shall endeavour to perfuade them from common Reason, that it is their duty not to be unconcerned in the cafe, but to give the arguments that have been, or may be offered in behalf of the principles of Religion, a fair, and serious, and impartial hearing and examination. And in order to this, I defire that they would, without prejudice, confider the following particulars. I. That there may be other probable causes of Infidelity often affigned befides want of evidence; even when this is pretended as an excuse for it. II. That the principles of Religion are of that high nature, and univerfal concernment to mankind, that we cannot answer it to our own reafon to be unconcerned about them; and therefore that we muft, as rational creatures, endeavour to be fatisfied about them. III. That if we have fufficient reafon to believe the great principles of Religion; fuch as the Being of a God, and a Providence, and a Future state, &c. our unbelief will not excufe us from a crime in the fight of God. IV. That it is unreasonable for any man to endeavour to perfuade others out of the principles of Religion, till he himself is first evi B 3 dently dently convinced that they are false, and difadvantageous to mankind. V. That it is ftill more unreasonable to make them the fubject of raillery and ridicule. I. That there may be other probable causes of Infidelity often affigned, befides want of evidence, even when this is pretended as an excufe for it. Though such as do not believe are very ready to charge all believers with unreasonable credulity, and to excuse their own unbelief with this pretence, that they have not fufficient evidence to convince them yet this may be nothing else but a general defire which all men have to justify their own conduct, and remove the blame from themfelves. They declare indeed, that they are ready to think freely upon all fubjects, and willing, as they fay, to fubmit to reafon; but then the reafon ought, in their opinion, to be fuch as to command their affent, fo plain and clear that it cannot be denied. But that the principles of Religion carry no fuch forcible evidence with them. For if they did, who could deny his affent to them? and if they do not, what harm can there be in refufing it? This is their way of arguing. And indeed if there were no voluntary indifpofition in any man man which could hinder him from difcerning a plain reason when proposed to him, there would be fome force in the argument. But if there may be corrupt inclinations, paffions or prejudices, which blind mens understanding, and keep them from affenting to fome truths, which appear plain and evident to those who are free and unprejudiced, then their argument has no force; and we and we cannot judge of the ftrength or weakness of that Evidence which is offered for any truth, merely from the effect which it has upon thofe to whom it is offered. They that disbelieve the great Truths of Religion muft needs own, that thofe who do believe them, believe upon infufficient arguments, or else they would be felf-condemned for not believing; and therefore they must alfo own, that as much of the belief as has no competent argument to fupport it, must be founded upon fome wrong difpofition of the perfon believing; that is, he has fome prejudice, paffion or affection, which inclines him to believe that argument good which in it felf is not fo, even though he himself is not, for the time, aware of any fuch undue prejudice. Now certainly if Credulity may arife from fuch a biafs, Incredulity may alfo proceed from ano B4 ther ther biafs. For we fee plainly in other cafes, that the very fame arguments proposed in the fame light to different men, even of the fame natural abilities, shall have very different effects, and that which entirely convinces one, shall not in the least move another, though supposed to be of equal understanding. And yet both fides are unwilling to own any defect or prejudice in themselves, and chuse rather to blame the argument itself, or the understandings of other people who apprehend the argument differently from what themselves do. And as it is in other cafes, fo it is in Religion, the arguments for the truth of it may be very good and conclufive, but fome men may be indifpofed for the receiving of them. instance, As for 1. Some men are fo far immersed in the things of this life, in the pursuits of riches or pleasures, or the like, that they will not be at the pains to confider whether there be any force in fuch arguments as relate to the Being of a God and a future state, or no; and fo content themselves with being ignorant or indifferent about them. Others, by indulging their lufts and paffions, contract a ftupidity towards things of an higher nature, or by too eafily entertaining fuch pre judices judices as favour their corrupt inclinations, appetites or humours, grow unwilling to admit of any thing that contradicts them: They would be glad to have things fo as best suits their own prefent vitious defires, and therefore they are not fincere in their love of Truth, but are defirous that Truth fhould be just what they love, and therefore they readily embrace any argument or objection which they think makes for them. They like not to retain God in their knowledge, because their practice is disagreeable to his nature. Every vitious inclination which a man is refolved to purfue, is a strong biass upon his mind, either towards Infidelity, or at least towards fuch corrupt notions of the nature of God as infenfibly lead men to it. We have a very plain inftance of this in that old Epicurean notion of a God, as of a Being happy indeed and eternal, but whose happinefs confifted altogether in doing nothing, and being concerned for nothing. For they who placed the utmost of humane happiness in ease and indolence, and the pleasure of felf-gratification, were eafily drawn to believe the fame of the divine happiness; and from thence to conclude, that there could not be any Providence of God which concerned itself with the |