also that auctorite, beinge well and diligently used, is but a token of superioritie, but in very dede it is a burden and losse of libertie.

And what gouernour in this wise knoweth him selfe he shall also by the same rule knowe all other men, and shall nedes loue them for whome he taketh labours and forsaketh libertie.

In semblable maner the inferior persone or subiecte aught to consider, that all be it (as I haue spoken) he in the Obedience substaunce of soule and body be equall with his su- due to gouperior, yet for als moche as the powars and qualities

ernours.

of the soule and body, with the disposition of reason, be nat in euery man equall, therfore god ordayned a diuersitie or preeminence in degrees to be amonge men for the necessary derection and preseruation of them in conformitie of lyuinge.d Whereof nature ministreth to us examples abundauntly, as in

It was doubtless his own experience of office which caused Bacon to complain that Men in great place are thrice servants: servants of the sovereign or State, servants of fame, and servants of business; so as they have no freedom, neither in their persons, nor in their actions, nor in their times.' And he adds, 'It is a strange desire to seek power and to lose liberty, or to seek power over others, and to lose power over a man's self.'—Essays, p. 92, ed. 1857.

This, too, was the advice of Martial:

'Principis est virtus maxima, nosse suos.'-Epig. lib. viii. 15, 8.

• The early Christians were expressly enjoined to submit themselves to the magistrates. And these 'powers' are declared to be of God,' to be ordained of God,' to be 'the ministers of God;' to resist them is to resist the ordinance of God, and to incur danger of damnation. The powers to which this applied, as appears by the condition of the early Christians, and by the facts, are the powers of the established government; they are called by St. Paul 'the powers that be,' and by St. Peter, 'every ordinance of man.'—Whewell's El. of Mor. p. 286.

Dr. Hooker uses very similar language: 'Without order there is no living in publick society, because the want thereof is the mother of confusion, whereupon division of necessity followeth, and out of division destruction. The apostle therefore giving instruction to publick societies, requireth that all things be orderly done. Order can have no place in things, except it be settled, amongst the persons that shall by office be conversant about them. And if things and persons be ordered, this doth imply that they are distinguished by degrees. For order is a gradual disposition.'-Eccles. Polity, p. 411, ed. 1723.

bees," (wherof I haue before spoken in the firste boke) cranes, redde dere, wolfes, and diuers other foules and bestis, whiche herdeth or flocketh, (to longe here to be rehersed), amonge whom is a gouernour or leader, towarde whome all the other haue a vigilant eye, awaytinge his signes or tokens, and according therto preparinge them selfe moste diligently." If we thinke that this naturall instinction of creatures unreasonable is necessary and also commendable, howe farre out of reason shall we iudge them to be that wolde exterminate all superioritie, extincte all gouernaunce and

• From the days of Plato and Aristotle, of Virgil and Cicero, the natural order preserved among the members of the animal kingdom has supplied political theorists with an obvious, if incomplete, analogy. John of Salisbury quotes Virgil's description of the bee community with approval, and thinks that states should be organised in conformity with the example thus afforded. And Patrizi, following the same line of argument, says, 'Ut ad minora descendam, nonne bruta animalia nonnulla sunt quæ imperio unius obtemperant? Munera imperata non detrectant, et tanquam sub Imperatore pugnant? Regem suum apes habere quis ambigit, qui populum nutu et arbitrio regat, et sedulas apes ad munera obeunda favosque componendos reddat? Hæc cogitatio principio fortasse vagis ac dispersis hominibus ferarum more persuasit, ut ab agresti vitâ discederent, et in unum locum congregarentur, Principemque sibi præficerent fortitudine, prudentiâ atque eloquentiâ præcellentem, cujus arbitria pro legibus observarent.'—De Instit. Reipub. lib. i. tit. 1. p. 12, ed. 1594. Erasmus advises that the attention of the youthful prince should be directed to the habits of bees and ants, and that moral lessons should be drawn from them: Quis non libenter auscultet apum et formicarum politiam ?'-Instit. Prin. Christ. p. 19, ed. 1519.

Dr. Reid, speaking of the particular benevolent affection which is denominated esteem for the wise and good, says, 'There is indeed a subordination in a herd of cattle, and in a flock of sheep, which, I believe, is determined by strength and courage; as it is among savage tribes of men. I have been informed that in a pack of hounds, a stanch hound acquires a degree of esteem in the pack; so that, when the dogs are wandering in quest of the scent, if he opens, the pack immediately closes in with him, when they would not regard the opening of a dog of no reputation. This is something like a respect to wisdom.'-Works, vol. ii. P. 563.

We may refer to Locke's definition of a 'state of nature,' as one not only of perfect freedom, but also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one against another, without subordination or subjection, unless the

lawes, and under the coloure of holy scripture, whiche they do violently wraste to their purpose, do endeuour them selfes to bryng the life of man in to a confusion ineuitable, and to be in moche wars astate than the afore named beestes? Sens without gouernaunce and lawes the persones moste stronge in body shulde by violence constraigne them that be of lasse strength and weaker to labour as bondemen or slaues for their sustinaunce and other necessaries, the stronge men beinge without labour or care. Than were all our equalitie dasshed,

lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. This equality of men by nature the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.'—On Government, pp. 189, 191, ed. 1821.

• Bentham says: We know what it is for men to live without government, and living without government, to live without rights; we know what it is for men to live without government, for we see instances of such a way of life. We see it in many savage nations, or rather races of mankind; for instance, among the savages of New South Wales, whose way of living is so well known to us. No habit of obedience, and thence no government; no government, and thence no laws; no laws, and thence no such things as rights; no security, no property; liberty, as against regular controul, the controul of laws and government, perfect; but as against all irregular controul, the mandates of stronger individuals, none.'Works, vol. ii. p. 500, ed. 1843.

'Men always knew,' says Hooker, 'that, when force and injury was offered, they might be defenders of themselves; they knew that howsoever men may seek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others it was not to be suffered, but by all men and by all good means to be withstood; finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, inasmuch as every man is towards himself, and them whom he greatly affecteth, partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common consent all to be ordered by some whom they should agree upon.'—Eccles. Polity, p. 18, ed. 1723.

с

'Unless,' says Blackstone, 'some superior be constituted, whose commands and decisions all the members are bound to obey, they would still remain

ite that is in gouer

naunce.

a

and finally as bestes sauage the one shall desire to slee a The necess- nother. I omitte continuall manslaughters, rauisshementes, aduoutries and enormities horrible to reherce, whiche (gouernaunce lackynge) muste nedes of necessitie ensue, except these euangelicall persones coulde perswade god or compelle him to chaunge men in to aungels, makinge them all of one disposition and confirminge them all in one fourme of charitie. And as concerninge all men in a generaltie, this sentence, knowe thy selfe, whiche of all other is moste compendious, beinge made but of thre wordes, euery worde beinge but one sillable, induceth men. sufficiently to the knowlege of iustyce.

as in a state of nature, without any judge upon earth to define their several rights and redress their several wrongs.'—Comment. vol. i. p. 48, 9th ed. We have here a picture of the state of nature,' which was afterwards a distinguishing feature the theories of Hobbes, Locke, and other philosophers. According to thes writers, 'On the first origin of mankind, their ignorance and savage nature were so prevalent that they could give no mutual trust, but must eac depend upon himself and his own force or cunning for protection and security. No law was heard of; no rule of justice known; no distinction of property regarded. Power was the only measure of right; and a perpetual war of all against all was the result of men's untamed selfishness and barbarity.'Hume's Philosoph. Works, vol. iv. p. 260.

• But according to Godwin, anarchy, though it is undoubtedly a horrible calamity, is less horrible than despotism. Where anarchy has slain its hundreds, despotism has sacrificed millions upon millions, with this only effect, to perpetuate the ignorance, the vices, and the misery of mankind. Anarchy is a short-lived mischief, while despotism is all but immortal. It is unquestionably a dreadful remedy, for the people to yield to all their furious passions, till the spectacle of their effects gives strength to recovering reason; but, though it be a dreadful remedy, it is a sure one. No idea can be supposed more pregnant with absurdity, than that of a whole people taking arms against each other till they are all exterminated.'-Political Justice, vol. ii. p. 175, ed. 1796.

The word 'gospeller' was very commonly used in the same kind of ironical sense as the words in the text. Thus Archbishop Whitgift alludes to the weak gospellers' in the preface to his answer to Cartwright, and Dr. John Harding speaks somewhat contemptuously of Bishop Jewel and the rest of our gospellers.' -Works of Jewel, vol. i. p. 148, ed. 1845. Parker Society.

• Dr. South says: Has it not been noted by the best observers and the ablest judges both of things and persons, that the wisdom of any people or nation has been most seen in the proverbs and short sayings commonly received amongst them? And what is a proverb, but the experience and observation of several ages

CHAPTER IV.

Of fraude and disceyte, whiche be agayne Justyce.

TULLI saieth that the fundation of perpetuall praise and renoume is iustyce, without the whiche no thynge ci. Offi.ii. may be commendable. Whiche sentence is veri

fied by experience. For be a man neuer so valiaunt, so wise, so liberall or plentuous, so familiare or curtaise, if he be sene to exercise iniustyce or wronge it is often remembred. But the other vertues be seldome rekened without an exception, whiche is in this maner. As in praysinge a manne for some good qualitie, where he lacketh iustyce, men will communely saye, he is an honorable man, a bounteous man, a wise man, a valiaunt man, sauynge that he is an oppressour, an extorcioner, or is deceytefull or of his promyse unsure. But if he be iuste with the other vertues, than is it sayde he is good and worshipfull, or he is a good man and an honorable,d gathered and summed up into one expression? The Scripture vouches Solomon for the wisest of men and they are his Proverbs that prove him so. The seven wise men of Greece, so famous for their wisdom all the world over, acquired all that fame each of them by a single sentence, consisting of two or three words: and yvwo σeavтdy still lives and flourishes in the mouths of all, while many vast volumes are extinct, and sunk into dust and utter oblivion.'- Sermons, vol. i. p. 437, ed. 1823.

'Fundamentum enim perpetuæ commendationis et famæ est justitia, sine quâ nihil potest esse laudabile.'—De Off. lib. ii. cap. 20. The reference in the original side-note is to the first book of the Offices, but as this is manifestly incorrect, the proper number has been inserted in the present edition.

'Beneficence,' says Adam Smith, is less essential to the existence of society than justice. Society may subsist, though not in the most comfortable state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it.' -Theory of Moral Sent. p. 125.

• The command of fear, the command of anger, are always great and noble powers. When they are directed by justice and benevolence, they are not only great virtues, but increase the splendour of those other virtues. They may, how ever, sometimes be directed by very different motives, and in this case, though still great and respectable, they may be excessively dangerous. The most intrepid valour may be employed in the cause of the greatest injustice.'-Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sent. p. 354.

4 But the writer last quoted says: 'Though the breach of justice exposes to