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Hence the expressed will of God is not identical with his real will. Some are called effectually: these God intended to save. Some are not so called: these God intended not to save. This monstrous dualistic self-contradiction in God the catholic orthodox Church has constantly condemned and rejected.
Anti-catholic consequences of Augustinianism are: 1. The damnation of unbaptized infants. They are damned in virtue of the imputation of Adam's guilt to all of his descendants. See Shedd, ii, 88. But this damnation is of a mitigated character: "Potest recte dici, parvulos sine baptismo de corpore exeuntes in damnatione omnium mitissima futuros." "Quis dubitaverit parvulos non baptizatos, qui solum habent originale peccatum, nec ullis propriis aggravantur, in damnatione omnium levissima futuros." See Schaff, ii, 836. 2. Another consequence is the damnation of the whole mass of the Gentile world. Even the virtues of a Socrates or a Lucretia are but masked sins, spUndida vitia, and they can only serve to mitigate their damnation—" ut mitius puniantur."
During the lifetime of Augustine the potency of his personality made a profound impression in favor1 of his system. Soon after his death, however, the orthodox consciousness discarded more or less positively the uncatholic notions which he had taught. The predominant drift of catholic theology after Augustine assumed a mediate position between Augustine and Pelagius, sometimes inclining rather toward the one, and then toward the other.
Predestinarian writers are fond of stigmatizing this tendency as semi-Pelagian. It would be equally correct, however, to call it semi-Augustinlan. And neither term can justly be regarded as a stigma. The fact is, the post-Augustinian orthodoxy is simply the catholic synergism which had been catholic from the beginning.
Among those who reasserted the Greek anthropology against Augustine was Cassian, (oi. 440.) Said Cassian: Man's depravity is not an extinction of all desire for the good. Man is conscious of his moral bondage, and he can and should seek after 'salvation—" velle sanari, qnaerere medicum." The seeds of all holiness are sown by God in the souls of all men; but without the help of grace we cannot develop them: "Dubitari non potest, inesse quidem omnia animae naturaliter virtutum semina beneficio Creatoris inserta, sed nisi haec opitulatione Dei fuerint excitata, ad incrementum perfectionis non poterunt pervenire." So taught Cassian. His neglect to refer very emphatically to universal prevenient grace as counteractive of depravity has given pretext for accusing him with leaning toward Pelagianism. But in fact he taught in the same way as Chrysostom and the Gregories..
Cassian was warmly opposed by Prosper, (ob. dr. 455,) who endeavored to induce Pope Ccelestin to condemn Cassian. But the papal brief was quite unsatisfactory. It entirely omitted Augustine's irresistible grace.
Much less Augustinian than Prosper was the author (perhaps Pope Leo the Great) of the work De Vocatione Gentium. This work teaches thus: There is no particularistic predestination; God wills the salvation of all; grace is universal, but not dynamic (violenta) in action; human freedom has some co-operative influence in conversion. These views are insisted on without giving up some of the harsh features of Augustine.
Faustus of Khegium (ob. cir. 493) stood between Cassian and Leo. He taught the universality of grace, the co-operation of freedom with grace, and the possibility of Gentile salvation— "lege naturae, quam Dcus in omnium cordibus scriprit in spe adventus Christi." "The efficaciousness of grace," said Faustus, " depends upon the free-will of man."
The provincial synod of Orange, A. D. 529, gave its sanction to a very mild Augustinianism. It decreed as follows : "Grace is not merely bestowed when we pray for it, but grace itself causes us to pray for it; the disposition to believe is effected by grace; the free-will, weakened in Adam, can only be restored through the grace of baptism; when man sins, he does his own will; when he does good he executes the will of God, yet voluntarily; through the grace of God all may save their souls; none are predestinated to sin; without prevenient grace none can love God."
These articles of Orange, though so mildly expressed, are intended to antagonize the orthodox synergism of the Eastern Church, and of the whole Church before Augustine. Their fatal unorthodox point is the dynamic character of grace: prevenient grace is the comse of faith.
It was but a momentary victory. The milder views of Cansian and Faustus—the same as those of Chrysostom—maintained their position, and were, in fact, the faith of the subsequent centuries. Let us now follow the course of catholic thought down to the next Augustinian disturbance in the Gottschalk controversy of the ninth century.
Under the influence of Faustus the innovations of Augustine had been condemned at two provincial synods—at Aries, in 472, and at Lyons, in 475. In the wake of these synods followed a succession of able theologians—Arnobius, Gennadius, Ennodius, Vincent of Lerinum—who maintained the orthodox synergism of the earlier Church.
The most prominent name in the following century is Gregory the Great, oh. 604. His system is partially Augustinian, but it contains elements which imply synergism. Among his positions are these: The good which we do is a joint product of grace and of the freed will: "Bonum quod agimus et Dei est, et nostrum : Dei, per praevenientem gratiam; nostrum, per obsequentem liberam voluntatem." Grace can be lost. There is no absolute decree. Grace is prevenient and also sul>sequent. Prevenient grace operates, but also co-operates. ' Subsequent grace helps us to succeed—" ne inaniter velimus, sed possimus implese." Wesleyan synergism is but a repetition of these sentiments.
In the path of Gregory followed Isidore of Seville, oh. •536. He holds thus: Prevenient grace makes the new life possible. "Before the gift of grace there is in man a free-will, hut not a will efficient to good." But Isidore's system is not self-consistent.
How little the Latin Church held to the Augustinian innovations upon the old orthodoxy is evident from the suddenness with which the fatalistic predestinarian views of Gottschalk disappeared after his death. Gottschalk (oh. 868) taught as follows: There is a twofold predestination: "Gemina est praedestinatio, sive electorum ad requiem, sive reproborum ad mortem." Christ did not die for all. Baptism washes out depravity; but only the elect among the baptized will really be saved. The fall of man did not come about by man's free-will, but was a part of God's absolute decree, by which the whole drama of hi-tory was arranged beforehand.
These views of Gottschalk raised a storm of opposition. Fourth Series, Vol. XXXII.—2
They violated the catholic Christian consciousness. They were at once opposed by Rabanus Maurus, Archbishop of Mayence, (ob. 856,) who affirmed that predestination was based on foreknowledge, that Christ died for all men, and that God would that all should be saved. How repulsive to the Christian public the views of Gottschalk were is plain from this statement of Rabanus to Hincmar, (see Hagenbach, ii, 57:) "Kotum sit dilectioni vestrae, quod quidem gyrovagus monachus; nomine Gotescale, qui se asserit sacerdotem in nostra parochia ordinatum, de Italia venit ad nos Moguntiam, novas superstitiones et noxiam doctrinam de praedestinatione Dei introducens et populos in errorem mitteus; dicens quod praedestinatio Dei, sicut in bono, sic ita et in malo, at tales sint in hoc mundo quidam, qui propter praedestinationem Dei, quae eos cogat in mortem ire, non possint ab errore et peccato se corrigere, quasi Deus eos feeisset ab initio incorrigibilis esse, et poenae obnoxios in interitum ire."
Gottschalk's views were condemned by the Synod of Mayence in 848, and by that of Quiercy in 849. By the influence of Hincmar a second synod of Quiercy in 853 affirmed that election is conditioned upon foreknowledge, that the freedom of will lost in Adam is restored in Christ, that Christ died for all, and that God willed the salvation of all.
A few dissident bishops in vain opposed these positions in synods at Valence and at Langres, (859.) The revival of Augustinianism was but of spasmodic duration. The catholic consciousness would not, and never did, give up these sentiments, (affirmed at Quiercy in S53,) to wit: "Homo libero .arbitrio male utens peccavit et cecidit. Deus elegit secundum praescientiam suam. Perituros non praedestinavit ut perirent. Libertatem arbitrii quam in primo homine perdidimus, per Christum recepimus. Et habemus liberum arbitrium ad bonum, praeventum et adjutum gratia; et habemus liberum arbitrius ad malum, desertum gratia. Deus omnes homines sine exceptione vult sidvos fieri, licet non omnes salventur.''
From Hincmar we pass now to the next great exponent of catholicity, Peter Lombard, <>b. dr. 1160. Lombard is an earnest defender of the ethical nature of the religious life. He holds that faith, though assisted by prevenient grace, is an act not of God but of man, and that this act is pleasing to God, and is rewarded by God by richer gifts of grace. He says, (Sent., lib. ii, d. 27:) "Actus nostri sunt meritorii in quantum procedunt ex libero arbitrio moto a Deo per gratiam. I'nde omnis actus humanus, qui subjicitur libero arbitrio, si sit relatus in Deum, potest meritorius esse. Ipsum autem credere est actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinae ex imperio voluntatis a Deo motae per gratiam: et sic subjacet libero arbitrio in ordine ad Deum: unde actus fidei potest esse meritorius—si tamen adsit caritas."
In Anselm (ob. 1109) there is a partial leaning toward Augustine. Nevertheless, he held it as absurd to say that man is free to evil but not free to good, (" non esse liberum arbitrium nisi ad mala.") He endeavored to maintain freedom of will without giving up predestination. The beginning of a holy life presupposes prevenient grace; its continuance, attending grace. Anselm makes no use of merely formal freedom, therein agreeing with Augustine.
Bernard (ob. 1153) taught that freedom of will remains after the fall. It is real, though feeble—" etsi miserum, tamen integrum." To will (velle) is present, but to accomplish (posse) is lacking. Here is the need of grace. In this Bernard agrees with Lombard, who says: "Dei gratiam non advocat hominis voluntas vel operatio, sed ipsa gratia voluntatem praevenit praeparando ut velit bonum, et praeparatam adjuvat ut perticiat." Thus, though man is free, yet without grace he cannot free himself from the bondage of depravity. This brings us back to the true catholic view, which has prevailed, on the whole, from the beginning.
The slightly wavering course of Anselm was followed by Hugo. St. Victor, Alexander Hales, Albertns Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and some others. These all insist, however, on the moral autonomy of man, and thus defend the original and permanent catholic view in a manner which Augustine would have condemned; but yet they retained the use of the Augustinian phraseology on the subject of foreknowledge and predestination, and vainly endeavored to explain the latter into consistency with the former.
St. Victor (ob. 1141) says: "We must distinguish from each other the act of willing in itself and the direction of the will to a particular object. 'Willing in itself is purely the act of