BOOK Movements of Adherbal and the Carthaginian fleet. Relief of by invited their former comrades to mutiny, they were driven back by stones and arrows. Many months had passed since the beginning of the blockade. While the Roman army had inclosed the town on the land side by a continuous circumvallation and trenches which extended in a half circle from the northern to the southern shore, the fleet had blockaded the harbour and endeavoured to obstruct all entrance by sinking stones. Lilybæum was thus shut off from all communication with Carthage, and was left to itself and the courage of its garrison. But it was neither forgotten nor neglected. It might be supposed in Carthage that a town like Lilybæum would be able to hold out for some months without needing aid, and it had been well supplied with provisions before the siege began. It was well known also that if it were necessary to break through the blockade, the Roman ships would not be able to hinder it. Probably the greater part of their ships were drawn up on shore, while the rowers were employed in filling up the moat. Some few ships might be out at sea, or might be lying at anchor, ready to sail, in well-protected roadsteads; but the violent storms, and the still more dangerous shallows of that coast, rendered it impossible for the Roman captains to make the blockade of Lilybæum effective. The Carthaginian fleet which was stationed at Drepana, under the command of Adherbal, instead of attacking the Roman fleet before Lilybæum, made use of the time to scour the coasts of Italy and Sicily, and to hinder the conveyance of provisions for the supply of the immense besieging army. Meanwhile an expedition was fitted out in Carthage for Lilybæum reinforcing and victualling the garrison of Lilybæum, Hannibal. An enterprising admiral called Hannibal, a man not unworthy of this great name, sailed with fifty ships and 10,000 men from Africa to the Ægatian Islands, west of Lilybæum. Here he lay, quietly hoping for a favourable 1 Diodorus, xxiv. fr. 1. Fifteen ships laden with stones were sunk. According to Diodorus (xxiv. fr. 1), the force wind.' At last it blew strong from the west; Hannibal now unfurled all sail, and without paying attention to the Roman ships, but still fully equipped for an encounter, steered through the difficult channels between cliffs and sandbanks towards the entrance of the harbour, where the stones which the Romans had sunk had long since been washed away by the storms. The Romans, seized with astonishment and admiration, dared not obstruct the way of the Carthaginian vessels, which shot past them heavily laden, and with their decks crowded with soldiers, ready for battle. The walls and towers of Lilybæum were lined with its valiant defenders, who, with mingled fear and hope, looked on at the grand spectacle. The harbour was gained without loss. The complete success of this undertaking inspired the besieged with fresh hope and courage, and gave the Romans warning that Lilybæum was not likely soon to be in their power. CHAP. III. FOURTH PERIOD, 250-249 B.C. Himilco determined to avail himself of the enthusiasm Unsuccessful which Hannibal's arrival had stirred up. Sallying out on attempt of the following morning, he made an attempt to destroy Himilco to destroy the the machines for the siege. But the Romans had antici- Roman pated this, and offered obstinate resistance. The battle works. was long undecided, especially near the Roman works, which the Carthaginians tried in vain to set on fire. At length Himilco saw the futility of his attempt, and commanded a retreat. In this manner the Roman soldiers were compensated for the vexation which the superiority of their enemies at sea had caused them on the previous day. amounted to 40,000 men. He relates some interesting details, but on the whole his narrative is confused and inaccurate. It has been asked (Haltaus, Gesch. der Römer, i. 384) why the Romans did not attack him. The reply to this question is contained in what has been stated in the text. Most of the Roman ships were drawn ashore, the crews were employed at the siege-works, and a great number of the men had already perished. According to Polybius (i. 44, § 4), the Romans feared to be drifted into the harbour. This shows clearly that the harbour was untenable for Roman ships. See above, p. 83, note 2. BOOK Departure of Hanni bal with his fleet. Capture of the Rhodian The night following, Hannibal sailed away again with his fleet. He went to Drepana, taking with him the horsemen, who till now had lain in Lilybæum, and were of no use there, while in the rear of the Roman army they could do excellent service, partly in harassing the enemy, and partly in obstructing the arrival of provisions by land.' The bold exploit of Hannibal had proved that the port of Lilybæum was open to a Carthaginian fleet. From this Hannibal. time even isolated vessels ventured in and out, and defied the slow Roman cruisers, who gave themselves useless trouble to intercept them. A Carthaginian captain, called the Rhodian Hannibal, made himself specially conspicuous by eluding the Romans in his fast-sailing trireme, slipping in between them and purposely allowing them almost to reach him, that he might make them the more keenly feel his superiority. The Romans, in their vexation, now sought again to block up the mouth of the harbour. But the storms and the floods mocked their endeavours. The stones, even in the act of sinking, Polybius says, were thrown on one side of the current; 2 but in one place the passage was narrowed, at least for a time, and, luckily for the Romans, a quick-sailing Carthaginian galley3 ran aground there, and fell into their hands. Manning it with their best rowers, they waited for the Rhodian, who, coming out of the harbour with his usual confidence, was now overtaken. Seeing that he could not escape by dint of speed, Hannibal turned round and attacked his pur 1 Diodorus (xxiv. fr. 1) relates that 7,000 horse, which in the beginning of the siege formed part of the garrison, were afterwards sent to Drepana because they were of no use in Lilybæum. He does not state the time when this was done. The inference contained in the text seems obvious. The cavalry could not leave Lilybæum by land, as the Romans, in the very beginning of the siege, had drawn a ditch and mound all along the land side of Lilybæum from sea to sea. The first opportunity for dispatching the cavalry by sea to Drepana presented itself when Hannibal left the port of Lilybæum, and could as easily take the men and horses as ballast. 2 Polybius, i. 47, § 4. This fast galley was a Teτpńρns (quadriremis), i.e. a vessel with four rows of oars.-Polybius, i. 47, § 5. suers; but he was unequally matched in strength, and was taken prisoner with his ship. CHAP. III. FOURTH PERIOD, B.C. Distress of the garri son of Lilybæum. Trifling encounters like these could have but little influence on the progress of the siege. Slowly, but securely, 250-249 the Roman works proceeded. The dam which levelled the filled-up moat became broader and broader; the artillery and battering-rams were directed against the towers which still remained standing; mines were dug under the second inner wall, and the besieged were too weak to keep pace with the works of the Romans by counter-mines. It appeared that the loss of Lilybæum was unavoidable unless the besieged should receive some unlooked-for aid. Roman works. In this desperate situation Himilco determined to repeat, Destrucunder more favourable circumstances, the attempt which tion of the had once so signally failed.' One night, when a gale siegeof wind was blowing from the west, which overthrew towers and made the buildings in the town tremble and shake, he made a sally, and this time he succeeded in setting fire to the Roman siege-works. The dry wood was at once kindled, and the violent wind fanned the flame into ungovernable fury, blowing the sparks and smoke into the eyes of the Romans, who in vain called up all their courage and perseverance in the hopeless contest with their enemies and the elements. One wooden structure after another was caught by the flames, and burnt to the ground. When the day dawned, the spot was covered with charred beams. The labour of months was destroyed in a few hours, and for the present all hope was lost of taking Lilybæum by storm. ance of the Romans. The consuls now changed the siege into a blockade, a Perseverplan which could not hold out any prospect of success so long as the port was open. But it was not in the nature of the Romans easily to give up what they had once undertaken. Their character in some measure resembled that of the bull-dog, which when it bites will not let ' Polybius, i. 48. BOOK go. Their The winter blockade. The winter had come, with its heavy rains, its storms, and all its usual discomforts. One of the two consuls, with two legions, returned home; the rest of the army remained in the fortified camp before Lilybæum. The Roman soldiers were not accustomed to pass the bad season of the year in tents, exposed to wet, cold, and all kinds of privations. They were in want of indispensable necessaries. The consuls had hoped to be able in the course of the summer to take Lilybæum by storm,3 and therefore the troops were probably not prepared for a winter campaign. Added to all this came hunger, the worst of all evils at this juncture, bearing in its train ravaging sickness. Ten thousand men succumbed to these sufferings, and the survivors were in such pitiable case that they were like a besieged garrison in the last stage of exhaustion. Thus is explained the fact that Polybius speaks twice of the construction of lines of circumvallation-i. 42, § 8, and i. 48, § 10. The siege of Sebastopol, 1854-55, affords a parallel case and an illus- 3 |