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HERODOTUS' AVOWAL OF SILENCE

IN HIS ACCOUNT OF EGYPT

BY

IVAN M. LINFORTH

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLICATIONS IN CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY

Vol. 7, No. 9, pp. 269-292

ISSUED SEPTEMBER 22, 1924

ACCOUNT OF EGYPT

BY

IVAN M. LINFORTH

Herodotus learned much about Egypt from his conversation with the priests of Ptah (Hephaestus) in Memphis, and seeking corroboration of what they had told him he made similar inquiries in Thebes and Heliopolis. Presumably, the material for his description and history of Egypt was drawn, in large measure, from the accounts which he received in these three cities, though it was supplemented by personal observations and by the scattered information which he gathered in his travels in Egypt.

Now the information which was imparted by the priests Herodotus divides into two classes, τὰ θεῖα and τὰ ἀνθρωπήια. “I do not care to relate," he says, "the kind of things which were told me about the gods, with the single exception of their names, because, in my opinion, one people knows neither more nor less about them than another; and if I do allude to any of these matters, it will be because I am compelled to do so by the course of the narrative. But as for human events, etc."

If one returns to this statement after reading the book to which it forms a preface, he must be somewhat puzzled at the apparent incongruity between Herodotus' announced purpose and his actual performance. He asserts that he will have as little as possible to say about feia, and yet the story of Egypt has more on the subject of religion than any other part of the history; he promises to tell us the names of the Egyptian gods, and as a matter of fact very few Egyptian names are mentioned. If this inconsistency is real, we must conclude that Herodotus was writing carelessly and was forgetful of this principle which he had proclaimed at the beginning.

1 II 3 τὰ μέν νυν θεῖα τῶν ἀπηγημάτων οἷα ἤκουον, οὐκ εἰμὶ πρόθυμος ἐξηγέεσθαι, ἔξω ἢ τὰ οὐνόματα αὐτῶν μοῦνον, νομίζων πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἴσον περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπίστασθαι. τὰ δ ἂν ἐπιμνησθέω αὐτῶν, ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἐξαναγκαζόμενος ἐπιμνησθήσομαι. ὅσα δὲ ἀνθρωπήια πρήγματα κτλ.

But there is clear proof that he meant it seriously and did not forget it. Later in the book he takes occasion to repeat the substance of his preface. "If I should undertake," he says, "to explain the causes which have led the Egyptians to treat animals as sacred, I should become involved in the subject of beîa πρýyμaтa,—a subject which I avoid at all costs. Where I have touched lightly on such subjects, it has been impossible for me to avoid it." Here he reaffirms his reluctance to deal with eîa, and again admits that his reluctance can be overcome by necessity. Indeed, he tells us plainly that he has already broken his rule. In what he has written between the prefatory remark and this repetition of it, there are to be found beta of the prohibited kind; and, furthermore, we learn that a discussion of the origin of the sanctity of animals would lead to Oeia. This repetition of the preface shows that it was not θεία. written thoughtlessly by Herodotus, but that he recognized it as a definite principle and was guided by it in the course of composition.

Since, therefore, it appears that Herodotus meant what he said and knew what he was about, we cannot escape the inference that the impression which we receive from his prefatory remark is in some way erroneous. In order to correct this impression it is necessary to ask and answer a few plain questions. What were, really, τà Ocîa in the stories of the priests? What was Herodotus' distinction between Oeia and aveρwπnia? How can a definition of Ocia be framed which will justify the inclusion of the religious lore which he recounts so freely in this book? What passages is he thinking of when he says that, if he does allude to Oeia, it will be only because he is forced to do so by the course of the narrative? Why is he unwilling to introduce eta into his narrative? What is the necessity which leads him to break his rule in some places? How can we reconcile the exception which is made in favor of names with the actual fact that Egyptian divine names are conspicuously absent?

2 τῶν δὲ εἵνεκεν ἀνεῖται [τὰ] ἱρὰ εἰ λέγοιμι, καταβαίην ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἐς τὰ θεία πρήγματα, τὰ ἐγὼ φεύγω μάλιστα ἀπηγέεσθαι. τὰ δὲ καὶ εἴρηκα αὐτῶν ἐπιψαύσας, ἀναγκαίῃ καταλαμβανόμενος εἶπον (ii 65).

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