he knew that righteous Abel was murdered by his wicked brother, notwithstanding God's teftifying of his works that he approved them, yet was not tempted to think worfe of Providence for all that, nor difcouraged from a religious obedience; because he was fully perfuaded, that however it might fucceed with him in this life, yet God would certainly take care of him, and make it up to him in the next. And according to this faith fo it happened to him, in a most remarkable manner, fufficient to convince all that knew it, of the certainty of that life which he believed. By faith Enoch was tranflated that he should not fee death, and was not found, [any more upon earth] because God had tranflated him: For before his tranflation he had this teftimony, that he pleafed God. And with respect to the two foregoing inftances, though more particularly, as it fhould feem, to the latter of them, the Apostle adds the observation in the Text: But without faith it is impofible to pleafe God, i. e. without believing the first principles of Religion, it is impossible that any man should be capable of receiving fuch teftimony from God, as either Enoch or Abel had done: For he that cometh to God, muft believe that he is, and that he is

a rewarder of them that diligently feek him, i. e. He that makes any religious addresses to a supreme Being, or proposes to have any intercourse with him, or thinks that he stands in any relation to him, so as to be capable of receiving any thing from him, must neceffarily believe the existence of fuch a Being, and that he shall be the better for making fuch application to him. But this he can have no great ground to hope for, unless he be perfuaded that this fupreme Being, or God, takes care of human affairs, and obferves human actions, and will, fome way or other, reward those that behave themselves well, either in this life or another; and if he plainly fee, that good men are not always rewarded in this life, he will from hence be induced to believe, that there is another life after this intended for them. And though he be not as yet perfectly acquainted with the manner how this fhall be, yet he can fafely truft to that wisdom, and power, and goodness, which he is perfuaded belongs to him, who is the Maker and Governour of all things.

That the belief of God's exiftence is neceffarily fuppofed in all those, who willingly, and ex animo, fhew any fort of veneration or respect towards fuch a Being, is a thing so self

evident,

evident, that no man can ever ferioufly go about to deny it. Even Epicurus himself, though he denied all Providence, yet was forced to own fome fort of Excellent and Happy Beings, whom he called Gods, that he might have fome pretence for complying with the outward expreffions of veneration and worship, used among those with whom he lived; though he founded the decency or fitnefs of this veneration, only upon the Excellency of the nature of Gods above men, and not upon any concern that they had, or could have, for mankind upon his principle.

a

But they who go no farther than this cannot, in any just fenfe, be faid to come unto God, they cannot, confiftently with their hypothefis, either ask any thing of him, or expect any thing from him, while they believe him not to be concerned for mankind. And therefore Tully makes even Cotta the Academic, (whose province it was, not to own the fame certainty or affurance in thofe matters, which the other fects of Philofophers did) yet plainly to condemn this hypothesis, as the

a Nec metuimus eos, quos intelligimus nec fibi fingere ullam moleftiam, nec alteri quærere; Et piè fanctéq; colimus naturam excellentem atque præftantem,----fays Velleius in behalf of the Epicurean worship, in Tully De N. D. lib. 1. c. 20 BJ,

THE

ruin of all Piety and Religion; b "For why, fays he, "fhould the Gods be worshipped by

men, if they are so far from having any care

or concern for them, that they continue in a "state of perfect inactivity? The excellence of "their nature is vainly pretended as a reason, "why a wife man should shew them reverence; "for what excellence can there be in that nature, which is entirely taken up in the pleasure of felf-enjoyment, and neither does, nor has done, nor ever will do, any thing "else? What piety can be due to that Being " from whom you can receive nothing? or how can any regard at all be due to that which has "no merit in it? Piety (or Religion) is looked

upon as justice towards God; but what right can there be whereon to found justice, "if there be 'no manner of common tie or re"lation

1

b Quid eft enim cur Deos ab hominibus colendos dicas? cùm Dii non modò homines non colant, fed omnino nihil curent, nihil agant. At eft eorum eximia quædam præftanfq; natura; ut ea debeat ipfa per fe ad colendum elicere fapien

tem.

An quicquam eximium poteft effe in eâ naturâ quæ fuâ voluptate lætans, nihil nec actura fit unquam, neque agat, nequé egerit? Quæ porrò pietas ei debetur, à quo nihil acceperis? Aut quid omnino, cujus nullum meritum fit, ei deberi poteft? Eft enim pietas juftitia adverfum Deos; cum quibus quid poteft nobis effe juris, cùm homini nulla cum Deo communitas? De Nat. Deor. 1. 1. cap. 41.

с

"lation between God and Man?" And he farther argues, that Epicurus, by removing from his notion of a Deity, all Favour and good-will to mankind, as things arifing from weakness and imperfection, had plainly rooted out the very foundation of Religion, by deftroying that, which is the peculiar character of the best and most excellent nature, viz. Goodness and Beneficence. And he judges with good reason, that Pofidonius was not mistaken in his opinion of Epicurus, when he thought him to be at the bottom a Real Atheist; though in words he outwardly owned the being of a God, to avoid the publick odium: For otherwife he could not think him fo weak, as really to believe things fo abfurd and inconfiftent of the Divine naAnd therefore he concludes after this manner, If there could be any fuch God,

ture.

d

F 3

(as

c Epicurus verò ex animis hominum extraxit radicitùs religionem, cùm Diis immortalibus & gratiam & opem fuftulit. Cùm enim optimam & præftantiffimam naturam Dei dicat effe, negat idem effe in Deo gratiam, tollit id quod maximè proprium eft optimæ præftantiffimæq; naturæ. Quid enim melius, aut quid præftantius bonitate & beneficentiâ? ib. cap. 43.

d Si maximè talis eft Deus, ut nullâ gratiâ, nullâ hominum caritate teneatur, valeat. Quid enim dicam, propitius fit? Effe enim propitius poteft nemini: quoniam, ut dicitis, omnis in imbecillitate eft & gratia & caritas. ib. 44. in fine,