goodness, be displeased with those that are guilty of them. -I acknowledge that there are many considerations, several of which are very properly urged both by Epictetus and Antoninus, which should dispose us not to be too rigorous in our censures upon the actions of others, and to put the most favourable construction upon them which the circumstances of the case can possibly admit. But it is certainly wrong, under pretence of engaging men not to be angry at the faults of others, to endeavour to palliate the evil and deformity of vice and sin, and to make such a representation of it, as if it were true, and pursued to its genuine consequences, would show that neither God nor man should be angry at it, and punish it. This seems to be the plain tendency of some of the passages which have been produced from Marcus Antoninus; though I am far from charging that excellent emperor and philosopher with intending those consequences, and indeed he has other passages of a different strain. For though he expressly asserts, as has been shown, that "the particular "wickedness of any individual hurts not another, it hurts "himself only; and that no injury or evil action can be hurt"ful to the whole;" yet he elsewhere says, that "he who is "guilty of an injury is guilty of an impiety: for since the nature "of the whole has formed the rational animals for being useful "to one another, he who transgresses this her will, is thus guilty "of impiety against the most ancient and venerable of the "gods." By which he means what he so often calls the whole, and the nature of the whole. Here he seems plainly to suppose, contrary to what he elsewhere teaches, both that a man may hurt and do an injury to another of the same species with himself, and that in so doing he is guilty of an impiety against the whole. And he there adds, that "he "who willingly lies is guilty of impiety, in as far as by de"ceiving he does an injury; and he who lies unwillingly, in

as far as his voice dissents from the nature of the whole; "which as he had observed just before is truth, and the first "cause of all truth." He there also says, "that he who pursues "pleasure as good, and shuns pain as evil, or who is not in

"differently disposed to pain and pleasure, life and death, "glory and ignominy, all which the nature of the whole re"gards as indifferent, is plainly guilty of impiety."*

I have insisted the more largely on the Stoical doctrine of forgiving injuries, and doing good to those that have used us ill, because it is that part of their doctrine in which they have been thought to come up to some of the sublimest precepts of morality as taught by our Saviour. I readily acknowledge that an excellent spirit breathes in several of their precepts on this head. But it appears from the observations which have been made, that by placing that duty in some respects on a wrong foundation, and enforcing it by motives which will not bear a strict scrutiny, and carrying it in some instances to an extreme, they weaken what they endeavour to establish. All that is just in this doctrine is taught in the gospel, without running into extremes. The best and properest of the motives proposed by these philosophers are also there urged to engage us to bear with one another's faults and infirmities, and to forgive and do good to those that injure and offend us: besides which there are additional motives proposed, which are of the greatest weight. This duty is bound upon us by the express command and authority of God himself, who hath also made our forgiving other men their offences committed against us, a necessary condition of our obtaining the forgiveness of our own offences from God. We are assured, that the unmerciful and unforgiving shall have no mercy shown them at the day of judgment. But especially the motives drawn from the wonderful love of God in sending his Son to suffer and die for us whilst we were yet enemies and ungodly, and the exceeding riches of his grace towards penitent sinners, together with the perfect example of a forgiving disposition in our most amiable and benevolent Saviour, must needs, where they are heartily believed, have a mighty force upon an ingenuous mind. And yet at same time great care

Anton. Medit. book, ix. sect. 1.

† James ii. 15.

is taken to keep up a deep sense of the evil of sin, and an abhorrence of it in the minds of men, which is of the utmost consequence to the cause of virtue, and the good order of the moral world.

I shall conclude this part of the subject with observing, that the benevolent doctrine which hath been mentioned, seems not to have been carried by any of the Stoic philosophers so far as by Epictetus and Marcus Antoninus, both of whom lived after this doctrinę had received its utmost improvement in the gospel of Jesus; and was exemplified in many of the primitive Christians, who prayed for their enemies and persecutors with their dying breath. The more ancient Stoics seem to have wrought up their scheme with greater rigour, and to have advanced maxims not very consistent with that humane and forgiving disposition so strongly recommended by Marcus Antoninus. Mr. Stanley in his excellent history of philosophy gives it as part of the Stoical description of their wise man, or man of perfect virtue, that "he is not merciful or prone to pardon, remitting nothing "of the punishments inflicted by the law, as knowing "them to be proportioned to, not exceeding, the offence; "and that whosoever sinneth, sinneth out of his own "wickedness. A wise man therefore is not benign, for "he who is benign mitigates the rigour of justice, and "conceives the punishments inflicted by law to be greater "than they ought: but a wise man knoweth the law to be "good, or a right reason, commanding what is to be done, "and what not."* Stanley refers for the proof of this to Laërtius and Stobæus, but does not point out to the particular passages of those authors, which therefore I shall here mention. The reader may consult Laërt. lib. vii. segm. 123. and Stobæus Eclog. Ethic. p. 178. edit. Plant. To which may be added, what Seneca says concerning it, de Clem. lib. ii. cap. 6 et 7, where he endeavours to explain and apologize for the Stoical doctrine on this head.+ "Mercy (says

* Stanley's Hist. Philosoph. p. 468. second edit. Lond.

+ Misericordia vitium est animorum nimis miseriæ faventium: quam siquis a

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"he) is the vice or fault of souls that are too favourable to "misery, which if any one requireth of a wise man, he may "also require of him lamentations and groans."-To show that a wise man ought not to pardon, he observes, that "pardon " is a remission of the penalty which is justly due; and that a man is said to be pardoned, who ought to be punished; "but a wise man does nothing which he ought not to do, "and omits nothing which he ought to do: and therefore he "does not remit the punishment which he ought to exact. "Yet he grants that which is the effect of pardon, but does "it in a more honourable way. He spares, counsels, and "corrects: he does the same thing as if he did pardon, but "does not pardon; because he that pardons acknowledges "that he hath omitted something which he ought to have "done.—To pardon is not to punish those things which you 66 'judge ought to be punished."

We have a remarkable instance of the rigorous Stoical disposition in the famous Cato of Utica, who is cried up as a perfect model of Stoical virtue, and whose character is so exquisitely drawn by the masterly pen of Sallust: and one of the principal strokes in his character is this, that whereas Cæsar was admired for clemency and mercy, and his readiness to pardon, Cato was revered for his strict and inflexible severity: "Severitas dignitatem addiderat." In Cæsar was found a sure refuge to the wretched; in Cato a certain vengeance to the guilty, "malis pernicies." Sal. de Bel. Catalin. cap. lv.

sapiente exigit, prope est ut lamentationem exigat, et in alienis funeribus gimitus. At quare non ignoscat dicam: constituamus nunc quoque, quid sit venia, ut sciamus dari illam a sapiente non debere. Venia est pœnæ meritæ remissioei ignoscitur qui puniri debuit. Sapiens autem nihil facit quod non debet, nihil prætermittit quod debet. Itaque pænam quam exigere debet, non donat. Sed illud quod ex veniâ conse qui vis, honestiori tibi viâ tribuit.-Parcit enim sapiens, consulit et corrigit, Idem facit quod si ignosceret, nec ignoscit: quoniam qui ignoscit, fatetur aliquid se quod fieri debuit omisisse-ignoscere autem est, quæ judicas punienda non punire.

CHAP. XI.

The Stoical precepts with regard to self-government considered. They talk in high strains of regulating and subduing the appetites and passions; and yet gave too great indulgence to the fleshly concupiscence, and had not a due regard to purity and chastity. Their doctrine of suicide considered. Some of the most eminent wise men among the heathens, and many of our modern admirers of na tural religion faulty in this respect. The falsehood and pernicious consequences of this doctrine shown.

LET us next proceed to consider that part of the Stoical morals which relates more immediately to ourselves, and the government of our appetites and passions. And with regard to this, nothing can make a more glorious appearance than the general principles of the Stoics, which every where breathe a contempt both of pleasure and pain. They prescribe the subduing and even the extinguishing the appetites and passions, and keeping them under the most perfect subjection to the laws of reason and virtue, and seem to aim at a greatness and dignity above the attainments of human nature. Yet if we closely examine their scheme in this respect, it will appear that it was in several instances defective, at the same time that in other instances it was carried to a degree of extravagance.

What has been already observed concerning the other philosophers, is equally true of the Stoics: that whatever they might say in general concerning temperance and continence, and against a love of sensual pleasures, yet in particular instances they gave greater allowances to fleshly lusts and the sensual appetite, than were consistent with the dignity of virtue, and the rules of modesty and purity. Some hints of this were given before. That unnatural and detestable vice, which, as I have shown, was commonly charged upon the philosophers, was looked upon by the principal of the ancient Stoics, Zeno, Chrysippus, and Cleanthes, to be an indifferent thing, as Sextus Empiricus informs us.* And some of

* Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. lib. iii. cap. 24.