opinion that truth alone is valuable; but he will add no more, since, under the auspices of this guide, he has no apprehension in following whithersoever it may lead.

It may be a consideration of expedience how far the promulgation of objections to an opinion, which is generally thought to be incorporated with Christianity, will affect its influence and diffusion; and were this doctrine, as some think it, essential, or even useful to morality on Christian principles, (and none other deserves the name,) I am so thoroughly convinced of the divine original of Christianity, of the excellence of all its parts, and of its beneficial influence on society, that I would not "rush in where Angels would fear to tread;" but thinking I can shew it to be inconsistent with the noblest dictates of truth, and the simplest principles of our nature, I hope to overcome the existing prejudices on this important subject, and to have willing hearers whilst I offer an explanation of those texts whereon the doctrine is presumed to be founded, which shall be free from any of the beforementioned objections, and which shall render every expression in Scripture, on the future state of mankind, perfectly harmonious; exhibiting the Gospel as it was at first announced by the Holy Spirit and the heavenly host, as "good tidings of great joy to all people."

In the course I have proposed I am first led to inquire, Whether eternal misery can be reconciled to our notion of the Divine goodness? and having in a few words stated the proofs we have of this attribute, I think it will appear to be inconsistent with such a doctrine. We prove the goodness of God by the evidence we have that He intends the happi

ness of all his creatures; and if it could be shewn in any case that he does not desire us to possess the happiness of which he has made us capable, imperfection might be attributed to the Author of Nature; and it would be impossible to reconcile to that notion of His goodness which makes it to consist in the diffusion of happiness, the opinion entertained by some that God hath unconditionally imparted an immortal nature to creatures, whom his prescience must have foreseen would be rendered thereby eternally miserable: for to continue existence when it is and can be only productive of misery, cannot be to impart happiness.

Existence, as it is derived from the hands of God, is always a blessing, not only in appearance but in reality, not only superficially but intrinsically, even in the sight of God. Now the giving and the continuing of existence are but the same act; because, whether we consider it an original decree of God that we should retain our being for ever, or that every breath we draw is derived from Him, and is an act of his power, (which is, I think, the more rational and scriptural idea,) in either case God must foresee the whole effect of the gift he imparts, and it is destructive of the idea of His goodness, that he shall have given existence to millions to whom it must be a curse, not a blessing, and who are visited with it, only because it is his will.

It is confessed that our rebellion cannot affect the ineffable happiness of God. Can it be consistent with His goodness to continue existence to millions to whom it is pure misery, in order to exhibit them in rebellion against Himself, even

when He hath put all things under His feet, if their death or extinction shall appear sufficient to vindicate His power and justice?

Should any one object that the existence of misery in any degree, contradicts the attribute of Goodness as infinite, I offer the following thoughts as sufficient to vindicate that attribute. Although we can fancy a state more perfect than the present, higher in intellectual and moral excellence, in which, being endowed with a stronger sense of right, and having less inclination to disobey, we should be consequently less liable to misery; yet the goodness of God is manifested in giving existence even to the rank of beings to which we belong, though many are called and few chosen, for a chasm must otherwise have existed in the gradation which extends from the Deity to the dullest insect. It is conceivable that God might have withheld existence; because, from the large portion of the animal nature to which the spiritual is joined, the majority might neglect to cultivate those peculiar faculties whereby the Deity is discerned, (for flesh and blood cannot discern Him,) and even though they should, like "brute beasts made to be taken and destroyed, utterly perish in their own corruption," existence, however, is a blessing, as opening the way to that happiness of which our nature is susceptible; a happiness to be attained by the volitions of moral and probationary agents. But the power to offend is essential to morality; for one who is irresistibly acted upon is but a passive instrument, to whom neither merit nor demerit can be ascribed. This, then, being the case, it was necessary that misused endowments should cause misery, as much as should

suffice to deter moral agents from offending, or, failing so to do, should limit their power. Here then the goodness of God is seen in producing the greatest possible good with the least possible evil; but were the evil greater than the least possible, we might justly say to Him, Why hast thou made me thus? For it would be obviously better for the individual that existence should cease, when only productive of pure misery.

It will be seen, then, that God's goodness is vindicated precisely at the point where nature and revelation would differ were the doctrine of eternal misery a revealed truth. Natural reason teaches us that God is infinite in goodness, and revelation gloriously confirms its teaching in all points but this one; which is one of tremendous importance, since it includes God's relation to ninety-nine of every hundred of mankind THROUGH ALL ETERNITY. If this doctrine be excluded, nature and revelation mutually support each other; and where they fail to do so, it is absolutely certain that they cannot be rightly understood. This consideration applies as strongly in support of my interpretation as in opposition to the received one.

Eternal existence in misery is no less inconsistent with God's attribute of justice; for the first principle of equity requires that those who are to be judged by a law should be able to comprehend both the crime and the punishment. Man cannot do so, for this plain reason-his understanding is finite, the sentence infinite. There must be proportion between crime and punishment: there can be no proportion between finite and infinite. The consciousness of this has made very able writers speak of a sort of infinite evil in sin, forgetting that of all

things in the universe, infinity is the only thing of which there can be but one sort, since nothing greater is possible, and any thing less would not be infinite.

It is observed by one writer, that our works are finite, but our sins are infinite. If our sins are not our works, what are they?

God having been pleased to make man a moral agent, He deals with him as such, and offers to his understanding blessings and threats, as motives to enforce the law he has promulged. These can operate as such no further than the understanding can embrace them; but the understanding can form no idea of infinite; it is, therefore, no moral motive. Now since God does nothing in vain, eternal torments cannot be proposed as moral motives, for they must be infinitely more than can operate, because the highest idea we can form of them must be essentially different from, and infinitely less than, the thing threatened; therefore the largest part must be in vain.

To illustrate this want of proportion, suppose a man applies himself to find out the extent of infinite punishments, (let me be forgiven a contradiction in terms,) and pushes his inquiry to the utmost either his faculties or his time may allow of, still infinitely more will remain beyond; for even the longest life, wholly employed in the attempt, would be insufficient to gain an idea of infinite and eternal. Now that which is beyond the reach of human faculties, must be useless as a moral motive. It cannot be said that it is useful, because more than can be conceived, and therefore a motive rising in force; for, consistently with our notions of the Divine justice,