them chronologically, i. e. grouped together in order of time, no longer studying a particular subject, but the whole literature of a particular age. Contemporary writers on different subjects may thus be compared, with a view to discover how the peculiar spirit of a period manifests itself through minds engaged on such various matter; to examine how far institutions or political events may have influenced the tone of thought and speculation in a country; to ascertain what changes may have been produced by one master spirit, marking one of the great epochs in the history of the human mind, and how the development of that creative thought may be traced through successive writers. In this manner we may imbibe the real spirit of a literature, and study the intellectual history of a people, without which their public annals are meagre and uninteresting.

It is evident how closely the study of national literature is connected with that of national history; but we must say a few words to prevent being misunderstood when we urge the importance of the latter. We are far from wishing to encourage that national vanity which takes no interest but in the history of our own country, feels no sympathy for the deeds of heroes, or the struggles of a people against oppression, unless they belong to our own tribe of the human race. It is not to feed such pride as this that we say all are bound to study the history, and know something of the laws and institutions, of their native land. That history traces the progress by which the laws under which we actually live, which regulate our property, modify our modes of living, and influence our social happiness, have grown to their present state; and therefore, while the study of general history is a matter of choice, this claims a place among points of essential importance. Nor is there cause for shame in the greater interest we take in it, so long as it does not degenerate into a base and selfish vanity. It is with national as with family pride, — its character depends on the individual. The true aristocratic spirit, which is no offspring of political institutions, but deeply rooted in the human mind, may, in its high and chivalrous sense, belong to nations as to families, and become a useful and noble stimulus. It may, indeed, degenerate, as we too often see, into

the mean vanity of titles and position, whose gilding scarcely hides the vile materials beneath, but it may also be a shield against evil, and, woven with a long train of lofty associa tions, it may prove an armor of defence in some of life's stormy conflicts. The heir of a noble name, the descendant of an Eliot, a Hampden, or a Sidney, may well feel that there is a chasm between him and any baseness, which he can pass only by trampling on the memories of his fathers. This is the true aristocratic spirit, and this may belong also to a nation. The heritage of national glory may be felt to leave a noble, yet heavy, responsibility on those who are intrusted with the care of transmitting it to posterity. The high deeds of those who have con tributed to that glory are recorded on monuments familiar to our eyes, or which first stirred our useful emulation; the privi leges we value, the freedom and security we enjoy, were won for us by the struggles of generations now sleeping in the graves over which our childish steps have wandered: these are the things which give an individual interest to national history, and enlist our warmest sympathies in its events. It was one of the most unphilosophical attempts of modern philosophy to reason down the love of country. The cosmopolite may prove, in good set terms, that he is bound to love all nations as much as the land of his birth, but if the extent of his devotion to either could be proved, we should know the value of this general benevolence. So long as family affections shall be stronger than the social, so long also will the love of our own country be stronger than that of any other. So long as the feelings kindle at the thoughts of home, so long as the associations of childhood have power over the heart of man, or the recollections of youth have a charm, or familiar objects a voice, or the sound of our native tongue heard again after a long absence stirs the soul like some magic spell, so long as human nature is alive to these involuntary impressions, the land of our birth will still, in defiance of theories, be dearer than all other lands; and the most refined mind may share the emotion which makes the rude ship's crew rend the air with their cheers as the touching cry "Home" welcomes the first sight of their native shore.

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Acquaintance with the history and constitution of our country is also necessary to enable us to take an enlightened interest in politics, the living history of our own times; and, in these days of political strife, of party feeling and violence, how expedient is it that we should at least be able to give a reason for the part we espouse, or defend the neutrality we attempt to maintain.

It is one of the strangest of prejudices with regard to women, which has put the study of politics under a ban, while history is made the principal object of most girls' reading. What interest can we feel in the heroes and great men of former days, if we have no sympathy for generous spirits toiling around us now? What interest can we have in the changes of government, the prevalence of this or that opinion in past ages, if we remain unconcerned for the conflict of opinions, of which the din reaches our own ears? This must remain an unaccountable inconsistency, unless we are allowed to suspect that persons who are indifferent to politics are, in truth, equally indifferent to history; and that, if the custom of society did not require some knowledge of historical facts, they would have remained as contentedly ignorant of them as of politics.

Even the only reasonable ground of objection against politics, namely, their tendency to create violence and disputes, is not an evil belonging to the subject itself, but to the minds of the individuals occupied with it. No doubt, for those engaged in the actual strife of politics, impartiality is most difficult to maintain ; but we see no reason why the by-standers should not form as sound and unbiased a judgment on this subject as on any other. If it is said that motives of self-interest are so often stirred by political questions as to produce unwonted disturbance of the judgment, this is in truth to allege that the persons of whom it is said are incapable of considering the simple grounds of an argument, and that the moment their feelings are interested, they naturally cease to reason, and adopt the prejudice which is most favorable to their interest.

Female partisanship, which is often as violent as it is inexcusable, arises from the defects in women we have so frequent

ly alluded to before, i. e. the prevalence of feeling over judg ment, and want of knowledge of the subjects on which they give an opinion. They at once assume that cause to be wrong which is supported by men they dislike, and rush into the discussion with all the boldness and all the inconsistency of the crudest ignorance. It is easy and exciting to canvass for a favorite member, to run about from house to house, gathering and spreading news, during an election or a change of ministry, and to foster ill-will and petty jealousies among tradesmen and dependants, by mean and invidious distinctions, while it requires thought and attention to be able to reason and form an opinion on political questions; and the female politician is, therefore, too often satisfied with the former. Too ignorant, or too impetuous, to understand either the arguments of opponents or those of the party she calls her own, she is all the more unconquerable that there is "no weak side of common sense whereat to attack her."

This exhibition is as melancholy as it is mischievous, and timid minds, who are always content just to check an evil, without considering what positive good might be substituted for it by a little caution, naturally cry out that women should leave politics alone. But the part of women might be a noble one in the arena of political discussion, did they but enter into it with better knowledge and a better spirit. Removed from the actual strife, spared all the excitement and irritation of public life, they should avail themselves of their privilege to maintain calmness and freedom from prejudice in their own minds, to discover and appreciate worth and high principle under whatever banner it may be found, and to assert the great cause of truth and charity above all party and sectarian interests. They might become the peacemakers in men's divisions, instead of adding to the clamor of party, in which, at the best, much injustice is mingled, by marking points of agreement rather than points of difference, and striving to win men back from the consideration of petty and local questions, which are too apt to engross those practically concerned with them, to the wide views and principles in which the lowering influence of

interest and passion is less felt. When women shall thus cultivate and use political knowledge, female politicians will speedily lose the bad name they have so often deserved.

May not, we would ask, another serious evil, namely, the too frequent want of an earnest public spirit, and love of the public good, be traced in great measure to the general want among women of a rational interest in politics, and to their keeping apart from the great interests that agitate society? One of the dangers of a period of inquiry and rationalism (and we use this word in its true and noble sense) is, lest men should become cold in becoming philosophical, and lose earnestness of character and endeavor. The prejudices which alone govern them in a ruder condition are generally bound up with the feelings, and act, therefore, immediately as motives; but in order that a simple conviction should have the same power, it requires that conscience should be habitually guided by reason; that whatever the latter discerns to be true, the former should feel to be right, and belonging to duty; otherwise, the convictions of the reason remain barren and without effect upon the will. In other words, a higher degree of moral development is required in proportion to the greater mental activity of any period. When, for instance, the trammels of an ignorant superstition are first cast aside, and men learn to inquire into their faith, the force which makes fanaticism almost sublime is broken down; for a time religion seems weak and cold, and greater cultivation is needed, a clearer exercise of the reason, and a more earnest conscientiousness, to make men walk steadily forward in the path on which they were impelled of yore by the blind impulse of fear and superstitious reverAnd so with regard to public spirit; loyalty, the form it assumed in other times, was a sentiment bound up with ignorant prejudice and lofty emotions. It also was a superstition beyond the province of reason, and men did not argue about it, but they died for it. Now public feeling is founded on a different basis; it no longer assumes the form of devotion to a monarch, but is transferred (nominally, at least) to the nation; now men know, or they pretend to know, why they adhere to

ence.