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reside have increased in that time from 6 to 01, and in addition to these places of residence there are 511 "outstations" where the gospel is preached. The little company of about 30 missionaries in 1850 has grown to 473, and the 11 missionary societies operating in 1850 have become 30 in 1877. Of these 11 societies are American, 13 British, 3 Continental, and 3 are Bible Societies.
The missionary force is now 344 married missionaries, 66 single males, 63 single females, a total of 473. Of these 209 are American, 222 British, 33 Continental, and 8 representatives of the Bible Societies. There are 9 English, and 10 American physicians, 3 of the latter being ladies. There has been an increase within the last ten years of 5 societies, 35 stations, 115 missionaries, and more than 150 outstations.
The whole is summed up as follows: 91 stations; 511 outstations; 312 organized Churches; 43 self-sustaining Churches; 243 partly self-sustaining; 13,035 communicants, of which 8,068 are males and 4,967 females; pupils, 3,602; in theological schools, 20; students, 231; Sunday-schools, 115; Sunday scholars, 2,605; school-teachers, 29; colporteurs, 76; ordained native preachers; 73; assistant native preachers, 511; Bible women, 90; church buildings, 243; chapels, 437; hospitals, 16; patients, 3,780; out-door patients, 87,515; dispensaries, 24; applicants, 44,281 money raised, $9,271.
"China" is concluded by an epitome of the history of Methodist missions in China, which embraces the M. E. Church, South, and British Wesleyan missions, giving a total for all these of 14 stations; 109 outstations; 103 organized Churches; 2,319 members; 1,016 probationers; 71 schools; 1,288 pupils; 4 theological schools; 51 students; 78 Sunday-schools; 1,375 scholars; 25 ordained preachers; 113 assistant preachers; 21 Bible women; 43 church buildings; 114 chapels; 3 hospitals; 23 indoor patients; 604 outdoor patients; 3 dispensaries; 681 patients; 57 missionaries, and 30 wives.
These results are both amazing and inspiring. All the more so because the work has for this whole period been in its initiative. Starting from the present vantage-ground, what may it not be hoped will be effected within the twenty-five years next to come? What, ere a century will end? Truly the evangelization of this empire, so vast and populous, is not after all Bo very remote. The child may be born that will see China a Christian nation. This is an inference from what we see, as well as the product of a living faith that the stone cut out of the mountain shall fill the whole earth.
Seven or eight chapters of the book remain. These are devoted to Japan, and abound in graphic descriptions of scenes and scenery; in a history of Christianity in Japan from its first introduction, in 1549, by the Jesuits under the- leadership of Xavier, until it was extinguished at Shimabara by Iyeyasu, and of its re-introduction in 1854 in greater purity and power by Protestant missionaries; of Shintooism and Buddhism, the false religions we would displace by the bringing in of a better hope; and, lastly, of the suffering of women in Japan, and their need of the Gospel. The wonderful transformations that have so speedily been accomplished in this laud appear from these chapters to be evidently the morning rays of a new civilization that ere long must pervade the whole nation, bearing amid its bursting glories the spiritual regeneration of thousands.
A mission just begun is thus placed by the side of a mission a quarter of a century old, only the more to invigorate the hope and strengthen the purposes of the people of God.
Will the author allow one to whom the great mission work is a specialty to render him thanks, on behalf of thousands of Christian hearts, for this interesting and valuable contribution to the missionary literature of the time?
Art. II.—THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION. Data of Mhia. By Herbert Spencer. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1879.
A Eight estimate of Mr. Spencer's ethics is impossible without referring to his general theory of mind. In common with many speculators of the same general tendency, he is very sensitive to the charge of materialism. Haeckel, Huxley, Spencer, and all the rest, indignantly repudiate this charge, and insist that only a fool or a knave can make it. Self-confessed materialists are as scarce as self-confessed thieves. What is materialism?
Materialism has many forms. It may be built upon the crude conceptions of matter which are framed by uncritical common sense, and it may be built upon a mystical notion of matter which defies comprehension. The first form is practically obsolete. For the modern materialist matter is not what it seems to be, but something mystic, subtle, wonderful. He never tires of dilating upon its mystery; and even while declaring it to be all-sufficient, he also insists that it is past finding out. But to the common mind the essence of materialism does not consist in an insight into the nature of matter, but in the claim that mind is but the unsubstantial product of organization. This claim is quite compatible with the loudest wondering over the mystery of the molecule, and even with idealism and nihilism. The idealist, who regards the organism as an ideal thing, may still hold that the organic idea so conditions the mental idea that the latter cannot exist without the former. The nihilist, too, who views both mind and matter as unsubstantial phantoms, may also insist that mental phantoms can exist only in connection with material phantoms. In fact, the union of idealism and materialism is nothing rare in the history of thought, for it was by this road that German philosophy descended into the materialistic slough. Strauss in his work, "The Old Faith and the New," insists that the difference between idealism and materialism is of names and terms rather than of principles. He himself remained a Hegelian to the last. Probably every thoughtful student of Hegel has felt that a slight change in terms would turn many parts of his system into a scheme of materialistic development. So the left wing understood the master, and they were not without excuse. The monistic materialist would have little difficulty in accepting Spinoza's root principles as identical with his own; and there are points of view from which parts even of Leibnitz's doctrine approach dangerously near a pantheistic form of materialism. There is an idealistic materialism, and there is also a materialistic idealism. . The ground, then, of the current repudiation of materialism by those who still make mind an unsubstantial product is, that materialism may be tested by its doctrine of matter and by its doctrine of mind. The monists judge themselves by their doctrine of matter, while common sense judges them by their doctrine of mind. Since they repudiate the crude and brutal notions of matter held by untaught common sense, they deny and resent the charge of materialism. But since they also teach that mind is a function of matter, common sense insists that they are materialists; for the common thought of materialism is not that it teaches this or that theory of matter, but that it makes the soul nothing. This double point of view is the source of those charges and repudiations of materialism which are now so frequent, and which common sense finds so bewildering. Our own judgment is that if our yea is to be yea, and our nay, nay, then the English language has no word which better describes the views of the so-called advanced scientists than materialism. Its use will not mislead the popular mind to any such extent as its rejection. At the same time the critic cares nothing for a name, provided the thing be understood. When, then, the so-called materialist rejects the name, the critic wishes to have it remembered that this rejection means only that the rejecter does not hold the vulgar and spontaneous view of matter. Whatever his name, he insists that mind is only a function of the body, just as pointing time is a function of clock-work. Judged, then, by his doctrine of matter, Mr. Spencer, with many others of his school, is not a materialist. Judged by his doctrine of mind, Mr. Spencer, with many others of his school, is a materialist. If materialism means an acceptance of the vulgar view of matter, he is not a materialist. If materialism means viewing the mind as a function of matter and motion, he is a materialist. What is his doctrine of mind?
In common with many other evolutionists, Mr. Spencer denies that mind is any thing substantial. The self is declared to be nothing but an aggregate of mental states, (" Principles of Psychology," vol. i, p. 500,) and these states are held together by the nervous system. A man does not have thoughts and f eelings, but is only the sum of his thoughts and feelings. The objective fact in evolution is declared to be a "redistribution of matter and motion;" and the problem of the evolutionist is to find its law. The result of the redistribution is the birth of the solar system, the genesis of the various physical forces, and finally of life and mind. The process is, of course, mysterious in its inner nature; but all these phenomena result, nevertheless, from the redistribution of matter and motion. If mind were excluded from the formula, the latter would no longer be all-embracing, and mind would appear in an outside realm by itself. But this would be an unallowable break in the continuity of the system. Mind, then, is only a general name for mental phenomena, and these result from the redistribution of matter and motion. To be sure, matter and motion and mind are all declared to be but symbols of the unknowable; but the symbol, mind, is throughout regarded as causally connected with the symbols, matter and motion. It is this dependence of mind, be it reality or symbol, on matter and motion, be they realities or symbols, which, to the common thought, constitutes Mr. Spencer's system a form of materialism. It is worthy of note that Mr. Spencer dwells on this symbolic character of matter and motion only when the question of materialism is up; at other times they are "relative realities," and as real as the unknowable itself. It would sound rather odd to speak of the redistribution of matter and motion as a redistribution of symbolic conceptions. Mental states, then, according to Mr. Spencer, are only adjuncts of certain physical facts. As such they are highly mysterious indeed; but, whatever their mystery, they are such adjuncts and nothing more. We shall see this more clearly if we raise the further question, What is the relation of mental-states to nervous action?
It has been proposed to call the nervous series neurosis, and the mental series psychosis. Adopting this terminology our question becomes, What is the relation of neurosis and psychosis? On this point the advanced scientists are not all agreed, and very few writers are consistent with themselves. Some regard psychosis as a transformation of physical energy in such a way that the energy displayed in psychosis has, for the time, no physical representative. It has disappeared from the physical realm entirely.. Upon this theory, if we should measure the physical energy of a brain just before it began to think, and should afterward measure it when thought had begun, we should find that a certain amount of physical energy had been expended without any physical effect. The energy expended would be found, not in the physical, but in the mental realm. This view was very common for a time while the correlation of the forces was a new and misunderstood doctrine. The thought was that "force" was at last proved to be a single essence which undergoes endless transformation; and hence there was a general readiness to believe that thought itself is as real a form of energy as the matter itself. Many passages in Mr. Spencer's works imply this view. Consider the following quotation:
How this metamorphosis takes place; how a force existing as motion, heat, or light, can become a mode of consciousness; Sow