if nature makes nothing imperfect, [or without an end] nor in vain, then she must have made all these things for men.

2. It is obferved, that there is fomething in the very outward ftructure of man, which very remarkably distinguishes him from the other creatures below him; and which, in the apprehenfion of fome perfons of great judgment and penetration, denotes his being chiefly defigned for the exercise of his reafon and understanding; towards which, his erect pofture of Body gives him a particular advantage. Upon which account, Aristotle himself takes notice, that of all animals, man alone is of an upright pofture, because his nature and effence is divine: And the work or business of that which is moft divine, is understanding and thinking; but this work could not be fo eafily perform'd, if there were a great bulk of body placed above (or incumbent upon) the seat of reason and thinking, for weight makes the mind, and the common feat of fenfe or perception, to be hardly moved,

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Δ' Ορθὸν μὲ γάρ ἐτι μόνον * ζώων 2[αὶ τὸ τὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ καὶ τ' ἀσίαν εἶναι Θείαν· ἔργον ἢ τῷ θειοτάτε τὸ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν· τό το δ' ε ῥᾳδιον πολλῷ τῷ ἄνωθεν ἐπικειμθύες σώματα το γδ' άρα δυσκίνη του Wolf 7 Aávorav & noul diDnow. Ariftot, de partib. Animal, 1. 4. c. 10.

ed, or to perform its functions with greater dif ficulty. I will not be answerable for the exact Philosophy of this reafon of Ariftotle's; but however, it shews his opinion, that the foul of man, or that part of him which reafons, and understands, and thinks, is not mere body or matter, but fomething which moves and actuates the body to fuch a degree, and which is therefore of more value than the body, because for the use and convenience of it the body itself was made of fuch a particular figure and fituation of parts. Divers others of the ancients (as • Balbus the Stoic in Tully expreffes their sense) think the figure of the body thus defigned, that by a more commodious viewing the Heavens,men might more readily attain to the knowledge of God; because men were not made merely to dwell upon the earth, but from thence to be spectators of things above and in the Heavens, a fight which

CQui (Deus) primum eos humo excitatos, celfos & rectos conftituit, ut Deorum cognitionem, cœlum intuentes, capere poffent. Sunt enim è terra homines non ut incolæ atque habitatores, fed quafi fpectatores fuperarum rerum atque cœleftium, quarum fpectaculum ad nullum aliud genus animantium pertinet. Cic. de N. D. lib. 2. cap. 56. Pronaque cum fpectant animalia cætera terram, Os homini fublime dedit cœlumque tueri, Juffit & erectos ad fidera tollere vultus, &c.

Ovid.

which no other kind of animals is concerned withal. Indeed, as to this reafon, it must be owned, that if the mere ability to view the Heavens, by the natural fituation of the eye, were all that is intended, there could not be much inferred from it, to the advantage of man above all other creatures, because there are many of them, whofe eyes are made as much, or more, to look upward, as those of man. But the pofition of the eye in the head is not the only thing to be confidered, but the natural elevation of the head, above all the rest of the Body, whereby this ability to look upwards at pleasure, as well as any other way, is render'd more advantageous to man than to any other creature. This is that which makes the argument good, and in this general fense I presume their expreffions ought to be taken. And therefore Socrates in Xenophon, f f very juftly, as well as religiously, makes it an inftance of the care of Providence, that, among many other advantages, it hath given man this erect pofture, to enable bim

{"Επειτ ̓ ἐκ όιει (Θεὸς ἀνθρώπων) Φροντίζειν, οἱ πρῶτον μὲ μός τον ἳ ζώων ἄνθρωπον ὀρθὸν ἀνίσησαν, ἡ ἢ ὀρθότης καὶ προοξῶν πλεῖον ποιες διαύσας, καὶ τὰ ὑπερθεν μᾶλλον θεῖον καὶ ἧττον κακοπαθών. Xenoph. auru. lib. 1. cap. 4. §. 11.

bim to fee further before him, and better to view the things above, and to be less fubject to injury : To which we may add, that it enables him to ufe his hands to many excellent purposes, both of animal and rational life, which he could not do if he had only feet inftead of them.

3. It may be farther observed, that of all vifible creatures, mankind alone has the benefit of Speech, or the power of communicating his thoughts by articulate founds, framed and modelled according to his own discretion. Other creatures have tongues, which serve them for the fame animal uses that the tongue of man ferves him for3. But this ufe of the tongue they have not, nor any other ability of making fignificant founds, except only in fo low a degree as merely to fignify fome preffing natural appetite, or present paffion of joy or grief, refulting from immediate fenfation of pleasure or pain. But in man, the Tongue and other organs of fpeech, befides their other ufes in animal life, are evidently defigned for the communication of reason and thought

Β. Καὶ μίω γλώτταν γε πάντων ? ζώων ἐχόντων, μόνην άν θρώπων ἐποίησαν (οι Θεοί) οἵαν ἄλλοτε ἀλλαγῆ ψαύεσαν τι τόματα αρθρῶν τε 7 φωνὴν καὶ σημαίνειν πάντα ἀλλήλοις βολές Mela. Xenoph. ib. § 12.

thought from one man to another, and so have a plain reference to an higher principle within, which is entirely diftinct from mere animal life.

From these observations, and divers others of like fort, which might be added if it were neceffary, which are frequently to be met. with even in Heathen writers, I think we may very fairly draw this conclufion, That the fame wisdom, power and goodness, which is fo manifeft in the vifible world, does likewise extend itself to things invifible; or that our Souls or Minds, and whatever other fuperior Beings there may be, are not lefs the produЄtion of fome wife, and good, and powerful Being, than our bodies and the bodies of other animals, or the things of an inferior degree, For fince there is in nature a manifeft and regular fubordination of one thing to another, or a gradual progreffion from things perfectly inanimate to things that have vegetative life, and from thence to animals of different degrees of excellence, and from them to man; and fince there is in man an evident relation of his outward or bodily fabrick, to the use of something in him which reasons, and reflects and uses the body, to many purposes, as its inftrument, and fhews its own