ther. Nay, farther, The very abuse of this principle by wicked men, and the making hypocritical pretences to Religion, or offering an oath for confirmation, in order to deceive others the more fecurely, is an evident proof of mens natural opinion, that the ftrongest obligation to human virtue, or moral honefty, is founded in a fincere belief of the first principles of Religion. And that this opinion is not adventitious or contrived by cunning men, and so instilled into others, to keep them in awe; I shall have a proper occafion to obferve more at large here

after.

1

'Tis a fatal thing, both to Religion and Morality, to diftinguish fo far between them as to imagine, that either of them can be perfect without the other. For as we have all the reason in the world to fufpect the fincerity of that man's profeffions of Religion, who is willingly deficient in moral honesty; fo he that openly declares himself to be under no reftraint of confcience from the belief of any invisible principle, must excuse us, if we doubt whether his integrity may in all cafes be fafely depended on. He that believes the principles of Religion, has all the other engagements to virtue that an Infidel can pretend to, and also that which is looked upon as more binding

G 3

binding than all the rest over and above: And what reafon then can I have to be fecure of his virtue or morality, who owns himself to be under fewer obligations to practise it than other men? Upon thefe confiderations therefore, if Morality were limited to our behaviour towards men only, even that could not be fufficiently secured upon the principles of Atheism. But thofe principles will be farther deficient likewife upon another account; and that is,

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2. Because if there really be a God that has any concern with us, or for us, a compleat morality muft neceffarily have respect to him, as well as to our intercourse with one another. This is what cannot reasonably be denied, unlefs there fhould be any who think, because God is a Spirit, and invifible, that therefore men, who are clothed with body, have no means of fhewing him any honour or reverence, or of acting or doing any thing that can have relation to fuch a fuper-eminent Being. But if there be any fuch perfons, they have a very mean opinion of a human mind, and a very odd notion of the morality of human actions, which depends upon the internal difpofitions of the mind, of which outward actions are only an external fign, and that not

always

always certain or infallible. But if we are capable of knowing or believing any thing of God, as a fupreme mind governing the world, we are also capable of inwardly owning this, and confequently of giving him an inward adoration and worship in our own minds. We may exercise affections of Faith, or trust, and affiance in him; of Love, and reverence, and obedience towards him. These are natural inward acts of Piety and Religion, due to an infinitely powerful, wife and beneficent Being, who has given us understanding, and will, and powers of acting: In which communicable Attributes, an human mind is related to the divine Being. If therefore, morality cannot be compleat and perfect, without acting fuitably and becomingly, to every relation in which we ftand to any Beings, and efpecially rational Beings, that are known to us; the very chief part of it must be in proper acts of Piety and Religion to the firft Being, from whom we derive our reason it felf. Upon this account Tully, in ftating the law of nature, which is the rule of moral actions, and from whence all other laws ought to be deduced, i juftly lays

i Eft igitur, quoniam nihil eft ratione melius, eaque & in homine & in Deo, prima homini cum Deo rationis focietas, De legg. l. I.

Jam

the foundation of it, in that original relation or fociety which is between God and man.

k And he makes the acknowledgment of a God, and a Providence over human affairs, and the different regards which that providence has to the good or evil actions of men, to be the first principles, which every member of fociety ought to be fully perfuaded of; as may be feen at large, in his books de Legibus.

And in this he agrees not only with Plato, and with other wife men that had gone before him, in writing upon this fubject, but with the common fentiments of mankind, expreffed in the general practice of all civilized nations. I need not be particular in infifting upon this, which may in fome measure appear from what has already been fuggefted, in this difcourfe;

and

Jam verò virtus eadem in homine ac Deo eft, neque ullo alio ingenio præterea. Eft autem virtus nihil aliud quàm in fe perfecta & ad fummum perducta natura. Eft igitur homini cum Deo fimilitudo. Quod cùm ita fit, quæ tandem poteft effe propior certiorve cognatio? Ibid.

k Sit igitur hoc jam à principio perfuafum civibus dominos effe omnium rerum ac moderatores Deos, eaque quæ gerantur eorum geri judicio ac numine, eofdemque optimè de genere hominum mereri, & qualis quifque fit, quid agat, quid in fe admittat, quâ mente, quâ pietate religiones colat, intueri, piorumque & impiorum habere rationem: his enim rebus imbutæ mentes, haud fanè abhorrebunt ab utili, & à vera fententiâ. De leg. lib. 2.

and which will farther appear, from the confideration of what I fhall offer under the next head; wherein I am to fhew,

II. That all Societies of men, that have ever subsisted in any tolerable order in the world, have profeffed the belief of God's existence, and at least of some kind of Providence, and an expectation of divine rewards and punish

ments.

Of which I defign to speak, with God's affiftance, the next opportunity.

SERMON