the full extent of his Government, but only a very small part of it; and therefore though we may argue, from the perfection of his nature, that he loves Righteousness and hates Iniquity, and confequently will, in the iffue of things, treat them after a different manner; yet the Revelation of his righteous Judgment is not confined to fo fhort a time, or within so narrow a compass, as the execution of human justice must be, which is limited by time and place, and muft either exert it self at prefent, or not at all. And from hence it happens, that Justice, Goodness, and other moral excellencies in men, (even in the best human Governors) do often intrench upon and limit one another, so that they cannot all be fully exercised, for want of fufficient compass to exert themselves altogether, and for want of fufficient power and knowledge of things in the agent. But God's Government is infinite and eternal, not limited by time or place; fo that his Goodness and Justice, and every other perfection, may each of them have their full exercise, and not interfere with one another; and the due effects of each may take place in fuch feafon as infinite wisdom fees most proper. Therefore before we can pafs an exact judgment upon the juftice and good

nefs of his Government, we must fee the. whole scheme of Providence unfolded, and all the various dependences of things, upon one another, fet in a true light. We must wait for the final iffue of things, and when that is come, we may depend upon it, that the whole management will appear just and good, even according to our most natural notions of Justice and Goodness; that is, according to the truth and reason of things all fairly ftated together.

If what I have hitherto faid, concerning the Moral Perfections of the Divine Being and their exercise, fhould be thought a digreffion from the defign of that propofition upon which I first begun; I defire it may be confidered, that, unless we be fully perfuaded of the certainty of thofe Attributes of God, and of the reasonableness of arguing from them, we cannot have any firm and stable foundation of our own moral obligations in respect of him; because we do then in effect fhut out the Divine Being from having any relation to us, as we are men, i. e. moral or rational and free Agents; inafmuch as we do by confequence deny either him or our felves to be fuch Agents. But on the contrary, if our Rational Nature is fo derived from the Divine Nature

as

as to bear a resemblance to it, in its capacity of acting freely according to the nature of things; this gives us a moral relation to God himself, 1 a relation of a quite different kind from that of all other creatures, which have no knowledge of him. He is indeed the Author of their Being, as well as of ours; and he governs them by his Wisdom and Power in a way fuitable to their nature, though they are not capable of reflecting upon it. But he is a Governor of Men and all Rational Beings in a fenfe vaftly fuperior, as they are capable of knowing him, and the relation they bear to him; and by knowing it, own an obligation of willingly conforming themselves to the Laws of his Government, which are the eternal dictates of right Reason.

Upon this foundation therefore, I think we may justly build that natural obligation, which every

X 2

1 Nam quod aliquibus cohærent homines, è mortal genere fumpferunt quæ fragilia effent & caduca: Ammum effe ingeneratum à Deo, ex quo vere vel agnatio nobis cum cœleftibus, vel genus, vel ftirps appellari poteft. Itaque ex tot generibus nullum eft animal præter hominem quod habeat notitiam aliquam Dei. Ex quo efficitur illud ut is agnofcat Deum qui unde ortus fit quafi recordetur ac nofcat. Jam vero virtus eadem in homine ac Deo eft, neque ullo alio ingenio præterea. Eft igitur homini cum Deo fimilitudo. Quod cum ita fit, quæ tandem poteft effe propior certiórve cognatio. Cic. de Leg. lib. 1.

every Rational man, who believes a God and a Providence governing the world, is under, to enquire, whether God has made any particular Revelation of his will, which men can be any way concerned to take notice of.

For if we are perfuaded, by the Light of Nature and Reason, that there is a Supreme Being, who made and preserves us, and from whom we received our reafonable nature, whereby we are capable of owning him; the fame light will convince us, that there is a natural duty of Gratitude owing from us to this Supreme Benefactor. And m if we are not affected with a sense of Gratitude for these benefits, which, even in the natural course of things, we constantly receive from Providence, we are not (in Tully's judgment) to be reckoned in the number of men, that is, of reasonable creatures. But now, fince the Divine Nature is infinitely perfect and happy in itself, wherein can any gratitude towards him approve itfelf? Not in giving him any thing by way of return, because he is already poffefs'd of all things; but in a juft acknowledg

ment

m Quem vero aftrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque viciffitudines, quem menfium temperatio, quemque ea, quæ gignuntur nobis ad fruendum, non gratum effe cogunt, hunc hominem omnino numerare qui decet? Cic. de Leg. lib. 2.

ment of his infinite perfections, and in worthily receiving and ufing what his goodness gives us; that is, in employing all the powers and faculties, which he has given us, according to his will and defign, however it be made known to us. And fince, from the confideration of the moral perfections of his nature, we are affured, that he himself chufes to act according to the highest Reason; and fince it must also be his will, that all rational creatures should chuse the fame, that is, in effect, fhould defire and endeavour, that their wills fhould be directed by his will, which is therefore abfolutely perfect, because it always chufes according to that infinite and unerring wisdom, which knows what is beft and fitteft to be done in every cafe that can happen, both with respect to the present time and all futurity: Upon these confiderations we are certainly obliged, in reafon, to be as much acquainted with the will of God as we can; and therefore to confider of every poffible way, whereby we may come to the knowledge of it.

For thus we may argue: A conftant difpofition to do according to the will of God, upon whom we depend for our Being, and for all our powers and faculties of acting, is