that it teaches this or that theory of matter, but that it makes the soul nothing. This double point of view is the source of those charges and repudiations of materialism which are now so frequent, and which common sense finds so bewildering. Our own judgment is that if our yea is to be yea, and our nay, nay, then the English language has no word which better describes the views of the so-called advanced scientists than materialism. Its use will not mislead the popular mind to any such extent as its rejection. At the same time the critic cares nothing for a name, provided the thing be understood. When, then, the so-called materialist rejects the name, the critic wishes to have it remembered that this rejection means only that the rejecter does not hold the vulgar and spontaneous view of matter. Whatever his name, he insists that mind is only a function of the body, just as pointing time is a function of clock-work. Judged, then, by his doctrine of matter, Mr. Spencer, with many others of his school, is not a materialist. Judged by his doctrine of mind, Mr. Spencer, with many others of his school, is a materialist. If materialism means an acceptance of the vulgar view of matter, he is not a materialist. If materialism means viewing the mind as a function of matter and motion, he is a materialist. What is his doctrine of mind?

In common with many other evolutionists, Mr. Spencer denies that mind is any thing substantial. The self is declared to be nothing but an aggregate of mental states, ("Principles of Psychology," vol. i, p. 500,) and these states are held together by the nervous system. A man does not have thoughts and feelings, but is only the sum of his thoughts and feelings. The objective fact in evolution is declared to be a "redistribution of matter and motion;" and the problem of the evolutionist is to find its law. The result of the redistribution is the birth of the solar system, the genesis of the various physical forces, and finally of life and mind. The process is, of course, mysterious in its inner nature; but all these phenomena result, nevertheless, from the redistribution of matter and motion. If mind were excluded from the formula, the latter would no longer be all-embracing, and mind would appear in an outside realm by itself. But this would be an unallowable break in the continuity of the system. Mind, then, is only a general name for mental phenomena, and these result from the redistribution of matter and motion. To

be sure, matter and motion and mind are all declared to be but symbols of the unknowable; but the symbol, mind, is throughout regarded as causally connected with the symbols, matter and motion. It is this dependence of mind, be it reality or symbol, on matter and motion, be they realities or symbols, which, to the common thought, constitutes Mr. Spencer's system a form of materialism. It is worthy of note that Mr. Spencer dwells on this symbolic character of matter and motion only when the question of materialism is up; at other times they are "relative realities," and as real as the unknowable itself. It would sound rather odd to speak of the redistribution of matter and motion as a redistribution of symbolic conceptions. Mental states, then, according to Mr. Spencer, are only adjuncts of certain physical facts. As such they are highly mysterious indeed; but, whatever their mystery, they are such adjuncts and nothing more. We shall see this more clearly if we raise the further question, What is the relation of mental states to nervous action?

It has been proposed to call the nervous series neurosis, and the mental series psychosis. Adopting this terminology our question becomes, What is the relation of neurosis and psychosis? On this point the advanced scientists are not all agreed, and very few writers are consistent with themselves. Some regard psychosis as a transformation of physical energy in such a way that the energy displayed in psychosis has, for the time, no physical representative. It has disappeared from the physical realm entirely. Upon this theory, if we should measure the physical energy of a brain just before it began to think, and should afterward measure it when thought had begun, we should find that a certain amount of physical energy had been expended without any physical effect. The energy expended would be found, not in the physical, but in the mental realm. This view was very common for a time while the correlation of the forces was a new and misunderstood doctrine. The thought was that "force" was at last proved to be a single essence which undergoes endless transformation; and hence there was a general readiness to believe that thought itself is as real a form of energy as the matter itself. Many passages in Mr. Spencer's works imply this view. Consider the following quotation:

How this metamorphosis takes place; how a force existing as motion, heat, or light, can become a mode of consciousness; how

it is possible for aerial vibrations to generate the sensation we call sound, for the force liberated by chemical changes in the brain to give rise to emotion-these are mysteries which it is impossible to fathom. But they are not profounder mysteries than the transformation of the physical forces into each other.-First Principles, 1st ed., p. 280.

This passage proceeds on the view mentioned. It takes the correlation of physical energies as the type of the process. But when one form of energy passes into a new form, it no longer exists in the old one. We should expect, then, that when physical energy passes into thought it no longer exists as physical energy. On this theory there may be a passing back and forth of physical energy between the nervous and the mental realm.

But in spite of this and many similar passages, Mr. Spencer and the evolutionists in general do not accept this view. It involves a serious break of physical continuity, and implies that the laws of motion do not determine all physical changes. The nervous state at any moment is determined not merely by the antecedent nervous state, but by that plus an irruption from the mental realm. Besides, the notion that physical energy should suddenly lay aside its distinctive character and become a thought, borders on the grotesque and the irredeemably absurd. These considerations have led to the view, now largely adopted by evolutionists, that neurosis does not pass into psychosis, but is attended by it. According to Prof. Clifford, the physical series goes along by itself, and the mental series goes along by itself. The favorite statement with Mr. Spencer is that the physical and the mental series "are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing." Prof. Bain also uses similar language, affirming a mental fact to be double-faced, being on one side a mental state, and on the other side a nervous change. Unfortunately this language is not so clear as could be desired. Both mind and matter appear in Mr. Spencer's formula as "faces;" but the relation of these "faces" is left undetermined. Are they mutually independent, so that the two faces go on by themselves? or does the mental face depend upon the physical face? Mr. Spencer thinks to escape materialism by this doublefaced theory; but in vain. He points out at great length the impossibility of assimilating the mental to the physical series. One passage ("Principles of Psychology," vol. i, pp. 157-162) has become classic among the Spencerians. "That a unit of feel

ing has nothing in common with a unit of motion becomes more than ever manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition.' "Nevertheless, it may be as well to say here, once for all, that if we were compelled to choose between the alternatives of translating mental phenomena into physical phenomena, or translating physical phenomena into mental phenomena, the latter alternative would seem the more acceptable of the two." This paragraph is often appealed to by the Spencerians as conclusively disproving the charge of materialism, and even as overthrowing materialism itself. It does not agree very well with the following utterance, also meant to be decisive: "See, then, our predicament. We can think of matter only in terms of mind. We can think of mind only in terms of matter."Principles of Psychology, vol. i, p. 627. Mr. Spencer adds that we can get values of y only in terms of x, and conversely. We can hardly believe that he was betrayed into the latter statement by the alliteration and the antithesis; and yet there seems to be no better ground for it. Let one try to think of motion in terms of love, or of love in terms of motion, and the absurdity becomes apparent. Moreover, the previous quotation is a distinct refutation of the latter; and as the statements there made were made "once for all," we must regard them as Mr. Spencer's final view. Yet, antimaterialistic as it seems, the affirmation is merely that mental phenomena cannot be conceived in terms of any thing else; but it does not deny that they may be, and are, the product of something else. Thought and feeling as mental states are incommensurable with matter and motion; but this is an irrelevant commonplace so long as it is allowed that they result from the redistribution of matter and motion. For the question is not whether they can be joined in a common thought, but whether thought depends on matter and motion. What was said before about the "opposite faces" applies equally to the incommensurable series. The physical series is viewed as the independent fact, and the mental series as only a concomitant product. It is this fact which justifies common sense in ranking Mr. Spencer with the materialists.

Mr. Spencer's working theory is best expressed in the following quotation: "As shown in the earlier part of this work, an idea is the psychical side of what on its physical side is an involved set of molecular changes propagated through an in

volved set of nervous plexuses. That which makes possible the idea is the pre-existence of these plexuses so organized that a wave of molecular motion diffused through them will produce, as its psychical correlative, the components of the conception in due order and degree. This idea lasts while the waves of molecular motion last-ceasing when they cease; but that which remains is the set of plexuses. These constitute the potentiality of the idea, and make possible future ideas like it."—Principles of Psychology, vol. ii, p. 484; see also vol. i, pp. 270,406.

In this passage and in many others the independence of the physical fact, "face," or series, is plainly affirmed. With equal clearness the dependent and transitory nature of the mental fact, "face," or series, is affirmed. Both may be "faces,” and incommensurable, but none the less, the physical "face," compared with the mental "face," is independent and abiding. The bewildering statements about double-faced somewhats and opposite manifestations of the unknowable, must not be allowed to obscure this fact.

But even yet we have no clear statement of the relation of neurosis and psychosis. The doctrine is that psychosis is the concomitant of neurosis, but the doctrine is also that the energy of neurosis never passes into an energy of psychosis. The physical series goes along by itself with unbroken continuity. If, then, we could accurately observe nervous movements, we should find every nervous antecedent exhausted in its nervous consequent, and we should nowhere get any hint of the mental series supposed to be going on at the same time. But this view calls up the gravest difficulties. The mental series in this case is not caused by the physical series, but attends it. If, then, the mental series have any energy, or if it have any laws peculiar to, and founded in itself, we must seek its cause outside of the physical series. And if the mental series goes along by itself, and the physical series goes along by itself, then we have no means of accounting for their harmony or even for their connection. The difficulty is the old one with which the students of Spinoza are familiar. He viewed being, as extended, as going along by itself, and being, as thought, as going along by itself. Nothing happens in the physical world which is not fully accounted for by its physical antecedents, and nothing happens in the mental world which is not fully ac