The Advantage and Necessity of the Christian Revelation Shewn from the State of Religion in the Ancient Heathen World

reasonably desired in such a case, and which, all things considered, is as great as could be expected concerning any facts whatsoever done in past ages. To all this may be added, the evidence arising from clear and express prophecies, relating to events which no human sagacity could forsee, some of them undeniably delivered and committed to writing many ages before their accomplishment, and yet in due time punctually fulfilled. All these are of great force, even separately considered; but when viewed and taken together in their just connection and harmony, from such a chain of proofs, as carries a mighty force of conviction with it to an honest and unprejudiced mind, that is animated with a sincere love of truth. The advocates of Christianity have frequently urged these arguments with great clearness and strength; and whilst these proofs continue firm, and the original facts are well supported, the truth and divine authority of the Christian religion stand upon solid and immoveable foundations. Nor should we suffer prejudices arising from the ill conduct of many of its professors and teachers, or from some particular passages of Scripture hard to be understood, or the difficulty of comprehending some of its doctrines which relate to things of a very sublime and mysterious nature, at all shake our belief of true original Christianity. It is a rule laid down long since by Aristotle, and the justness of which has never been controverted, that we ought not to expect in all things the same kind of evidence, but in every thing content ourselves with such proofs as the nature of the subject will bear. To insist upon mathematical demonstration in matters of religion and morality, is perfectly absurd and unreasonable; and yet the evidence may be such as is sufficient to produce a certainty, though of another kind, and which may very fully satisfy the mind, and make it reasonable for us to give our assent to it, notwithstanding some objections that may be made against it, and from which scarce any truth is entirely free.

I shall on this occasion consider a pretence that has been often made use of by men of sceptical minds, that without an absolute certainty (which they pretend is not to be had in what relates to religion) they may reasonably and safely withhold their assent. But such persons ought to consider, that if their be a probability on the side of religion, though short of an absolute certainty, this would induce an obligation upon them to receive it, and to VOL. II.

govern their temper and conduct by the rules it prescribes. Where a thing appears to be probable, that is, that there is more reason for it than the contrary, this does not leave the mind in a perfect equilibrium, and at liberty absolutely to suspend its assent if it be a matter of speculation, or to abstain from acting, if it be a matter of practice. This the Pyrrhonists, who carried scepticisin to the greatest height, were sensible of, and therefore would not allow that any one thing is more probable than another; which seems to me to be one of the greatest extravagancies that any man pretending to reason can be guilty of; nor do I believe that any one man, whatever he might pretend in words, could really bring himself to think so. Those of what was called the New Academy, though at the bottom little better than sceptics, saw the absurdity of this, and therefore though they would not acknowledge a certainty, yet allowed a probability in things; and if they had pursued this concession to its genuine consequences, it would have subverted the scheme, they had in view of a perpetual suspension of assent. It is an undeniable maxim, that we ought to follow evidence as far as it appears to us, and therefore that which is probable ought to sway our judgment, and influence our practice, according to the measure of its probability, and the preponderancy of the reasons which are brought for it. It is manifest to every one that has any knowledge of mankind, that it is probability which governs our conduct, if we act prudently; and that the author of our beings designed it should be so. We are so constituted, that in almost all cases relating to practice, we are obliged to follow what appears to us, upon a proper consideration of it, to be most probable; and for any man wilfully to neglect a thing which would probably be of great advantage to him, or to do any thing which probably will expose him to great loss and damage, would be justly deemed a very foolish and unreasonable conduct, and in matters where duty is concerned a very guilty one. Some of those who were otherwise much addicted to scepticism in speculation, have yet acknowledged, that in the affairs of common life, people ought to follow probable appearances. And if this is to be done in what relates to our present temporal interest and advantage, why not in that which relates to our highest happiness? The more important any affair is, and the greater the danger is in neglecting it, or he damage to be sustained by such a neglect, the more we

are obliged, by the soundest maxims of reason and good sense, to govern ourselves, and act according to what appears to us, upon a diligent inquiry, to be most probable." And what reason can be assigned, that we should not act so in matters of the greatest consequence, and in which our everlasting salvation appears to be nearly concerned? In cases of this nature, if the hazard be vastly greater on one side than the other; all the rules of prudence lead us to take that part, which has the least hazard attending it, even though the evidence on that side should be supposed to be no greater, or perhaps something less, than on the other. But when both the evidence is much stronger on one side, and at the same time the hazard men run by rejecting it much greater, to take that side which is both less probable and more dangerous, would be the most foolish and inexcusable conduct in the world.

If therefore, upon a fair inquiry, there is at least a great probability that the Christian Revelation came from God, it is both our wisdom and duty to embrace it, and to govern ourselves by its excellent rules. No man in that case would run a hazard by embracing the gospel, or at least a hazard in any degree equal to what he would expose himself to by rejecting it. Let us suppose, that by complying with the terms of salvation which are there proposed, he should deny himself some of those liberties which he would otherwise indulge, and controul his passions by the Christian rules, which do not require us to extirpate the passions and appetites, but to govern and keep them within the bounds of moderation and temperance, this is no more than the wisest men have advised as the properest way for securing a man's own tranquility, and for preserving body and soul in a right temper. In other cases, men think it reasonable to hazard some present loss, and to undergo some present hardships and inconveniencies, on the probable prospect of avoiding a much greater evil, or procuring some valuable and superior advantage. But when the advantage proposed is so infinitely great as the rewards promised to good men in the gospel, and the evils so great as the punishments there denounced against the obstinately impenitent and disobedient, it ought certainly to have proportionably a more powerful influence.

I hope every reader that brings with him a mind sincerely disposed to know the truth and follow it, will join with me in earnest

supplications to God, who is a lover of truth and holiness, that he would be graciously pleased to clear our minds from vicious prejudices, and dispel the clouds of ignorance and error, that we may receive the truth in the love of it, may behold it in its convincing light, and feel its transforming power, and may bring forth fruit suitable to it in a holy and a virtuous life, to the glory of God, and our own eternal salvation.