or displeasure with themselves for what they have done, after the actions are over. For that is a thing of a much higher nature, which requires reafon, and reflection, and fome application of mind, both to things past and future, as well as prefent; and confequently must fuppofe a belief of fomething invifible, upon which we are moved to action in a human or reafonable way, and a comparing of our actions, with fome antecedent rule or law, for the tranfgreffion of which we inwardly judge our felves accountable to fome fuperior Being, who is fome way or other as confcious of what we do, as we our selves are. And to this purpose let it be observed;

་

I. That all human actions, which are not merely animal, depend upon a belief or perfuafion of fomething future or invifible, which gives the first motion to them: That is, men never defignedly undertake any thing confiderable, but they expect either ro acquire fomething good and useful from it, or to avoid something evil which would otherwise enfue. Thus men plant and fow upon a belief of future fruit; they work, and trade to remote countries which they have never feen, not only upon a belief, that there are fuch countries, but also that they shall receive fome advan

tage

tage by their pains and hazard: All which things are future, and none of them capable of a strict demonftration. And though this confideration may feem not to have any great relation to the belief of a Providence; yet, if we take the matter right, we cannot but obferve, that even these probabilities of the future confequences of human actions, by which men are excited to perform this or that, have more or less weight with them, as men are more or lefs perfuaded of an overruling power that keeps the world in a constant order: For the more Chance rules, the less can any prospect of the future be depended on; and the more uncertain the profpect, the less is the inducement to act upon it. But;

2. Moral actions do depend ftill more upon the acknowledgment of principles, remote from fenfe, and fuperior to chance: And our obligation in confcience to the fteady performance of such actions, must be founded upon the belief of an intelligent Legislator, who is also an inspector of our behaviour: For let virtue be defined after what manner you please, let it be the love of order, Harmony or Proportion of mind; let it be a living agreeably to the perfection of nature, or acting for the G

good

good of the whole Human species, of which we are but a part: Call it by what fine names foever, (which perhaps are lefs intelligible than the thing it felf without fuch defining) yet still the question returns, who conftituted this order of things? who first made this harmony or proportion? or who is the author of this nature? g For he must be the ultimate Legislator; and this Law of nature, this rule of morality, must be his Will, though not arbitrary and mutable, but directed by his fupreme reason; whether it be made known to us by the obfervation of that natural order of things which he has established, and from whence, by reafoning, we gather the fitness and decency of every moral action; or whether it be discovered to us by any more immediate direction or revelation from himself. And if there be not an opinion or perfuafion, that this Supreme Being is a witness of human life,

and

8 Hanc igitur video fapientiffimorum fuiffe fententiam, legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam, neque fcitum aliquod effe populorum, fed æternum quiddam quod univerfum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique fapientia. Ita principem legem illam & ultimam, mentem effe dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei. Cic. de legib. lib. 2. And again,

Lex vera atque princeps apta ad jubendum & ad vetandum, ratio eft recta fummi Jovis. ib.

and confcious of what we do, even in our most fecret receffes, it is hard to conceive how our own confciences fhould be affected with fhame and regret, though men applaud us, when we do ill; or with pleasure and fatisfaction, though we incur the censure of a mistaken world, when we do well. Thefe effects of confcience, fuppofe in us a belief of the intimate and constant prefence of one, whofe favour or displeasure is more to be regarded than any outward confideration whatever. From whence it will follow, that whatever opinion fets men loose from the restraint of their own confciences, will make their justice, fidelity, gratitude, and all other moral virtues, respecting their fellow creatures, very precarious; and therefore an avowed infidelity in the first principles of Religion, muft needs be very destructive of that morality, which regards our intercourse with one another.

An Author not fufpected of partiality in the cafe, has freely owned this truth, when he tells us, that h" where the Theiftical be"lief is entire and perfect, there must be a fteddy opinion of the fuperintendency of a Supreme Being, a witnefs and fpectator of

G 2

"human

Enquiry concerning Virtue, pag. 57.

"human life, and confcious of all that is felt or acted in the universe; fo that in the per"fecteft recefs, or deepest folitude, there must "be one still prefum'd remaining with us, whose

prefence fingly must be of more moment than "that of the most auguft affembly on earth. "In fuch a prefence as this, 'tis impoffible, but "as the shame of guilty actions must be the greatest of any, fo must the honour be of "well doing, even under the unjust censure of

a world. And in this cafe, 'tis very apparent how far conducing a perfect Theifm "must be to virtue, and how great deficiency "there is in Atheism."

And that this is agreeable to the natural and common fentiments of mankind, is plain from hence, that in all ages and nations of the world, an oath, or appeal to the Deity, has been look'd upon as the strongest security, both of veracity in afferting, and fidelity in promifing, that one man could freely give another. Now this custom of demanding or offering an oath could never have obtain'd, without an antecedent opinion deeply rooted in the minds of men, That the belief of a Deity, and the sense of his being a witness and Judge of our actions, was one of the strongest engagements to act justly and honeftly by one ano

ther.