CHAP. VIII. SECOND PERIOD, B.C. Although since the battle of the Trebia the seat of war had been shifted from Cisalpine Gaul to central and southern Italy, and although Rome itself was now more directly exposed to the victorious arms of Hannibal, yet the 216-215 Romans had neither given up Cremona and Placentia, their fortresses on the Po, nor relaxed their efforts for continuing the war with the Gauls in their own country. They hoped thereby to draw off the Gallic auxiliaries from Hannibal's army,' and moreover to prevent any Punic army which might succeed in crossing the Pyrenees and Alps from advancing further into Italy. For this reason in the spring of 216 two legions and a strong contingent of auxiliaries, amounting altogether to 25,000 men, were sent northward, under the command of the prætor L. Postumius Albinus, at the time when Terentius Varro and Æmilius Paullus set out on their ill-fated expedition to Apulia. The disaster of Cannæ naturally rendered the task of Postumius very difficult by increasing the courage of the tribes hostile to Rome, and by damping that of their friends. Nevertheless the prætor kept his ground in the country about the Po during the whole of the year 216, and so far gained the confidence of his fellow-citizens that he was elected for the consulship of the ensuing year. But before he could enter on his new office he was overtaken by an overwhelming catastrophe,2 second only to the Defeat of great disaster of Cannæ. He fell into an ambush, and was cut to pieces with his whole army. It is related Cisalpine that the Gauls cut off his head, set the skull in gold, and used it on solemn occasions as a goblet, according to a barbarous custom which continued long among the later Gauls and Germans. 3 Postumius Gaul. Rome was in a state of frantic excitement. The worst Further calamities of the disastrous year that had just passed away Roman revolts of seemed about to be repeated at the very time when the allies in Polybius, iii. 106, § 6. 2 This was early in the year 215 B.C., more than seven months after the battle of Cannæ. Polybius (iii. 118, § 6) is careless in stating that it happened a few days after.' Bruttium. BOOK IV. Sojourn of Hannibal in Capua. brave garrison of Casilinum had been forced to capitulate, and when by this conquest Hannibal had opened for himself the road to Latium. A short time before the faithful towns of Petelia and Consentia in Bruttium had been taken by storm. The others were in the greatest danger of suffering the same fate. Locri soon after joined the Carthaginians under favourable conditions: and thus a maritime town of great importance was gained by the enemy. In Croton the nobility tried in vain to keep the town for the Romans, and to shut out the Bruttian allies of Hannibal. The people admitted them within the walls, and the aristocratic party had no choice but to yield to the storm and to purchase for themselves permission to leave. the town by giving up possession of the citadel. Thus the whole of Bruttium was lost to the Romans, with the single exception of Rhegium. The legions were stationed in Campania, and did not venture beyond their fortified camps. Everywhere the sky was overhung with black clouds. In Spain alone the victory of the Scipios at Ibera opened a brighter prospect. By it the danger of another invasion of Italy by Hannibal's brother was for the present averted. Had the battle near the Ebro ended like the battles hitherto fought on Italian soil, it would seem that even the hearts of the bravest Romans must have despaired of the republic. Hannibal passed the winter of 216-215 B.C. in Capua. These winter-quarters became among the Roman writers a favourite topic of declamation. Capua, they said, became Hannibal's Cannæ.3 In the luxurious life of this opulent city, to which Hannibal's victorious soldiers gave themselves up for the first time after long hardships and privations, their military qualities perished, and from this time victory deserted their standards. This statement, if not altogether false, is at any rate a vast exaggeration. The date of the loss of Locri and Croton cannot be ascertained with perfect accuracy. Livy reports it twice: xxiii. 30, and xxiv. 1. 2 Livy, xxiv. 2, 3. Florus, ii. 6: 'Capuam Hannibali Cannas fuisse.' Livy, xxiii. 18. Valerius Maximus, ix. 1, ext. 1. VIII. SECOND PERIOD, 216-215 B.C. As we have seen, only a portion of Hannibal's army passed CHAP. the winter in Capua, whilst the rest was in Bruttium, Lucania, and before Casilinum. But apart from this, it is manifest that the people of Capua could not at that time have been sunk in luxury and sensual pleasures. If their wealth had been little affected by the calamities of the war, surely the necessity of feeding some thousand soldiers would soon have sobered them down and taught them the need of economy. Hannibal knew how to husband his resources, and he would not have allowed his men to drain his most valuable allies. We can scarcely suppose that voluntary extravagance and excessive hospitality marked the conduct of a people which had, at the very outset, stipulated for immunity from contributions. Lastly, it is not true that the Punic army had in Capua the first opportunity of recovering from the hardships of the war, and of enjoying ease and comfort. The soldiers had had pleasant quarters in Apulia after the battle on the lake Thrasymenus,' and had already passed one winter comfortably. But whatever may have been the pleasures and indulgences of Hannibal's troops in Capua, their military qualities cannot have suffered by them, as the subsequent history of the war sufficiently demonstrates. in Cam That Hannibal's offensive tactics were relaxed after the Operations battle of Cannæ is particularly evident from the events pania, of 215 B.C. The year passed without any serious en- 215 B.C. counters between the two belligerents. The Romans had resolved to avoid a battle, and applied their whole strength to prevent the spread of revolt among their allies, and to punish or re-conquer the towns that had revolted. The war was confined almost entirely to Campania. In this country Hannibal did not succeed, after the surrender of Casilinum, in making any further conquests. An attempt to surprise Cumæ failed, and on this occasion the Capuans suffered a serious reverse. Neapolis remained steadfast 1 See above, p. 216. 2 Livy's account (xxiii. 35), divested of the specific colouring which a patriotic Roman would naturally give it, comes to this, that the Roman consul, BOOK and faithful to Rome; Nola was guarded by a Roman garrison, and the Roman partisans among the citizens; and a renewed attempt of Hannibal to take this town is said to have been thwarted, like the first attack, the year before, by a sally of the Romans under Marcellus, and to have resulted in a defeat of the Carthaginian army.' On the other hand the Romans took several towns in Campania and Samnium,3 punished their revolted subjects with merciless severity, and so devastated the country of the Hirpinians and Caudinians that they piteously implored the help of Hannibal. But Hannibal had not sufficient forces to protect the Italians who had joined his cause and who now felt the fatal consequences of their step. Hanno, one of Hannibal's subordinate officers, being beaten at Grumentum in Lucania by Tiberius Sempronius Longus, an officer of the prætor M. Valerius Lævinus, who commanded in Apulia, was obliged to retreat into Bruttium. A reinforcement of 12,000 foot, 1,500 horse, 20 elephants, and 1,000 talents of silver, which Mago Sempronius Gracchus, in conjunction with the people of Cumæ, laid a trap for the Capuans. The various towns of Campania, it appears, celebrated a common festival at Hama (as the Latins celebrated theirs on the Mons Albanus). During one of these festivals, the Roman consul Sempronius Gracchus and the Cumanians surprised and killed the unarmed and unresisting Capuans. They afterwards justified this act of treachery by saying that the Capuans had intended to surprise them, and were caught in their own snare. But, as Arnold remarks (Hist. of Rome, iii. 184), this could only be a suspicion, whilst the overt act of violence was their own. According to all appearance, this alleged victory is but another version of that of the preceding year. In all essential parts the same circumstances are related, only on a larger scale. Instead of 2,800 Carthaginians, 5,000 are slain in the second fight, together with four elephants. Plutarch (Marcell. 11) relates only one victory of Marcellus; but we cannot appeal to his authority, as his account seems to be the result of a confusion. Livy relates (xxiv. 17) actually a third victory of Marcellus over Hannibal at Nola, in which 2,000 Carthaginians are killed. It is precisely the same story over again. The plebeians at Nola send for Hannibal, the nobility for Marcellus; the march of Marcellus is identical with that related xxiii. 17. The panegyrists of the house of Marcellus, it seems, had great faith in the credulity of the public; nor did they see any improbability in a story which makes the people of Nola call in the aid of Hannibal a second time, shortly after a first attempt had been punished by the execution of seventy of the conspirators. Compulteria, Trebula, and Saticula.—Livy, xxiii. 39. Livy, xxiii. 37. was to have brought to his brother in Italy, had been directed to Spain after the victory of the Scipios at Ibera; and Hannibal had accordingly, in the year 215 B.C., not only calculated in vain on being joined by his brother Hasdrubal and the Spanish army, but he was also deprived of the reinforcements which ought to have been sent to him straight from Africa. As at the same time the revolt of the Roman allies did not spread further, and as the Romans gradually recovered from the effects of the defeat at Cannæ, the fact that Hannibal was not able to accomplish much is easily explained. CHAP. VIII. SECOND PERIOD, 216-215 B.C. the Car thaginians and 215 B.C. As in Italy, so in the other theatres of war, the Cartha- Defeat of ginian arms were not very successful during this year, 215 B.C. In Spain, the victory of the Scipios at Ibera was fol- at Illiturgi lowed by a decided preponderance of Roman influence. Intibili The native tribes became more and more disinclined to in Spain, submit to Carthaginian dominion, thinking that the Romans would help them to regain their independence. It seems that the battle of Ibera was lost chiefly by the defection of the Spanish troops. Hasdrubal had thereupon tried to reduce some of the revolted tribes, but was prevented by the Scipios, and driven back with great loss. According to the reports which the Scipios sent home, they had gained victories which almost counterbalanced the disaster of Cannæ. With only 16,000 men they had totally routed at Illiturgi a Carthaginian army of 60,000 men, had killed more of the enemy than they themselves numbered combatants, had taken 3,000 prisoners, nearly 1,000 horses, and seven elephants, had captured fifty-nine standards, and stormed three hostile camps. Soon after, when the Carthaginians were besieging Intibili, they were again defeated and suffered almost as heavily. Most of the Spanish tribes now joined Rome. 1 Livy, xxiii. 49. It is a great pity that we have no more detailed report of these two splendid victories than the dry narrative which Livy gives in half a chapter. But the meagreness of the report might be excused if its truth were beyond suspicion. We shall find in the sequel that all the statements that have reference to the affairs of Spain, and especially to the exploits of the Scipios in that country, are tainted with laudato y exaggeration on an |