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quiry into thofe things in which our own state and condition is fo nearly concerned: and we act against our nature, as we are reasonable beings, when we are unconcerned about them. The thing that I would now confider is, whether if we have fufficient arguments laid before us, to prove the Being and Attributes of God, provided we make an honest and impartial use of our own reafon and understanding, we may not be obliged at our own peril to attend to them. That is, fuppofing God to be the fovereign Governor of the world, and to take notice of all the actions and difpofitions of men, and to have given them laws, either naturally arifing from the conftitution of things, or revealed from himself, and to have fet up a standing proof of fuch his being; whether all rational creatures, that are capable of knowing him, be not under fuch a natural obligation to take notice of him, that they may be justly made to fuffer, i. e. may be punifhed for their neglect of it. And this I think may be confiftent with the highest reafon; and disbelief may be criminal, where the motives to believe are fufficient to convince any honeft mind, and fuch as no man can be ignorant of without fome previous fault of his own will, and the things offered to our belief fuch as every man must necef

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neceffarily own himself to be concerned in.

St. Paul speaking of the Gentile world who had revolted from the true knowledge of God, and become vain in their imaginations and reasonings about him, having laid down this as a principle, that, That which may be known of God is manifeft among them, for God hath fhewed it unto them; for the invifible things of him, from the creation of the world are clearly feen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead: Concludes from thence, that they were without excufe, because that when they knew God, i. e. had fuch evident natural means of knowing him, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, &c. I do not here urge this paffage of St. Paul, as of an infpired writer, by way of Authority to decide the point in hand: but I produce it only as an argument from reafon and the nature of the thing, which carries its own weight, along with it, abstracted from any superior authority; and the plain sense of the argument is this, That if God hath fhewed fufficient evidence of his own Being and Power, unto all men from the frame of things, they are without excuse who take no notice of him, nor acknowledge any dependence upon him: and

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confequently, if he be a law-giver and a judge (as has been univerfally allowed by those who own'd him, as the maker and governor of the world) he must make a difference between those who act in conformity to the nature of things, freely owning their natural state of fubjection to him, and those who renounce fuch order of fubjection; and he may deal with those men as offenders, who difown his Authority by bringing his Being into queftion. Acts of unbelief being indeed no other (in this case) than acts of wilful disobedience, where the evidences of his Being are so plain, that it must be the fault of the Will and not of the Understanding, if we be not moved by them; affected ignorance will be no excuse in fuch a cafe, where the means of information are so obvious.

It is well known, that there have been some of late years among us, who have publickly fet themselves to weaken the force of this argument, by infinuating, that if a man fhould be supposed to incur any penalty from the hand of God for want of any belief, though it were even that of his own Being, it would be a great diminution to that entire Freedom of thinking, which they pretend God has made the natural right of every man, and which it cannot be confiftent

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with his goodness thus to abridge. And they farther tell us, that a man may foffefs his Soul in peace, as having an expectation of enjoying all the good things which God can beflow, and no fear of any future mifery, or evil, from his hands; and the very worst of his be, that he is pleasantly deceived. patrons of Free-thinking (as they defire to be called) would keep honeftly to their own definition of Free-thinking, and mean no more by it than only b the ufe of the understanding, in endeavouring to find out the meaning of any propofition whatfoever, in confidering the nature of the evidence for and against it, and in judging of it according to the feeming force or weakness of the evidence; I know no man of underftanding and integrity that could justly oppose fuch freedom. For it will readily be granted by all, that men who use their understandings, must have more fenfe than they who use them not: for they are improved by use and application, as other faculties are: and I have before obferved, that we are under a natural obligation, even to our own reafon, to make the best use and improvement of them that we

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a V. Free-thinking, p. 38.

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But if instead of defending mens right to use their understandings; under the name of Free-thinking, they are pleased to call any odd or extravagant opinion Free-thinking, provided it be but contrary to those which are commonly received; a man must use his understanding very untowardly, that can believe this confiftent with the definition. For if, as these authors feem to allow (whether fincerely or not I will not now examine) d The knowledge of fome truths be required of us by God, and if the knowledge of others be useful to fociety; then certainly the holding at all adventures, and without any serious examination, affertions contradictory to fuch truths or inconfiftent with them, cannot be any inftance of fuch Free-thinking as we have a right to, but either want of thinking or an abuse of it.

I am very ready to acknowledge, that God. has never obliged us to know or believe any truth, but what he has given us some previous means of knowing, or fufficient ground of believing: but then on the other hand he may certainly, without any impeachment of his goodness, oblige us to use those means honeftly, and require a fincere love of truth from us. He may, in order to our own happiness, forbid

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