 1792. and the whole army, weakened by license and insub- CHAP. ordination, fast tending to decay. The armies of Bournonville and Custine, paralysed by the division and inactivity of their chiefs, were in little better circumstances, and their recent failures had gone far to weaken the energetic spirit which their early successes had produced; while the troops who had overrun Savoy and Nice, a prey to their own dis- 1 Jom. ii. orders, were suffering under the consequences of the plunder and devastation which had inflicted such 230. misery on the conquered districts.1 But it was evident, from the events which had occurred, that the war was to exceed, in magnitude and importance, any which had preceded it, and that consequences, beyond all example momentous, were to follow its continuance. The campaign had only commenced in the beginning of August, and before the close of the year, an invasion, the most formidable which had ever threatened the existence of France, had been baffled, and conquests greater than any achieved by its preceding monarchs obtained. Flanders, the theatre of such obstinate contests in the reign of Louis XIV., had been overrun in little more than a fortnight; the Transalpine dominions of the house of Savoy severed from the Sardinian crown, and the great frontier city of Germany wrested from the empire, almost under the eyes of the Imperial and Royal armies. All this had been accomplished, too, under the greatest possible apparent disadvantages; the French armies had taken the field in a state of complete insubordination; disgrace and discomfiture had attended their first efforts; the kingdom was torn by intestine faction; a large portion of its nobility in the ranks of the invaders; and few of its generals had seen any service, or were in a condition to oppose the experienced tactics of the enemy. Dum. iii. CHAP. VIIL. But to these apparently overwhelming disadvantages, the French had to oppose elements hitherto 1792. unknown in modern warfare, the energy of republican valour, and the vigour of democratic ambition. Experience soon demonstrated that these principles were more powerful than any which had yet been brought into action in human affairs, and that the strength they conferred would be equalled only by the developement of passions as strong, and feelings as universal. The French triumphed as long as they contended with kings and armies; they fell, when their tyranny had excited the indignation, and their invasions roused the patriotism of the people. But it was not immediately that this formidable power arose; and political lessons of the utmost moment, for the future guidance of mankind, may be gathered from the commencement of this memorable war. 1. The first conclusion which presents itself is the absolute necessity, in attacking a country in a state of revolution, of proceeding vigorously in the outset, and not suffering early success to convert democratic energy into military ambition. These two principles are nearly allied; the one rapidly passes into the other; but at first they are totally distinct. After a little success in war, a revolutionary state is the most formidable of all antagonists; before that has been obtained, it generally may, without much difficulty, be vanquished. No armies could be in a worse state than those of France at the commencement of the campaign of 1792, and the reason was, that the license of a Revolution had dissolved the band of discipline; none could be more formidable than they were at Arcola, because success had then turned political fervour into the career of con VIII. 1792. quest. In attacking a revolutionary state, the only CHAP. wise and really economical course is to put forth a powerful force at the outset, and never permit a transient success to elevate the spirits of the people. Bitterly did the Austrian and Prussian Governments regret the niggardly display of their strength at the commencement of the war. They could easily have then put forward a hundred thousand men for the invasion of Champagne, while sixty thousand advanced through Alsace, and as many from the Low Countries. Two military monarchies, wielding a united force of above four hundred thousand men, could assuredly have made such an effort for a single campaign.' What a multitude of evils would such 1 Jom. i. an early exertion have saved; the French Conscription, the campaign of Moscow, the rout of Leipsic, the blood of millions, the treasures of ages! 2. Had the Allies duly improved their advantages at the outset, the Revolution might unquestionably have been vanquished in the first campaign. A little less delay in the advance to the Argonne forest, would have prevented the French from occupying, with their inexperienced force, its broken defiles, and compelled them to yield up the capital, or fight in the plains of Champagne, where the numerous cavalry of the Prussians would have proved irresistible; a little more vigour in pressing on the retreating column from Grandpré to St Ménéhould, would have dispersed the whole defending army, and converted the passion for freedom into that of terror. Fifteen hundred Prussian hussars there routed ten thousand of the best troops of France; the fate of Europe then hung on a thread; had the Duke of Brunswick fallen on the retiring army with 375, 386. |