moral endowment, and thus fall into bondage to sin, he may even yet recover from his guilt and enslavement (if not persisted in too far) by accepting the special visitations of grace, repenting of his sins, and seconding the regenerating influence of the Spirit. He is, therefore, in either case a synergist, (from oúv Epyov,) a co-worker with God, throughout his moral life. Such is the answer of Wesleyan Arminianism to the question or questions before us, as to the relation of man's freedom to

God's grace.

Is this answer in harmony with the general consciousness of the Church catholic? Is it a heresy, a sectarian individualism? or is it an essential element of orthodox catholicity?

What says the history of theology? Let us consult the records. The results will not be without interest.

Passing over at once the testimony of the Scriptures, and simply assuming that this testimony is either synergistic or monergistic, either for or against the above-given synopsis of Wesleyan Arminianism, we come directly to the earliest Christian theology, that of the Greek fathers, and ask, How did they understand the Scriptures to teach on the subject before us?

We preface our examination by this general statement of Hagenbach, (Hist. Doct., i, 155 :) "Freedom and immortality are those traits of the human mind in which is manifested the image of God. Such was the doctrine of the primitive Church, confirmed by the general Christian consciousness. All the Greek fathers, as well as the apologists, Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and the Latin author, Minutius Felix, also the theologians of the Alexandrian school, Clement and Origen, exalt the avregovorov (the autonomy, self-determination) of the human soul.... They know nothing of any imputation of sin except as a voluntary and moral self-determination is presupposed.... None but heretics ventured to maintain that man is subject to another influence than himself." With this statement Luthardt perfectly harmonizes. He says, (Lehre vom Fr. Will., p. 13:) "The idea of man's ability to choose between good and evil is a fundamental article with all the Greek theologians. It inspires their entire system of thought." In general, the Greek fathers excluded every thing of a magical character from their conception of sin and grace. Christianity was to them not the exclusive possession of the favored few

who stood in material contact with the written word or the organized Church, but it virtually belonged to the whole human family, to all who at any time or in any place honestly sought the truth. The self-revelation of God is universal. Where the specific revelation, through written words or living prophets, is wanting, there the λoуós ожEquaτikós (the germinal word or revelation) is given. And all who humbly heed this general self-revelation of God are blessed and accepted of the Father. It is only a later and narrower age which presumed to confine God's pardoning graciousness to the material limits of the visible Church and sacraments.

As to the modus of conversion, the Greek fathers as a body, and in fact the entire theology of the Orthodox Eastern Church, are very positively synergistic. The key-note of their whole. system is thus well expressed by Justin (born A. D. 89; ob. 176) in his Apology, i, 10: "Though we had no choice in our creation, yet in our regeneration we have; for God persuades only, and draws us gently, in our regeneration, by co-operating freely with those rational powers he has bestowed upon us." And with this thought Clement of Alexandria (ob. cir. 212) fully harmonizes. "God," says he, "co-operates with those souls that are willing." "As the physician furnishes health to that body which synergizes toward health, so God furnishes eternal salvation to those who synergize toward the knowledge and obedience of the truth."-Strom., viii. Clement knows nothing of a gratia irresistibilis.-Strom., viii, p. 855.

So teaches also Origen, ob. 254. His central view is thus stated by Shedd, (ii, 34 :) "The faculty by which to will the right man has from God; but the decision itself is his own act. God's part is, therefore, greater than man's, as the creation of a faculty is greater than the use of it. Moreover, every right beginning of action on the side of man requires a special succor and assistance from God. Through the Holy Spirit this succor is granted, according to the worthiness of the individual; and thus every right act of man is a mixture of self-choice and divine aid, (μικτόν ἐστιν ἔκ τε τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς. συμπνεούσης θείας δυνάμεως.-opp., ii, p. 571.)" sense spoke also Theophilus of Antioch, ob. 181. emphasizes man's moral autonomy: 'Elɛv¤ɛpov yàp στον εποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ἄνθρωπον.-Ad Autol., ii, 27.

In the same

He strongly kaì aνtežoú.

In regard to depravity, or original sin, the Greek fathers. agree in teaching that it is an inherited corruption or disorder of human nature, but not of the nature of sin proper, or guilt. Says Justin, (Dial. c. Tryph., c. 124:) "All men deserve to die, because they have sinned as Adam,” (¿μoiwç tậ 'Adàμ.) Of the imputation of Adam's guilt he has no thought. Clement rejects the idea of imputing Adam's sin to his children. Strom., iii, 16. Origen teaches that guilt arises only when we freely yield to the temptations to which our depravity exposes us. De Princ., iii, 2. So teach also Tertullian (De Bapt., 18) and Cyprian. Ep., 64. The latter calls original sin contagio mortis antiquae, (Ep., 59,) but says that it does not annul freedom. De Grat., c. 2. Cyril of Jerusalem (ob. 386) says, "When we come into the world we are sinless, (avaμápτητоL,) but now we sin from choice." He has the highest ethical notion of virtue: "There is no kind of souls that are either sinful or righteous by nature, but that we are either the one or the other proceeds only from free choice." Shedd, ii, 38. And with Cyril agree the other eminent Greek fathers-the two Gregories, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Chrysostom, Theodoret, and the rest. Gregory Nazianzen declares (Orat., xl) children to be άπоvýρová, (innocent.) Gregory. Nyssa denies that depravity in infants is sin. Opp., iii, p. 317. Chrysostom held that, though mortal Adam could beget mortal descendants, yet sinful Adam could not beget sinful descendants. "No one owes any thing to justice until he first becomes a sinner for himself," (οίκοθεν.)

Evidently the idea of imputing the guilt of Adam to all of his descendants, and then of damning a large part of them because of that imputation, is an unorthodox invention of a later age.

As to the process of conversion, the Greek fathers of the fourth century are well represented by Gregory Nyssa, ob. cir. 395. "With him," says Schaff, "human freedom plays a great part." He lays far more stress upon heart-purity than upon a mere forensic justification. The path to deliverance from sin is the path of ethical endeavor, of humiliation, and self-mastery. When the soul in obedience to conscience heeds the voice of God, divine grace meets the soul and leads it into self-mastery. His general view (see Luthardt, p. 18) is as follows: "In consequence of the fall the divine image in us is

marred and affected with imperfection, (appwornua.) We have from birth a tendency to sin, (πpоç kakιáv ógμń.) But this tendency does not break down our moral freedom. Freedom is of the essence of man; it is lost only when man ceases to be man. Moral freedom conditions the possibility of virtue. Take it away, and we cease to be moral agents; we could be neither praiseworthy or blameworthy. Now, freedom of will involves freedom to good as well as freedom to bad. Man is no longer a moral agent if he is unable to shun sin. But when a man has once fallen into sin, how is he to recover himself? First, under the experience of life and the guidance of the Spirit he is awakened to serious thought; he comes to himself. Then, when thus brought to see his real moral condition, he opens his eyes and welcomes the light, as a mortally sick man welcomes the physicians. His soul is thus filled with new light and life. The germ, the basis, of this new life lies hidden in every human being. It was not forfeited or annihilated by the fall. It is the ethical conscience, the God-consciousness. Were this lost there would be nothing of the human being left, and the regeneration of such an un-man would be a pure creation out of nothing. But does man regenerate himself? No! he becomes regenerate by accepting the chastenings of Providence, welcoming the visitations of the Spirit, and co-operating with divine grace."

These views of Gregory are fully shared by Basil the Great, ob. 379. "He teaches the co-operation of human liberty with divine grace, as the Greek Church has always taught."-Lichtenberger, Encycl., ii, p. 104.

So also taught Gregory Nazianzen, ob. 390. He holds that the sinner is not to wait until some visitation of overpowering grace drives him to repentance, but rather that the grace necessary to his regeneration is congenital with him, and is ever ready to co-operate with him, whensoever he will.

Such is, also, the opinion of the great Chrysostom, ob. 407. "Chrysostom's theory of regeneration was firmly synergistic." -Shedd, ii, 40. "His synergism is that of the whole Greek Church."-Schaff, ii, 937. His general position is thus summed up by Neander, (ii, 659–661 :) “Gregory's deep feeling of the need of redemption led him to appreciate the necessity of divine grace, while his correct ethical conception induced him to

set a high value on the free-will of man as a necessary condition of all the operations of grace." In explaining Rom. v, 19, he says: "This passage is not to be so understood, as if by the sin of one all became actual sinners; it teaches, rather, simply that the condition of human nature, which to the first man was a punishment, was thus transmitted to all his posterity. But this misfortune only redounds to man's benefit if he is not remiss in the use of his will." "If we but will, not only death, but even Satan himself, shall never harm us." There is no such thing as irresistible grace. Grace is effectual in proportion to our co-operation with it. God draws us to him not by force, but by our own free-will.

The next great theologian of the East, Theodore of Mopsuestia, (ob. 428,) stood upon the border of the great Augustinian controversy. He endeavored to keep the true synergistic mean between the fatalistic divine monergism of Augustine and the merely human monergism of Pelagius. He distinctly rejected the imputation of Adam's sin to his descendants. Man's inherited nature is not sinful, but corrupt. New-born children are not guilty of sin; hence they do not need baptism and the eucharist in order to their forgiveness. On the subject of grace Theodore held the orthodox view. Redemption extends to the whole human race. We are saved by faith in Christ, and by an obedient life. See Herzog, xv, 718. That Theodore was utterly opposed to all moral determinism is clear from the mere title of the work which he wrote against Augustinianism. It was entitled, "Against Those who say that Man Sins not by Freewill, but by Nature," (púoe.) That this system was, on the other hand, not Pelagian, is thus stated by Neander, (ii, 656:) With the Pelagians he insisted on "man's inalienable freedom, as opposed to the doctrine of a constraining grace and of predestination. But the great difference between the two systems was this-that in the Pelagian the doctrine of a redemption and a Redeemer had no foothold whatever, while in Theodore's system it had a thoroughly essential one, and, indeed, constituted the central point of the system."

Kindred to the position of Theodore was that of Theodoret, ob. cir. 457. He co-ordinated the operations of grace and freedom in the manner of Chrysostom, making the efficaciousness of grace dependent upon its reception and use by human freedom.