hitherto spoken, is built, or from what original it proceeds. Which I fhall take occafion to do from these words of St. Paul.

The queftion now before us is, What fufficient cause there can be affigned for fo univerfal an effect? And the Apostle fays, that what is or may be known of God, is manifest among men, because God hath fhewed it unto them; intimating thereby, That the univerfal notice which mankind hath of a Deity, is made unto them by God himself; and the way by which he conveys to them this notice, of his own Being and Power, and other knowable Attributes, is by his Works. For the invifible things of him, even his eternal Power and Godhead, from the creation of the world, are clearly discovered, being understood by the things that are made. It is not very material to determine, whether the words, from the creation of the world, be here to be understood for the work of creation, from whence they might collect the power of God the Creator; or to fignify the time of the creation, when man was first made; the power of God being to be known by all men, from that time, by his works, or by the things that are made and preferved by him.

M 3

For

For, take the words in either of these fenfes, the affertion contained under them will come to much the fame, and fignifies, that God, by his works of creation and providence, both ordinary and extraordinary, hath afforded unto all men, ever since the world began, fufficient means of being convinced of his eternal Power and Godhead: In the judgment therefore of the Apostle, that universal perfuafion of mankind, concerning God's existence, is from God himself, and therefore proves his Being. But the name of an Apostle, is of no authority, to perfuade those men who difown all revealed Religion; and therefore we must view this argument in another light, and confider the Truth contained in it, only in the way of natural reafon and difcourfe. And in order to this, let us examine the feveral ways by which fo general a perfuafion can reafonably be fuppofed to have prevailed in all ages, as this concerning the Being of God is known to have done; and we fhall find, that they all confpire manifeftly to prove the truth and certainty of the thing fo generally believed. For that all forts of men, fo diftant from each other, both in time and place, fo different in manners and customs, fo difagreeing in their fentiments and opinions about all other mat

ters,

ters, and so opposite in their interests, should thus conftantly concur in one fundamental opinion, upon which, notwithstanding they have raised such contradictory superstructures, must neceffarily prove, that they all have it from some common original, antecedent in nature to all the notions or opinions in which they differ.

Now the feveral ways, by which this univerfality of belief can be fufficiently accounted for, may be reduced to these three that follow.

1. This general concurrence in the acknowledgment of a Deity, may proceed from fome common Inftruction, conveyed down from one to another, from the very beginning of mankind; and by that means derived into the feveral ages and nations of men.

Or,

2. It may, in fome measure, arise from the natural Frame or Make of every man's mind; difpofing him clearly to apprehend the truth and certainty of it, upon the first propofing. Or,

3. It may be discovered as a plain and neceffary Conclufion, deducible, by common principles of reafon, from what is obvious to the fenfe and experience of every confiderate man, who will but attend to those effects

1

of power, wisdom and goodness, which daily present themselves to him.

It is not neceffary to affign any one of these three grounds of perfuafion, exclufively of the reft, for this universal consent of mankind, in the matter of which we are now speaking; because we may be fully fatisfied, that each of them have their fhare, either in producing, or continuing, or confirming, this general belief among men; and each of them, duly confidered, is a strong evidence for the truth of what is intended to be proved by them. Neither do they at all interfere with one another; for though, according to mens different ways of reasoning, one of them may appear more convincing to one man, and another to another, according as different men turn their attention more to one than to another; yet the afferting of one, does not in the least weaken the force of the other.

The Apostle here in the Text, feems principally to infift upon the last ground of belief, viz. That of natural reasoning from the manifeft works of God; because he is speaking of those, who profeffing themselves wife, or affuming the name of philofophers, yet became fools, in this practice of abominable Idolatry, as well as the more ignorant vulgar;

they

they became vain in their imaginations or reafonings, while they worshipp'd the creature; which, if they had reasoned justly and carefully, would rather have led them to the acknowledgment and adoration of the Creator; or would have kept up that original notion of God, which the lefs inquifitive part of mankind had, for a long time, delivered down from one to another. But yet, by this reasoning from the works of God, he does by no means intend to fet afide, but rather confirms all the other ways, whereby the knowledge of God is conveyed to mankind. And therefore we may confider each of them separately: And,

1. If we suppose this general concurrence, in the acknowledgment of a Deity, to have proceeded from fome common instruction or institution at first, and so to have been conveyed down, from one age to another, by tradition: This will neceffarily lead us to the first original of mankind; and fo make it highly credible, that they all, at firft, fprung from one common-stock. For, as b I have formerly obferved, no particular age or nation can be affigned, fince mankind was far spread over

the

b See Serm, the iv. and v.