The Cambridge Companion to WittgensteinHans D. Sluga, David G. Stern Cambridge University Press, 28 ott 1996 - 509 pagine Each volume of this series of companions to major philosophers contains specially commissioned essays by an international team of scholars, together with a substantial bibliography, and will serve as a reference work for students and non-specialists. One aim of the series is to dispel the intimidation such readers often feel when faced with the work of a difficult and challenging thinker. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) is one of the most important, influential, and often-cited philosophers of the twentieth century, yet he remains one of its most elusive and least accessible. The essays in this volume address central themes in Wittgenstein's writings on the philosophy of mind, language, logic, and mathematics. They chart the development of his work and clarify the connections between its different stages. The authors illuminate the character of the whole body of work by keeping a tight focus on some key topics: the style of the philosophy, the conception of grammar contained in it, rule-following, convention, logical necessity, the self, and what Wittgenstein called in a famous phrase, "forms of life." An important final essay offers a fundamental reassessment of the status of the many posthumously published texts. New readers will find this the most convenient and accessible guide to Wittgenstein currently available. Advanced students and specialists will find a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Wittgenstein. |
Sommario
Wittgensteins critique of philosophy | 34 |
Pictures logic and the limits of sense in Wittgensteins Tractatus | 59 |
Fitting versus tracking Wittgenstein on representation | 100 |
Philosophy as grammar | 139 |
A philosophy of mathematics between two camps | 171 |
Necessity and normativity | 198 |
Wittgenstein mathematics and ethics Resisting the attractions of realism | 226 |
Notes and afterthoughts on the opening of Wittgensteins Investigations | 261 |
Whose house is that? Wittgenstein on the self | 320 |
The question of linguistic idealism revisited | 354 |
Forms of life Mapping the rough ground | 383 |
Certainties of a worldpicture The epistemological investigations of On Certainty | 411 |
The availability of Wittgensteins philosophy | 442 |
477 | |
497 | |
Mind meaning and practice | 296 |
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Anscombe argued argument atomic behavior BLBK Cambridge Certainty claim conception connection Cora Diamond describe discussion distinction edition elementary sentences empirical ethics example expression fact false fitting theories Frege G. E. M. Anscombe G. E. Moore G. H. von Wright genstein grammar Hans Sluga holism human idea idealism interpretation judgments kind language language-game linguistic logical Logical Atomism Lovibond Ludwig Wittgenstein meaning mental metaphysics mind moral Nachlass names natural normative notion objects Oxford particular Philosophical Investigations philosophy of mathematics picture possible practice private language argument problem psychological question Quine realism reality reference rejects relation remarks representation role rules Russell Russell's semantic sense signs simple skepticism slab sophical speak stein things thought tion tracking theories Tractatus true truth truth-functions typescripts understanding University Press utterances Witt Wittgen Wittgenstein's later Wittgenstein's philosophy words world-picture writing