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dependent Mind to be the firft caufe or principle of all things, and that which gives motion to all things, being itself unmoveable and unchangeable: As may be feen at large both in his Phyficks and Metaphyficks. And he every where makes beauty and order to be the effects of Mind and Understanding. And he commends Anaxagoras in many places, 'g for this principle, that an intending mind was the caufe of what is good and right, and the mover of matter, for fome end and defign. And he is fo far from thinking final or intending causes unphilosophical, that he expofes that Philofophy, as very ridiculous, which pretends to give an account of the formation of animals without

και συμβεβηκός-κὶ τὸ κινῶν αΐδιον καὶ πρότερον της κινεμλύει, and much more to the fame purpose, 1. 12. cap. 8, 9, 10. where, after fhewing that there cannot be a progreffion of caufes in infinitum, without one original independent caufe, he concludes with thefe words, Τὰ ἢ ὄντα ἐ βάλει πολιτεύεως κακῶς, εκ εgator worvxoregenin, As ixoog. And in his Phyficks, 1. 8. cap. 6. he has thefe words, Εν γδ τοῖς φύσει, δὲν τὸ πεπερασμρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ἐὰν ἐνδέχην ὑπάρχειν, ἱκανὸν ἢ καὶ εἰ ἓν, ὃ πρῶτον οἰκινήτων αΐδιον ἂν ἔσαι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀρχὴ κινήσεως· φανερὸν ἢ καὶ ἐκ τάδε ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναί τι ἓν καὶ αΐδιον τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν, &

B Metaph. 1. 1. cap. 3. & lib. 12. cap. 10. 'Avažavóegas 5 wis κινῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχl, ὁ γδ τῆς κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἕνικά τινΘ. Πολλαχε με γδ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς ἢ τῶν λέγει, Ι. Ι. de Anima, cap. 2.

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without them, and he fays, that an ordinary carpenter would give a much better account of a piece of work, of which he was the maker, than fuch kind of Philofophers did, who went no farther than the mere mechanical motion of one part of matter upon another. And he elfewhere justly blames those Philofophers, who allowed nothing but matter, in the univerfe, for introducing motion without any active cause or principle to produce it; And likewife, becaufe k they were not able to give any account of what was good and fit (τ8 εὖ καὶ καλῶς) in the being or formation of things, from matter alone, or from

Η Πλίω βέλτιον ὁ τέκτων· εἰ δ ἱκανὸν ἔσαι αὐτῷ, τὸ τοσε τον εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐμπεσόν α ξ ὀργάνει τὸ μὲ κοιλὸν ἐγχύετο, τὸ ἢ ἐπίπε δον, ἀλλὰ διότι *' πληγὼ ἐποιήσατο τοιαύτίω καὶ τίνω ἕνεκα, ἐρε * αιτίαν, &c. de Partib. Animalium lib. 1. cap. 1.

1 Ει δ' ὅτι μάλισα πᾶσα φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις ἔκ τινῷ ὡς ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων ἐςὶ, ο τί τότε συμβαίνει καὶ τί τὸ αἴτιον, ο γδ δὴ το με υποκείμενον αὐτὸ ποιες μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτὸ λέγω δ' οιον, ἔτε τὸ ξύλον ἔτε ὁ χαλκὸς αἴτιον το μεταβάλλειν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν· ἐδὲ ποιεῖ τὸ μὲ ξύλον κλίνην, ὁ 3 χαλκὸς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλ ̓ ἕτερον τι ο μεταβολῆς ἴδιον· τὸ ἢ τῷτο ζητῶν ἐσι τὸ ἢ ἑτέραν αρχι ζητῶν, ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίημεν, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ κινήσεως. Metaph. 7. I. cap. 3.

* Τα γδ' οὗ καὶ καλῶς τὰ ἃ ἔχειν τα 3 γίνεται ὄντων ἴσως ἔτε γῆν ἔτ ̓ ἄλλο το τοιέτων εθὲν ἔτ ̓ εἰκὸς αἴτιον εἶναι αὐτῷ αὐτομάτῳ ἢ τύχῃ τοσῶτον ἐπιτρέψαι πράγμα καλῶς ἔχει, ibid.

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from chance and fortune. And those who make Body or matter the only fubftance, or univerfal nature, he condemns of great mistake, inasmuch as they confider only the first principles of body, but not of things incorporeal, though there be things incorporeal; And likewife, because, pretending to philofophize about the nature of all things, they take away (or leave out) the cause of motion. So that Ariftotle was far from thinking an immaterial fubftance and contradiction, or that Matter could move itself, or think and act.

Thus I have endeavoured briefly to reprefent the abfurdities which they muft of neceffity be driven to, who deny a Supreme, Intelligent, Eternal and Self-exiftent Being to be the original cause of all things, and the Author of all the Beauty, Order and Harmony of the world, and the fountain of all the Power, Wisdom and Goodness, which is manifeft in the frame and preservation of it. And I might have drawn this matter out to

a much

1Ὅσοι μεὶ ὧν ἕν τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν εἶναι φύσιν ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτίω σωματικω καὶ μέγεθος ἔχεσαν, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχώς ἁμαρτάνεσι. Τῶν γδ σωμάτων τὰ τοιχεία τιθέασι μόνον, ὃ δὲ ἀσωμάτων ἔ, ὄντων καὶ ἀσωμάτων,

ελογέντες τὸ ἢ κινήσεως αἴτιον ἀναιρᾶσιν.

καὶ πρὸ πάντων φυσι Metaph. L. Ι. cap. 7.

a greater length in the abstracted or metaphyfical way of reasoning, if my intended method would have allowed me to pursue that course. But because this has been fully done in that Demonftration of the Being and Attributes of God, which was fome years ago published by an excellent Author, as the subftance of his Difcourfes upon this fubject, I shall rather refer thofe that defire farther fatisfaction in this way to that Treatise itself, where the arguments of Mr. Hobbes and Spinoza, and other Materialists, are fully answered, and the Self-existence of one Independent Infinite Being, of all poffible perfection, demonstratively proved.

I proceed therefore now to what is afferted in the words of the text, as an inference from the foregoing doctrine, viz. That men having fufficient means of knowing God (i. e. plain and evident reafon to convince them, that there is fuch a Being) if notwithstanding this, they either difown, or take no notice of his Being, if they neither glorify him as God, nor fhew any gratitude towards him, they become thereby utterly inexcufable, and will therefore certainly fall under his juft indignation for their neglect of him. This is what the Apostle affirms even of the Hea

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then world, That they are without excufe, because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful.

This confequence is what thofe men would fain avoid, who are inclined to Atheism, but yet are not hardy enough abfolutely to deny thofe demonftrations which are brought for the Being of a God, when they are prefs'd with them. They have understanding enough to fee the abfurdity of attempting to prove it impoffible, that there should be such a Being, as we call God. And therefore they are willing to wave that point, and to compromise the matter would content themselves to let it reft as a speculative point, of which much may be faid on both fides; though they are pleased when they can find out objections against any particular method of proving it. But then they take it ill that we should offer to perfuade them, that they are under any obligation themselves actually to own the belief of fuch a Being, or to tell them that they can be under any penalty from him for not believing, or not attending to the confequences of fuch belief. Why fhould we not be contented to let them alone to their own uncertainty, and, with Protagoras, to declare

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