A.M.

inhabitants of the country joined him again, as well out of hatred to the Romans, who had treated them with great rigour, as the remains of affection for their king, reduced to the mournful condition in which they saw him from the most splendid fortune and exalted greatness. For the misfortunes of princes naturally excite compassion, and there is generally a profound respect engraven in the hearts of the people for the name and person of kings. Mithridates, encouraged and strengthened by these new aids, and the troops which several neighbouring states and princes sent him, resumed courage, and saw himself, more than ever, in a condition to make head against the Romans. So that not contented with being re-established in his dominions, which a moment before he did not so much as hope ever to see again, he had the boldness to attack the Roman troops so often victorious, beat a body of them, commanded by Tabius, and after having put them to the rout, pressed Triarius and Sornatius, two other of Lucullus's lieutenants in that country, with great vigour.

Lucullus at length engaged his soldiers to quit 3937. their winter-quarters, and to go to their aid. But they Aut. J.C. arrived too late. Friarius had imprudently ventured a battle, in which Mithridates had defeated him, and killed him seven thousand men; amongst whom were reckoned an hundred and fifty centurions and

& nationum copiis juvabatur. Hoc jam ferè sic fieri solere accepimus; ut regum afflict fortune facilè multorum opes alliciant ad misericordiam, maximèque eorum qui aut reges sunt, aut vivant in regno: quòd regale iis nomen magnum & sanctum esse videatur. Cic. pro leg. Manil. n. 24.

+ Itaque tantum victus efficere potuit, quantum incolumis nunquam est ausus optare. Nam cùm se in regnum recepisset suum, non fuit eo contentus, quod ei præter spem acciderat, ut eam, posteà quàm pulsus erat, terram unquam attingeret: sed in exercitum vestrum clarum atque victorem impetum fecit.-Cic. pro Jeg. Manil. n. 25.

twenty-four tribunes*, which made this one of the greatest losses the Romans had sustained for a great while. The army would have been entirely defeated, but for a wound Mithridates had received, which exceedingly alarmed his troops, and gave the enemy time to escape. Lucullus, upon his arrival, found the dead bodies upon the field of battle, and did not give orders for their interment: which still more exasperated his soldiers against him. The spirit of revolt rose so high, that, without any regard for his character as general, they treated him no longer but with insolence and contempt; and though he went from tent to tent, and almost from man to man, to conjure them to march against Mithridates and Tigranes, he could never prevail upon them to quit the place where they were. They answered him brutally, that as he had no thoughts but of enriching himself alone out of the spoils of the enemy, he might march alone, and fight them if he thought fit.

* Que calamitas tanta fuit, ut eam ad aures L. Luculli, non ex prælio nuntius, sed ex sermone rumor afferret. Cic. pro leg. Manil. n. 25.

SECT. IV. Mithridates, taking advantage of the discord which had arisen in the Roman army, recovers all his dominions. Pompey is chosen to succeed Lucullus. He overthrows Mithridates

in several battles. The latter flics in vain to Tigranes his son-in-law for refuge, who is engaged in a war with his own son. Pompey marches into Armenia against Tigranes, who comes to him and surrenders himself. Weary of pursuing Mithridates to no purpose, he returns into Syria, makes himself master of that kingdom, and puts an end to the empire of the

Sei ucide. He marches back to Pontus. Pharnaces makes the army revolt against his father Mithridates, who kills himself. That prince's character. Pompey's expeditions into Arabia and Judæa, where he takes Jerusalem. After having reduced all the cities of Pontus, he returns to Rome, and receives the honour of a triumph.

MANIUS Acilius Glabrio and C. Piso had been elected consuls at Rome. The first had Bithynia and Pontus for his province, where Lucullus commanded. The senate, at the same time, disbanded Fimbria's legions, which were part of his army. All this news augmented the disobedience and insolence of the troops towards Lucullus,

d

It is true, his rough, austere, and frequently haughty disposition gave some room for such usage. He cannot be denied the glory of having been one of the greatest captains of his age; and of having had almost all the qualities that form a complete general. But one was wanting which diminished the merit of all the rest; I mean the art of gaining the

Dion Cass, 1. xxxv. p. 7.

affections, and making himself beloved by the soldiers. He was difficult of access; rough in commanding; carried exactitude, in point of duty, to an excess that made it odious; was inexorable in punishing offences; and did not know how to conciliate good will by praises and rewards opportunely bestowed, an air of kindness and favour, and insinuating manners, still more efficacious than either gifts or praises. And what proves that the sedition of the troops was in a great measure his own fault, was their being very docile and obedient under Pompey.

In consequence of the letters which Lucullus had written to the senate, in which he acquainted them, that Mithridates was entirely defeated, and utterly incapable of retrieving himself, commissioners had been nominated to regulate the affairs of Pontus, as of a kingdom totally, reduced, They were much surprised to find, upon their arrival, that far from being master of Pontus, he was not so much as master of his army, and that his own soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt.

The arrival of the consul Acilius Glabrio still added to their licentiousness. *He informed them, that Lucullus had been accused at Rome of protracting the war for the sake of continuing his command; that the senate had disbanded part of his troops, and forbade them paying him any further obedience. So that he soon found himself almost entirely abandoned by the soldiers; Mithridates, taking advantage of this disorder, had time to recover his whole kingdom, and to make great ravages in Cappadocia.

Whilst the affairs of the army were in this condition, great noise was made at Rome against Lucullus. Pompey had just put an end to the war with the

* Plut. in Pomp. p. 634. App. p. 238. Dion Cass. 1. xxxvi P. 20.

* In ipso illo malo gravissimâque belli offensione, L. Lucullus qui tamen aliquá ex parte iis incommodis mederi fortasse potuisset, vestro jussu coactus, quòd imperii diuturnitati modum statuendum, veteri exemplo, putavistis, partem militum, qui jam stipendiis confectis erant, dimisit, partem Glabrioni tradidit. Cic. pro leg.

Manil. n. 26.

A. M. 3938.

Ant. J. C,

66.

pirates, for which an extraordinary power had been granted to him. Upon this occasion, one of the tribunes of the people, named Manilius, proposed a decree to this effect: "That Pompey, taking upon "him the command of all the troops and provinces "which were under Lucullus, and adding to them Bithynia, where Acilius commanded, should be charged with the conduct of the war against the kings Mithridates and Tigranes, retaining under him all the naval forces, and continuing to com"mand at sea with the same conditions and preroga❝tives as had been granted him in the war against "the pirates: That is to say, that he should have "absolute power on all the coasts of the Mediterra

وو

nean, to thirty leagues' distance from the sea. This was, in effect, subjecting the whole Roman empire to one man. For all the provinces which had not been granted him by the first decree, Phrygia, Lycaonia, Galatia, Cappadocia, Cilicia, the higher Colchis, and Armenia, were conferred upon him by this second, which included also all the armies and forces, with which Lucullus had defeated the two kings, Mithridates and Tigranes.

Consideration for Lucullus, who was deprived of the glory of his great exploits, and in the place of whom a general was appointed to succeed more to the honours of his triumph than the command of his armies, was not, however, what gave the nobility and senate most concern. They were well convinced that great wrong was done him, and that his services were not treated with the gratitude they deserved : But what gave them most pain, and what they could not support, was that high degree of power to which Pompey was raised, which they considered as a tyranny already formed. For this reason they exhorted each other in private, and mutually encouraged one another to oppose this decree, and not abandon their expiring liberty.

Cæsar and Cicero, who were very powerful at Rome, supported Manilius, or rather Pompey, with