the affairs of the world; for all fuch concern would deftroy its own ease and reft, and confequently its happiness. For it was a maxim with them, Nifi quietum nibil beatum; and again, as Velleius in Tully expreffes their common fentiment, which, it's plain, had its original from their own love of ease and laziness of temper, Nos autem beatam vitam in animi fecuritate, & in omnium vacatione munerum ponimus.

2. As for those who are not fo much under the power of their bodily appetites or paffions, but that they can fee the grofs deformity of them, and how much they debase human nature when men are led by them and are therefore afhamed of fuch a brutal life as vifibly finks them below the use of human Reason; yet even these men may have inward vices of the mind, which without a fincere and honeft attention to the fecret workings of their own hearts, may produce. as perverfe effects in their reasonings, and more incurable. For Infidelity may often arife from pride and felf-conceit, which difposes men of parts and learning to an affectation of fingularity and a defire of feeming wifer than other people, by maintaining paradoxes, and contradicting all opinions that

are

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are vulgarly received, for that very reason because they are so: And they that are of a lighter and vainer temper, and value themselves upon an appearance of wit in converfation, proceed fometimes to ridicule and laugh at things of the highest nature, instead of arguing foberly about them. That mens indulging this kind of temper in themselves has been a temptation to them to embrace Atheistical opinions in other polite ages and countries befides our own, is plain from what Plato observed long ago, who when, in one of his Dialogues, he brings in Clinias difputing against Atheism from the common topicks of the beauty and harmony of the universe, the regular motions of the heavenly bodies, and the common notions of mankind, in which all nations Greeks and Barbarians agreed concerning a God and a Providence, makes an Athenian stranger reply to him, That be was afraid there were a Set of ill men in the world who would defpife and laugh at fuch old and common arguments. It may be, fays he, that you who live here, remote from the city, may imagine that intemperance in pleasure and fenfual luft is the only cause of fuch impiety; but there is another ground of

Lib. 1c, de Legibus. p. 886.

it

it befides this, and that ↳ is a certain grievous ignorance pretending to the greatest wisdom. Plato knew that at Athens, the feat of wit and learning, there were fome great pretenders to Philosophy, who maintained atheistical opinions upon a formed hypothefis contrary to the antient doctrine, and fome no doubt set themselves up for wits upon that account, not that they really had any fuperiority of understanding above those that went before, but because they affected fomething that might diftinguish them from the reft of the world, if it was only in point of novelty. We fee that in other cafes befides Religion, this temper often leads men to a spirit of contradiction, in the gratifying of which men may fall into very foul mistakes and abfurdities themfelves, while they imagine themselves to be only exposing and ridiculing the follies and abfurdities of other people. And that the fame temper may mislead men in respect of the principles of Religion, is more than probable from the manner of writing which those men generally purfue, who appear forwardest in the cause of infidelity. There does not often seem to be in them fo great a concern for truth, as a defire of

Η Αμαλία μάλα χαλεπή δοκὅσα εἶναι μεγίση φρόνησις. De legg. 1.10. p.888. ed. Serrani.

of fhewing their own parts: nor are they ever fo forward in laying down any confiftent scheme of principles of their own, as in contradicting the most commonly received principles of others. They feem defirous of being taken for men of deeper reach than their neighbours, that are not to be imposed upon by vulgar opinions, but can spy the weakness or failure of thofe arguments which to others, that are more modeft, have always appeared very convincing. A certain felf-confidence, mix'd with a contempt of other mens understanding, is very apt to betray men into a wrong use of their reason, and to make them ftrike into odd and fingular ways of thinking, only because they are new and contrary to that which others have chofen upon much better confideration; and we see that there is nothing so abfurd but what if once ftarted will find fome profelytes for a while, if it be only for the novelty of it.

It has been thought by fome, That the chief reason why all men affent to the truth of Mathematical demonftrations, when plainly proposed to them, is because none of those truths interfere with the interefts, paffions or inclinations of any man; because if they did, men concerned would find some pretence

to evade the force of them. I will not affirm that this is the only reafon of fuch univerfal affent to Geometrical conclufions; but the fuppofal however evidently allows, that fome truths, which in their own nature are capable of fufficient proof, may be disbelieved or rejected through prejudice, or prepoffeffion of interest or paffion, or fome partial or vitious disposition of mind in those to whom the proof is offered. It is certain, that what men do not like, they are very unwilling to understand, though they will not easily be brought to own this for the reason, but will always find out fome colour or other to avoid the fufpicion of fuch partiality.

But befides these perfonal indifpofitions of mind, which may give a trong biafs towards Infidelity, there is one thing farther which appears to have great influence over fome mens reasoning, even in the first principles of Religion, and that is

3. An inconfiderate and indistinguishing averfion to Superftition, which evil they think can never be effectually cured, but by destroying the very foundation of Religion itself. It is a very common practice, in many inftances, for those that are grown weary of the folly and mischief of one extream, prefently and with

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