tinue all by thine ordinances. Ps. cxix. 91., and the examples manifest that, sometimes fire, sometimes water, sometimes good, sometimes bad angels, sometimes godly, sometimes wicked men, sometimes frogs, sometimes lice, &c., must serue to accomplish his councells. And there is nothing exempt from such a disposing God. Euen, also, that which seemeth to be already performed, as it is written, The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposition thereof is of the Lord; not yet the very harts and thoughts of men, as it is written, From the habitation of his dwelling hee beholdeth all them that dwell on the earth; he fashioneth their hearts euery one.

"It is true, God hath, indeed, the angels and men with that kind and nature that they can move themselves by their own free will, and either intend this or that. Euen, indeed, as they doe. But for all that, hee holdeth the raines of their free will in his hande, in such a manner that, either hee can let them proceed when it goeth after his will, or hee can pull it backe, or moue it to this, or the other side, euen as sometimes a man draweth on a beast to a snare, which he letteth either passe freely before him, or pulleth backe, or can turne hither or thither, which comparison God himselfe vseth, where he saith to the king of Assiria, I will put my hooke in thy nostrils, and my bridle in thy lips, and will bringe thee backe againe, the same way thou comest.' Esa. xxxvii. 29.

"From whence it may well be said that the permission of God is not a bare permission, but that God hath alwais a hand with them in the action. For in all permissions of God concurre these two parts of the foreknowledge together. First, that he sustaineth the being and power of the creature, even in the committing of sinne, as is well known. Second, that he hath, also, their wicked and sinful motions in his hands, and so turneth them that the same must be effected thereby, which hee will have effected to the furtherance of his glory, and the benefit of his servants. Therefore, hee also ascribeth the worke which is effected in this manner, oftentimes to himselfe, as the abovenamed examples doe witnesse.

"The same is one part of the special vnspeakeable wisdome of God, that hee can so manage his government, that he, also,

with those creatures, which yet doe what they doe, out of free will, and in respect of their natures could do otherwise, yet, for all that, can unfaillibly accomplish the same, which hee hath determined to have accomplished by them.

Wit.

"Doctor Luther saith thus of this matter: If not wee ourselves, but God worketh in vs our salvation, then cannot wee act any thing bodily, before such time as his, is there; doe wee, frame wee, and worke wee it, the best wee can. And I say wee must doe wickedly, not that we are enforced thereunto; but as we vse to say, it must be so of necessity, without resistance, and yet not by any powerful compulsion or force. That is, when a man hath not the spirit of God, then is hee not, as it were, driven headlong by force, that he must commit wickednesse against his will, (as they vse to carry a theefe or murtherer to the gallows against his will,) but he doth it willingly and gladly, &c; that is here, by vs, called a MUST, or A MUST BE OF NECESSITY, which is not subject to alteration. Germ. fol. 479. Also, we know well that Judas betrayed Christ willingly; but we say that such a will in Judas was certainly and vnchangeably to be accomplished, at the time and houre, as God had determined it. Or, if wee bee not yet vnderstood, then wee must make a difference of two necessitiesone necessity where a thing must come to passe at a certaine time without constraint. He that now heares vs speake, let him know that we speake of the last, and not of the first. That is, we do not speake of this, whether Judas was willingly a traitor or against his will; but whether it must come to pass at the time and hour which God had determined vnchangeably, that he should betray Christ willingly. Fol. 529 A..

"This is the construction of vs and Doctor Luther, how these things are to be understood; that nothing cometh to passe unlesse God hath ordained that it should come to passe, whether it bee good or euil, and that it must come to passe, euen as the Lord hath determined it. And that the permission of God is not a bare and empty permission, but that alwaies there is mingled something of his working."

They proceed to answer objections, and to some further illustrations, but a sufficiency has been taken to show the reader,

that their reasonings on this subject are precisely the same as those of the writers of New-England, who are so continually accused of holding that God is the author of sin. I shall therefore close this number with a few remarks.

1. From the opinions of these German divines, so largely quoted, it appears that they believed there was a certain divine efficiency in all the accountable actions of creatures, both good and bad, which, however, no way impaired or altered their accountability: or, in their own words, "that the permission of God is not a bare and empty permission, but that alwaies there is mingled something of his workeing." Less than this cannot be inferred from the nature and perfections of an almighty infinitely wise God, who created, and every moment sustains, all creatures, and all their actions.

2. They clearly perceived two kinds of necessity operating on the actions of creatures. First, force, or what may be termed physical necessity. This always destroys accountableness, or is incompatible with it. Thus the planets move by physical necessity; and thus a criminal, who is carried forcibly to execution, moves under a physical necessity. Secondly, moral necessity, which is so far from being inconsistent with accounta bleness, that it is essential to it. As in the above quotation: "Then," says Luther, "we must make a difference of two necessities: one necessity, where I am forced to worke by forcethe other necessity, where a thing must come to passe at a certaine time."

Moral necessity arises from the infallible certainty that all beings possessed of reason will act according to their choice, or, as says Jonathan Edwards, "according to the greatest apparent good, at the time." Hence the moral order of events is as established and unalterable as the natural or physical; and moral necessity is as essential to freedom and accountableness, as physical is incompatible with it; and if this kind of moral necessity did not exist, there could be no such thing as foreknowledge or preordination, any more than the frame and motions of the natural universe could subsist without the operation of physical necessity.

It is easy to perceive that no event can be the proper object

of prescience or preordination which is not either immediately and infallibly connected with the energy of the divine will, or else mediately and more remotely, though not less infallibly, connected therewith, by its forming a link in the chain of events infallibly connected together, as cause and effect, and which chain must somewhere be connected with the almighty energy of God's will. Or, in other words, it cannot be certainly foreknown that any event will take place, but by its infallible connexion with a cause which can and will produce it. "Thus," says the above quotation, "when a man hath not the spirit of God, then is hee not driuen, as it were headlong, by force, that be must commit wickednesse against his will, but he doth it willingly and gladly; and that is here by us called a must, or must be of necessity which is not subject to alteration." But this is a moral necessity as above explained.

3. These writers had clearly in view the distinction termed moral inability, though they did not call it by that name. Thus, again, as in the above quotation, they say, "when a man hath not the spirit of God, then is he not driven by force, that he should commit wickedness against his will; but he doth it willingly and gladly;-and, in respect to his own powers, could doe otherwise, i. e. could be holy, and obey God, yet for all that he must sin and although Judas, in respect to his physical powers, might have done otherwise, yet, nevertheless, he must betray Christ. A moral inability to do right, and a moral necessity of doing wrong, always lie by the side of each other, are of equal force, though that force be not physical, and do in no case impair a man's guilt; for they are alike the evidence of freedom and the measure of guilt. If Judas betrayed Christ freely and willingly, then, with respect to his own physical powers, he might have done otherwise; but, in reference to his moral character, he could not do otherwise. When a traveller comes to two roads, he certainly is fully at liberty, and has physical powers to take either; but when he has made his elec tion, and taken one, then it will appear that he was morally unable to take the other, and, of course, that what he did was under a moral necessity; which, as I said, consists in the infallible certainty that a man will always act according to the greatest ap

parent good, all things considered, at the time. Whoever, therefore. says, understandingly, that a man cannot act contrary to his will, or cannot change his will, means, if I may so say, a moral and not a physical cannot; as Luther in the above quotation, when he says a sinner must sin, means not a physical, but a moral must, or necessity.

I shall conclude this number. by observing, that as a moral inability to do an act is as effectual a bar as a physical, so the influence or force of moral is as great and certain as that of a physical necessity. And I will illustrate this by citing a seripture fact. "And Elisha said unto him, (Hazael,) go say unto him, (Benhadad,) thou mayest certainly recover, howbeit the Lord hath showed me that he shall surely die." The message sent to Benhadad was, "Thou mayest certainly recover," yet Elisha told Hazael that God had assured him that Benhadad should die. The murderers of Benhadad acted freely, i. e. under no physical force or compulsion; they might have let him alone; he might have recovered, yet God's certain and eternal purpose issued, and was previously declared, on the inevitable operation of a merely moral necessity. They must kill him.

The observation has elsewhere been made, and it ought to satisfy every humble and every rational mind, that God, who can create, constitute, and uphold a moral agent, can unalterably decree all his actions, and can have an efficient agency in the same, and yet not impair their freedom or accountableness. Those who raise an outcry at this doctrine, which is absolutely necessary to the perfections of God, seem to think nothing of the power and skill necessary to create and sustain a moral agent.

INVESTIGATOR.