Being by performing visible effects upon the body, though itself be invisible; and fince all these several ranks of things tend upwards, and each of them, as it were, point at something above them, to which they own a subjection, at least in point of excellence; it is but reasonable from thence to suppose, that man, which is of this compound nature, made up of fomething vifible and fomething invifible, is, in refpect of his Mind and Reason, as much related to fomething above him, as he is, in respect of his Body, related to the creatures below him. And confequently, whatever Being is the fountain or original of all that power, wifdom and goodness which we admire in the world, it is a Being much more resembling the Soul or thinking part, than the body or paffive part of Man. All material things manifeftly disclaim any intelligence or thought of their own. They are acted indeed and moved in a wife and regular manner, by design and to fome purpose, but they do not act or move themselves. Man has a power of acting or moving himself and other things about him, to a certain degree, and he perceives or is conscious that he has it. But yet withal he is conscious, that he himself did not exist from eternity, and fo could

not

not always have this power: And therefore he perceives, that he depends upon fome other cause for his Being, which did exist before him. And thus whatever perfections or powers there are in the mind of man, they were made or caufed by a Being, yet more perfect, because antecedent to man, and capable of communicating fuch powers and perfections as are in man, which man by experience knows in himself he cannot communicate to any other being. And from hence by neceffary reasoning we may conclude, that the firft caufe of all perfection must neceffarily be Eternal or Self-exiftent, that is, it neither had nor poffibly could have any fuperior or antecedent cause of its being.

But fince this Self-exiftent Being is (as I faid before) much more refembled by the foul or invisible part of man, than by any thing outward or fenfible, its attributes or perfections will be more fully reprefented, and better understood, by being compared with the correspondent powers or perfections in the mind Let us therefore briefly confider the human mind or foul, with respect to those attributes of power, wisdom and goodness, the perfection of which we attribute to the Supreme Being. And we shall find in man not

of man.

R

merely

merely the effects of them, such as are difcernible in all the parts of Nature, as I have before fhewn, but likewise fome image or refemblance of the attributes themselves, or a capacity in the mind of man to exercise them in a limited degree. Thus, for instance, The Mind or Soul of man has a power of actuating the body, though not feen or felt in it; of moving or not moving all or any part of it at pleasure; of determining its motion this way or that way, without being first moved or impelled by any outward force, that is, a power of beginning motion of itself, which is indeed a true and real power, and fuch as matter is not capable of; a power of willing, chufing or acting freely, or without being acted upon by any external agent. I know, that thofe men who are unwilling to allow the Being of any God, but the Universe, or any spiritual substance, or any thing distinct from matter and motion, do likewife of confequence deny this power of beginning motion, or what in other words is called Freewill, to be in man; because they say there is always fome cause or other, which antecedently determines him to chufe and act this way or that way: And by this they think a man is as neceffarily moved to act, as a Clock to ftrike,

ftrike, though it may be by a longer chain of causes, one depending upon another, fo that the impulfive cause cannot be fo immediately feen. But here in this way of reasoning they always either beg the question, that is, would first have us take it for granted, that there is no other Being in the world but matter differently modified, which never acts but as it is acted upon, or else they confound a Moral motive, or rational ground of a man's acting, with a Phyfical efficient caufe: So that an abstracted reason inducing, and a bodily impulfe forcing us to this or that, are with them taken for the fame thing, though they are things as entirely distinct as found and colour; and one would think, that, as Dr. Barrow expreffes it. No man is furely fo dull, that he cannot perceive a huge difference between being dragged by a violent hand, and drawn to action by a strong reafon; although it may puzzle him to express that difference. I might add a great deal more concerning this felf-moving, or felf-determining power in the mind of man, which yet perhaps would be better understood by a man's carefully confulting the operations of his own mind. But this matter has of late been fet in fo clear a

light, by an excellent perfon, h that I think there is no occafion at prefent for enlarging up

on it.

2. As to Wisdom in the mind of man, we may obferve feveral excellent inftances. I need not mention fenfation or perception, which are but the first neceffary inlets to knowledge, or rudiments of it, caufed by the intervention of our outward fenfes, and which perhaps are not peculiar to man. But we may take notice of fuch abilities as these which follow; its power of reflecting upon itself and its own idea's, as well as upon things without itfelf; its comparing, reasoning and judging of things paft, prefent and future; its confidering and fuiting ends to means, and acting always with fome defign or view of good, real or apparent: The power of inventing and contriving, improving and perfecting many noble arts and sciences, by confidering the nature of feveral caufes and their effects, and the dependencies of one thing upon another; the quickness of its thought and its power of representing to itself, in an inftant, things at the greateft diftance, as if they were prefent, without the trouble of lo

cal

See Dr. Clarke's Letters to Mr. Leibnitz.