those contrivances, which are the effects of human Art, then it is an abfurdity not to think the efficient cause of them, in a much higher degree, intelligent than man is. And fince man himself, with all his powers and perfections, could not make himself, but must proceed from a fuperior cause, that cause must have all the real perfections which man has, in an eminent degree, or else those perfections in man would be caufed purely by nothing, which is a manifeft contradiction. But

2. When they fay, that what we account the effects of wisdom, power and goodness, or of an intelligent Being, is only the mere cafual or neceffary refult of matter and motion, this will ftill be liable to the fame abfurdity in the end, that something is caused by nothing. For if there be any intelligent or understanding Being in the world, any Being endued with consciousness and perception, as man is allowed to be, fuch intelligence, perception and consciousness, muft either be a perfection. diftinct from that of matter and motion, produced by a fuperior, active, intelligent Being, which is itself neither matter nor motion (and to allow this, is to own a God and a Spiritual Substance, which is all that we contend for in this argument;) Or it must be a compofi

tion of Unintelligent figure and motion; Or else it must be something caufed by nothing. Now that any compofition of unintelligent figure and motion, should be intelligence, thought, perception or confcioufnefs, is altogether abfurd: Because, whatever the compofition of any material thing is, it is ftill in reality only that thing (or things) of which it is compounded. It is not altered in nature, but only in fituation of parts: It may ap pear differently to our fenfes, but to our reafon it is ftill the fame, let the parts be never fo mix'd or divided. A Globe cut into two Hemispheres, is not a jot nearer to Thought than it was before, because it is only the two parts of the fame whole: nor can two equal Hemifpheres put together have any other nature than what a Globe has: And the like may be faid of all divifions or compositions of figure, or of matter and motion, how various foever. Therefore unless Figure be Thought, and all matter have sense, percep tion and consciousness (which is so abfurd a fuppofition, that though fome have advanced it, yet, I believe, few will maintain it) ther no matter, as fuch, can have it or cause it. And then whatever has fenfe, perception and understanding, if it be not caused by a fupe

rior, intelligent, immaterial Being, must be caused by nothing; that is, there must be an effect without any caufe at all, which is abfurd.

b Tully very often in his writings charges the hypothefis of Epicurus with this abfurdity, of affigning a particular motion of declination to atoms, (which Lucretius calls clinamen principiorum) in order to produce freewill, or a power of acting voluntarily, and yet not pretending to affign any cause of such declination, which, he fays, is the most abfurd blunder that any philofopher can fall. into. And he makes this a fundamental fault in the philofophy d both of Epicurus and Democritus, that they confidered only matter, and not the efficient cause, or power by which things are produced. And indeed whoever does this, will, in the end, be forced

upon

b De Finibus Bon. & mal. l. 1. cap. 6. And in his Book I. de Nat. Deor. cap. 25. and in feveral places of his book de

Fato.

c Ait enim declinare atomum fine causâ, quo nihil turpius phyfico. De finib. 1.1. c. 6.

d Utriufque (Democriti fc. & Epicuri) cum multa non probo, tum illud in primis, quòd cum in rerum naturâ duo quærenda fint, unum, quæ materia fit, ex qua quæque res efficiatur; alterum, quæ vis fit, quæ quidque efficiat; de mate riâ differuerunt, vim & caufam efficiendi reliquerunt. ib.

upon the fame abfurdity that Epicurus was, or fomething very like it. And the removing it a degree further off, will not alter the cafe, unless it be to make the thing more abfurd when we come at it. Juft as Epicurus to avoid one difficulty, which Democritus it feems did not take care to fence againft, run upon this folution, which, as e Tully fays, was much worse than owning the thing to be indefenfible. And this has, in the event, been the cafe of all thofe schemes of Philosophy, which have pretended to make the world without an infinite intelligent Mind being concerned in it.

3. To fuppofe, that all things were from Eternity, fucceeding one another neceffarily, in the way they now are, without any Supreme Intelligent Power to dispose them, or give them motion, will also be equally abfurd. That fomething must have existed from all eternity, cannot be denied by any one;

for

e Epicurus cùm videret fi atomi ferrentur in locum inferiorem fuopte pondere nihil fore in noftrâ poteftate, quod effet earum motus certus & neceffarius; invenit quomodo neceffitatem effugeret, quod videlicet Democritum fugerat. Ait atomum, cum pondere & gravitate directa deorfus feratur, declinare paullulum. Hoc dicere turpius eft quàm illud quod vult, non poffe defendere. De Nat. D. I. 25.

for else nothing could ever have exifted. This muft therefore either be fome one felf-existent, unchangeable, independent Being, from whom all other things originally receive their being; or else there must be an eternal fucceffion of dependent changeable Beings, as this vifible world comprehends, one producing another, without any original cause at all; that is, there must be an infinite series of effects, following one another, without any efficient cause,

which is abfurd.

Ariftotle indeed, is alledged as an afferter of the Eternity of the world; and being a man of a very piercing judgment, Atheists fometimes think themfelves fufficiently defended under the patronage of his name. But if they would really confult his writings, they would find that his arguments afford their cause but very little defence. For whatever eternity he may afcribe to the material world, he is very far from doing it in their sense. He never thought, that matter could move itself, or could be the original caufe of all things; but he makes f an Eternal, Intelligent, Independent

εὍτι ᾧ ἂν ἐσιν ἐσία τις αΐδις καὶ ἀκίνητο, καὶ κεχωρισμών taidnav paving in 7 signujú av. Metaphyf. 1. 12. c. 7. Η μ γδ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἢ ὄντων οἰκίνητον καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ