men, not to be averse to the belief of a God and a Future State, taken from the advantages of that belief both to virtue and happiness, even fuppofing the cafe to be only probable, or as yet doubtful. And whatever the admirers of this Author may think, there is fo just a foundation in reason for this way of arguing, that it will not be the less used or valued by any confiderate man, for the unworthy reflection which he has made upon it. And, indeed, to do him right, when he is in a better humour, he himself is pleased to make ufe of the fame argument in effect, though put into other words, [in his Enquiry concerning Virtue] when he tells us, " that by virtue of the BELIEF of a world to come, a man may retain his Virtue, even under the bardeft

Serrani. Λογίζομαι γδ ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, (καὶ θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς) εἰ μ τυΓχάνοι ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆς και· εἰ 5 μηδέν ἐςι τελόυτήσαντι, ἀλλ' ἐν τῶτόν γε ῒ χρόνον αὐ τὸν ἢ πρὸ δ θανάτε ἧτζον τοῖς παρᾶσιν ἀηδὴς ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενΘ,

And again, pag. 114. ̓Αλλὰ τάτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρὴ ὧν διελη λύθαμο, ὦ Σιμμία, πάντα ποιεῖν, ὥτε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μελαχών, καλὸν γδ τὸ ἄθλον, καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη· τὸ μὲ ἦν ταῦ τα διαχωρίσασθαι ὅτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, & πρέπει νῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ· ὅτι ρύτοι ἢ ταῦτά ἐσιν ἢ ταῦτ ̓ ἅττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οικήσεις, ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχή φαίνε ὅσα, τῦτο καὶ πρέπειν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδινεῦσαι, οιομένῳ ὅτως ἔχειν· καλὸς τὰ ὁ κίνδιων, καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ.

u Pag. 7.1.

hardest thoughts of Human nature. And speaking of Religious Affection, he fays, that w if the fubject and ground of this divine paffion be not really just or adequate, (the Hypothesis of Theifm, i. e. the Existence of a God, being Suppofed falfe) the paffion ftill in it felf is fo far natural and good, as it proves an advantage to Virtue and Goodness. But if, on the other fide, the fubject of this passion be really adequate and just, (the Hypothefis of Theifm being real, and not imaginary) then is the paffron alfo juft, and becomes abfolutely due and requifite in every rational Creature. Now what is this but arguing for Religious Affection, or the admiration of the Divine order of things, (which he might have called Faith if he had pleased) from its advantage to virtue, even though the fubject of it fhould in the end, prove not to have been real but imaginary? And why may not another man, endeavour to persuade men to live according to Virtue and Religion, from the fame Topick, even though it be put into plainer language?

X

But to conclude; There is no confiderate man, but who would willingly be fatisfied in

matters of so great moment, as the principles of Religion; and therefore every man ought to take the fureft way of attaining that fatisfaction, by preparing himself to entertain Truth with a fincere love of it; that is, by living fo that no Truth may ever be ungrateful to him. There is a great affinity between Virtue and Truth; and the fureft way to find the one, is by the fincere practice of the other. Let us therefore lay afide all paffion and prejudice, and every irregular defire, which may hinder us from being impartially willing to obey every reasonable obligation, which the discovery of Truth can lay upon us. And if we are already got so far as in earnest to believe a God, and that the practice of virtue or moral rectitude is his will, but yet want farther fatisfaction as to the Truth of Revelation; let us first do the will of God as far as we know, and then we shall know whether the doctrine be of God.

And
may the Father of Lights, and God of
all Truth, direct us all in our fincere en-
deavours after the knowledge of his Will.

SERMON

SERMON XI.

Preached March the 3a 17%.

Ifaiah ii. 3.

And many people shall go, and fay; Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob, and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths; for out of Zion Shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerufalem.

N my laft Difcourse, I took occafion from thefe words to con

I. That every Rational man, who believes a God and a Providence governing the world, is under a natural obligation, to enquire whether God has made any particular Revelation of his will to men, which they are any way concerned to take notice of.

I shall now proceed to confider the second thing, which I then proposed to speak to,

viz.

II. That whoever seriously makes this enquiry, will find good reafon to conclude, that fome Revelation may justly be expected from God, confidering the general state of mankind.

This is a point which deferves to be very feriously confidered, because it is the very. point, upon which all those who can be truly called Deifts, begin to divide from fuch as believe a divine Revelation. For he that believes a God and a Providence governing the world, and obferving the actions of men, as every one must do that can properly be called a Deift, and yet denies the Truth of all Revelation, muft of neceffity, either hold it unreasonable either to believe or expect any

fuch