n

an abfolutely fit and reasonable inftance of our gratitude towards him. This is the very perfection of Piety, which we may, with Tully, call Juftice towards God; fince it is nothing elfe but afcribing to him, in the most effectual manner, that honour of his infinite perfections, which is juftly due to him, by conforming our felves to them. Now this difpofition, to conform our felves conftantly to the will of God, must neceffarily include, or prefuppofe, an endeavour to know what this will is, and by confequence to enquire, what ways he has thought fit to make any part of it known to us: [unless we are before hand certain, that it is impoffible for him to discover it any other way, but this one which we call the way of nature, which, as I fhall have occafion to fhew hereafter, we cannot be.]

For though we may depend upon it, as his will, that we should never act contrary to the Rules of Goodnefs, Truth and Justice, because whatever is evidently contrary to these, contradicts his very nature, and cannot be his will;

n Eft enim pietas Juftitia adverfum Deos. Cic. De Nat. Beor. lib. 1. cap. 41.

See the following Sermon.

will; and though he has given us the faculty of Reason, whereby to distinguish good from evil, and a liberty to chufe according to that distinction; yet, because our Understandings are limited, fo that we are not always able presently to fee that entire connection which one action has with another, but, without the utmost attention, may be apt to mistake appearances for truth, and to act accordingly, (especially in matters of Religion or intercourfe with the Divine Being) whereby we may run into great confufion, as we fee in fact the greatest part of mankind have done: We cannot but think it reasonable, to wish or defire a more particular direction, if it may be had, from that Being himself, who cannot be mistaken. And this at leaft ought to put us upon enquiry, whether this Being has, any where, made any fuch discovery, as will either give us greater light into our duty, or direct us to better affiftance or clearer motives to the steady performance of it. And here it was that the generality of Mankind first began to fail. Even the Philofophers them-` felves, of almost all Sects, neglected to feek after God in this refpect. They did not glorify him as God, by owning his moral perfections to fuch a degree as they ought to have

X 4

have done. Their Piety seldom went so far as either to pray unto him, or give him thanks for their own improvement in virtue or moral perfection. In this they depended too much upon themselves and their own natural abilities, and made their chief application to the Deity only for things of an inferior nature. Their opinion was too much like that of the Poet,

Р Satis eft orare Jovem quæ donat & aufert; Det vitam, det opes: æquum mi animum ipSe parabo.

And Cotta, in a Tully, represents it as a general doctrine: Virtutem nemo unquam acceptam Deo retulit; i. e. No man thinks himself beholding to God for his Virtue: And he commends the opinion as right, because (fays he) to be virtuous is just matter of praise, which it could not be if it were the gift of God, with much more to the fame purpose, which he fumms up after this manner, Judicium boc omnium mortalium eft, fortunam à Deo petendam, à fe ipfo fumendam effe fapientiam. And thus, according to St. Paul, Profeffing them

P Horat. Ep. 18. lib. I.

a De Nat. Deor. 1. 3. cap. 36.

themselves wife, they became fools; and by forfaking the true knowledge of God, they were led away to all manner of immorality. For as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind: a mind that could not fufficiently distinguish between good and evil, but easily drawn to do thofe things which are not conve

nient.

The fatal confequence which attended this neglect of application to God, for true wifdom to direct men in the moral conduct of their lives, may fhew us our obligation, in interest as well as duty, to enquire seriously, Whether God has any way afforded means of further light, than what we our felves can collect from unaffifted natural Reafon, to direct us in attaining the utmost knowledge of his will. And this fhould now lead me to confider the fecond thing which I proposed to speak to, viz,

II. That whoever feriously makes this enquiry, will find it reasonable to conclude, that fome Revelation may justly be expected from God, confidering the general state of mankind,

But

But because I cannot go through with the full confideration of this at prefent, I fhall forbear to enter upon it; and shall rather chufe to conclude this difcourfe with an earneft exhortation, to all fuch as, by the principles of Reason, are convinced of the Being of God and his moral Attributes, That they would live up to this Light of their own Reafon in their further enquiry after the Revelation of the Will of God.

"Tis owned on all hands, that Paffion, and Prejudice, and Partiality arifing from unruly lufts and appetites of any kind, are great impediments to the finding and embracing of Truth, especially fuch Truth as is likely to contradict those prevailing Paffions. And therefore, if we are honeft and fincere in our fearches after Truth, we must first free our felves from these impediments, that is, we must live fo as not to have any biafs upon our minds against the practice of Religion, if, upon enquiry, we fhould find reafon to believe its principles true. This is but a very reasonable thing to defire, of those who allow the steady practice of all virtue to be the happiness and perfection of human nature, at the same time that they question or doubt of the truth of all Revealed Religion, as divers of the Heathen