furdity of denying the Exiftence of fuch a Being, though they quarrel with the premises upon which any other men endeavour to prove it. Now this proceeding is what may be justly complained of, that men fhould go about by all ways to weaken the belief of that in others, which they themselves, at the bottom, either own to be true, or at least are not fully fatisfied of the contrary. This would hardly be thought fair and equal dealing in any other cafe; and much less fhould it be fo in this, which is of the utmost concern to all men. It is an unreasonable practice in refpect of God Almighty, fuppofing him to be; and in refpect. of men, supposing them to believe his Being. For, 1. Suppose it be true, that there is a God and a Providence, and that these men are not fo hardy, as to pretend abfolutely to demonftrate the contrary; it may be that he is fuch governour of the world as is withal a King: or Magistrate, a Lawgiver, and Judge of mens actions, as the generality of men do, in fome respect or other, own him to be. Now if I go about to weaken mens belief of his Being, or to argue against it, what am I doing all the while but feducing them, as much as I can, from that natural allegiance which they think they they owe him? I am certainly destroying his Title, if I am either making his Being uncertain, or perfuading men that he has no fuch relation to them, or concern for them. Suppofing then it were not yet known, what punishment he would inflict upon fuch feducers, yet certainly they could not but of themselves think it reasonable, that he should treat them in a different manner from his faithful fubjects. Though his goodness be infinite, as no doubt it is, yet it cannot but look upon fuch men ast criminal; and the greater his goodness is, the more criminal it is to abuse it, and to withdraw others from it. This makes it an unreafonable practice in refpect of God Almighty. But, 2. In refpect of men, who are fuppofed to believe his Being, it is unreasonable, because unless we are very fure that they are under a delufion, and that we can certainly better their condition by undeceiving them, we act very unkindly and uncharitably towards them, in trying to perfuade them that they are deceived in an opinion or belief of that Being, on which they think their chief happiness depends. A certain author, who is not generally thought to have any prejudice or partiality in favour of revealed Religion, owns, k It is impoffible that any but an ill natured man can wish against the Being of a God, for this is wishing against the publick, and even against one's own private good too, if rightly underfood. Now certainly, what cannot be wished against without great ill-nature towards mankind, cannot be attempted to be difproved with any good-natured defign towards fuch as really believe it. For if it really be an happiness to mankind that there is a God, the present sense of that happiness must, in a great measure, depend upon their knowing or believing that there is one. Upon which account I cannot but wonder at another faying of the fame author, which feems to contradict the former. That, as Religion ftands amongst us, there are a great many good people, who would have less fear in being expofed, (to forlorn nature and a fatherlefs world) and would be easier perhaps in their minds if they were affured they had only mere Chance to truft to. For no body trembles to think there fhould be no God, but rather that there fhould be one. But certainly every good man would tremble to think he had been thus deceived * Letter of Enthusiasm, p. 35. *Pag. 40. in deceived in all his expectations. This thought would be more terrible to him, than the profpect of lofing the kindest and best parent the world, in the most helpless condition; for do what he will he can never be fecure against any kind of misery, where Chance alone governs all things. So that a rational creature cannot be easy under the apprehenfion of being fo exposed any way, but by thinking as little as poffible of his own circumstances, that is, by divefting himself of reafon and thought. But under the conduct of an infinitely wife, and good and powerful Being, he be fure that no real harm can befal him may without his own fault. And therefore if a man were even fully perfuaded in his own mind, that there is no God, yet fo long as he knows, that the belief of him is what all good men may take comfort in, it would be a very fpiteful and ill-natured thing to endeavour to rob them of this comfort, without propofing fomething better and more certain. But when he can pretend to no fuch full perfuafion himfelf, but only to be doubtful or sceptical in the matter, to attempt the fame thing is intolerable. They who are weak enough to imagine, that the principles of Religion have no real foundation, but were at firft invented by wife men for the good government of the world and to keep mankind in order, are thereby obliged to acknowledge their usefulness to the wellbeing of humane fociety. And therefore, even upon their own fuppofition, it would be unrea→ fonable for them to weaken the force of those principles, if they confulted either the good of others or themselves, unless they could propofe some other method which would evidently have a more univerfal good effect. It would certainly be their wifest way to keep this secret to themfelves, if they were fure they had it; but when they are not fure, it is both foolish and malicious to pretend to perfuade others that they have it. And upon the whole I cannot but think it a reasonable caution, which Tully puts into the mouth of Balbus the Stoic, in the conclufion of his argument for Providence, that it is an evil and impious custom to difpute against the Being of a God, whether it be done in earnest or only in pretence and affectation. This leads me to confider in the last place, V. That it is ftill more unreasonable to make these principles of Religion the fubject i Mala enim & impia confuetudo eft contra Deos difputandi, five ex animo id fit, five fimulatè. De Nat. Deor. in fine. |