CHAP. III. SECOND PERIOD, B.C. advanced from Clypea, the basis of his operations, and had penetrated into the neighbourhood of Carthage, where he had taken possession of Tunes. Here he could not possibly maintain himself. He was obliged to accept a battle 261-255 on the plain, and suffered a signal defeat, which, owing to the great superiority of the Carthaginian cavalry, ended in the almost complete annihilation of the Romans. Only about 2,000 escaped with difficulty to Clypea; 500 were taken prisoners, and among these Regulus himself. The Roman expedition to Africa, so boldly undertaken and at first so gloriously carried out, met with a more miserable fate than that of Agathokles, and seemed indisputably to confirm the opinion that the Carthaginians were invincible in their own country.' the the Her mæan pro montory. It was necessary now, if possible, to save the remainder Victory of of the Roman army, and to bring them uninjured back to Romans at Italy. A still larger Roman fleet than that which had conquered at Ecnomus was accordingly sent to Africa, and obtained over the Carthaginians at the Hermæan promontory a victory which, judging by the number of Carthaginian vessels taken, must have been more brilliant than the last.2 If the Romans had intended to continue the I We cannot credit the reports according to which the Carthaginians treated Xanthippus with ingratitude and caused him to be murdered on his return to his own country, in order to expunge the humiliating memory of their great obligations to him (Valerius Maximus, ix. 6, 1; Zonaras, viii. 13; Appian, viii. 4). Polybius had heard of these or similar charges, but he rejected them, and related (i. 36, § 2) that Xanthippus left Carthage shortly after his victory, from the fear of exposing himself to jealousy and calumny. According to Polybius (i. 36, §11) not less than 114 Carthaginian vessels were taken with their crews. But the statements concerning this victory are very conflicting. Instead of 114 captured vessels, Diodorus (xxiii, fr. 14) mentions only 24, not to speak of the numbers given by Eutropius and Orosius. Haltaus (Gesch. der Römer, i. 308, Anm.) proposes to change the number éxaTdV δεκατέσσαρας of Polybius into εἴκοσι καὶ τέσσαρας, and thus to make the statements of Polybius and Diodorus agree with one another. This ingenious conjecture is highly commendable. If we adopt it, we shall no longer see anything strange in the narrative of Polybius, who tells us that the Romans drove back the Carthaginians with ease and at the first onset (ἐξ ἐφόδου καὶ ῥᾳδίως τρεψάμενοι), an expression which would hardly be appropriate, if 114 vessels had been taken. Such a number of captured vessels would make the victory near the Hermaan promontory a more brilliant one than that of Ecnomus; and it would, BOOK IV. Destruction of the Roman coast of Sicily. war in Africa till they had utterly overthrown Carthage, they would have been able now to carry their plan into execution, though not under such favourable circumstances as before the defeat of Regulus. The fact, however, that they did not do this, and that they sent no new army to Africa,' strengthens the inference suggested by the withdrawal of half of the invading army after the landing of Regulus, viz., that the expedition to Africa was undertaken only for the sake of plundering and injuring the land, and for dividing the Carthaginian forces. The only use made of the victory at the Hermæan promontory was to take into their ships the remnant of the legions of Regulus and the spoils which had been collected in Clypea. now, The Roman fleet sailed back to Sicily heavily laden. But after so much well-merited success, a misfortune fleet off the overtook them on the southern coast of Sicily from which no bravery could protect them. A fearful hurricane destroyed the greater number of the ships, and strewed the entire shore, from Camarina to the promontory Pachynus, with wrecks and corpses. Only eighty vessels escaped destruction, a miserable remnant of the fleet which, after twice conquering the Carthaginians, seemed able from this time forward to exercise undisputed dominion over the sea. to say the least, be surprising that Polybius should dispose of it in three lines, whilst he devotes as many chapters to the battle of Ecnomus. Zonaras (viii. 14), in his description of the battle near the Hermæan promontory, differs widely from Polybius. Dion Cassius, whom Zonaras abridged, had evidently drawn his information from another source, possibly from Philinus. According to this account the battle was long doubtful, and was at last decided in favour of the Romans when those Roman vessels which had wintered in Clypea advanced and attacked the Carthaginians in the rear. This is another instance which shows that the detail of descriptions of battles deserves as yet little credit. Polybius says nothing of a landing of Roman troops in Clypea, and of a battle with the Carthaginians, reported by Zonaras (viii. 14), in which (according to Orosius, iv. 9) 9,000 of them were killed. This alleged victory was probably gained only on paper by some patriotic Roman annalist, as a set-off against the defeat of Regulus. Third Period, 254-250. THE VICTORY AT PANORMUS. CHAP. III. THIRD PERIOD, B.C. Capture of Panormus by Cn. Cornelius It was among such reverses as these that Rome showed her greatness. In three months a new fleet of 220 ships joined the remnant of the disabled fleet in Messana, and sailed towards the western part of the island, to attack the 254-250 fortresses of the Carthaginians, who, little expecting such a result, were fully engaged in Africa in subduing and punishing their revolted subjects. Thus it happened that the Romans made a signal and important conquest. Next to Lilybæum and Drepana, Panormus was the most considerable Carthaginian stronghold in Sicily. Its situation on the north coast, in connexion with the Punic stations on the Liparæan Islands, made it easy for an enemy to attack and ravage the Italian coast. The place, which, under Punic dominion, had reached a high state of prosperity, consisted in a strongly fortified old town and a suburb or new town, which had its own walls and towers. This new town was now attacked by the Romans with great force both by land and sea, and after a vigorous resistance it fell into their hands. The defenders took refuge in the old town, which was more strongly fortified; and here, after a long blockade, they were forced by hunger to surrender. They were allowed to buy themselves off each for two minæ. By this means 10,000 of the inhabitants obtained their freedom. The remainder, 13,000 in number, who had not the means to pay the sum required, were sold as slaves. This brilliant success was gained by Cn. Cornelius Scipio, who six years before had been taken prisoner in Lipara, and had since then gained his freedom either by ransom or exchange. The undisturbed blockade of the important town of Failure of Panormus, in the neighbourhood of Drepana and Lilybæum, the second The ransom must have been paid either by the Carthaginian state, or by friends or relatives of the captives, not living in Panormus, for according to the laws of war all the money and valuables contained in Panormus fell into the hands of the Romans. BOOK Roman ex Africa. shows that at that time the Carthaginians had not a sufficient army in Sicily, as otherwise they would certainly have tried to deliver Panormus.' They were fully engaged pedition to in Africa. The Romans accordingly ventured in the same year to attack Drepana, and though their enterprise failed, they attempted in the following year to take even Lilybæum, and then made a second expedition into Africa, most probably in order to take advantage of the difficulties of the Carthaginians in their own country. This undertaking, which, like the former invasion, was intended to be only a raid on a large scale, utterly failed, producing not even the glory which crowned the first acts of Regulus. The great Roman fleet, with two consular armies on board, sailed towards the same coast on which Regulus had landed, east of the Hermæan promontory, where lay the most flourishing part of the Carthaginian territory. The Romans succeeded in landing in different places, and collecting spoil; but nowhere, as formerly in Clypea, could they obtain a firm footing. At last the ships were cast on the sand banks in the shallow waters of the lesser Syrtis (Gulf of Cabes), and could only be got afloat again with the greatest trouble, on the return of the tide, and after everything had been thrown overboard that could be dispensed with. The return voyage resembled a flight, and near the Palinurian promontory on the coast of Lucania (west of Policastro) the ships were overtaken by a terrible storm, in which a hundred and fifty of them were lost. The repetition of such a dreadful misfortune in so short a time, the loss of two magnificent fleets within three years, quite disgusted the Romans with the sea. They resolved to relinquish for the future all naval expeditions, and, devoting all their energies to their land army, to keep equipped only as many ships as might be needed to supply the army in Sicily with pro It is stated that in this year the Carthaginians retook Agrigentum, and that they would have reconquered the whole of Sicily if they had not been informed of the arrival of both consuls (Zonaras, viii. 14). The latter assertion is an unmeaning phrase, and as to Agrigentum, it is hardly probable that after its repeated captures that town can have been a place of much importance or military strength. III. THIRD PERIOD, visions, and to afford all necessary protection to the coast CHAP. of Italy. We may fairly feel surprised at finding in the Capitoline fasti the record of a victory of the consul C. Sempronius Blæsus over the Punians. If such a triumph 254-250 really was celebrated after such an utter failure, it would follow that under certain circumstances the honour was easily obtained. B.C. tion of both sides. The two years of the war which now followed were years Exhausof exhaustion and comparative rest on both sides. The war, which had now lasted twelve years, had caused innumerable losses, and still the end was far off. The Romans had, it is true, according to our reports, been conquerors in almost every engagement, not only by land, but, what was prized far higher and gave them far greater satisfaction, by sea also. The defeat of Regulus was the only reverse of any importance which their army by land had experienced. In consequence of that reverse they had to leave Africa; but in Sicily they had gradually advanced further westward. The towns which at the beginning of the war had been only doubtful possessions, inclining first to one side and then to the other, were all either in the iron grip of the Romans, or were destroyed and had lost all importance as military stations. In the west the limits of the territory where the Carthaginians were still able to offer a vigorous resistance were more and more contracted. From Agrigentum and Panormus they had fallen back upon Lilybæum and Drepana, and even towards these the Romans had already stretched out their hands. Still more, Rome had contended for the mastery over the sea with the greatest maritime power in the world, and had been victorious in each of the three great naval engagements. But they were not at home on that element, and in the two tremendous storms of the years. 255 and 253 they lost, with the fruits of their heroic That the Capitoline fasti are utterly unworthy of credit we have already seen (i. 280 et seq.; 528, note 2). In the present instance the alleged triumph of C. Sempronius Ti. f. Ti. n. Blæsus Cos de Poenis is no doubt a forgery, imported into the public annals through the mendacity of the Sempronian family. |