the tribunes. The tribunes also had authority to convene the Senate and bring business before it, preside, and take part in debate. These privileges they acquired very early, by irregular practice passing into custom, rather than by any special enactment.

THE AUSPICES. - The absolute continuity of the government, which was more necessary at Rome than elsewhere, on account of a kind of theocratic idea in the constitution, was secured by a curious contrivance. The regular succession in Roman magistrates was as rigid as later in the Church. The welfare of the state was supposed to depend upon the favor of the gods, and this could only be transferred from one officer to another by an election which was practically a religious ceremony in which both officers took part. This favor, technically known as the auspicia, would lapse unless the election and inauguration were rightly performed. The ceremony consisted in taking the auspices, a regular process of religious divination by the flight of birds, etc., according to a very antiquated ritual (see below).

AUGURS. - The magistrates alone were authorized to consult the auspices, that is, to observe the various signs by which the gods were supposed to declare their will with regard to the state. The interpretation of the auspices, however, which had been developed into an extremely technical science (jus augurium), was in the hands of a much honored body (collegium) of distinguished citizens, called augurs (augures). These were not themselves magistrates,1 but simply the official interpreters of the jus augurium, which they alone were supposed to know. Since all important public acts (especially the holding of the comitia) were done auspicato (i.e., under authority of the auspices), the augurs naturally came to have great political influence. Their interpretation and advice could be disregarded, but such disregard was at the risk of the magistrate and was almost sure to affect his popularity, especially if misfortune followed. The augurs held office for life. Originally they had the right to fill vacancies on their board, but later such vacancies were sometimes filled by election by the people. Cicero himself became an augur, B.C. 53.

INTERREX.

Whenever there was a suspension of legal authority, by vacancy of the chief magistracy, it was understood that the auspicia — which were regularly in possession of the magistrates were lodged (in accordance with the most ancient custom) with the patrician members of the Senate until new magistrates should be inaugurated. The renewal of the regular order of things was begun by the patrician senators coming together and appointing one of their own number as interrex. He held

1 See Philippic xiv., sect. 14, and note.

2 The rule in this matter was several times changed by law.

office for five days, as chief magistrate of the commonwealth and possessor of the auspicia; then he created a successor, who might hold the comitia for the election of consuls, but who usually created another successor for that purpose.

DICTATOR. The dictator was an extraordinary magistrate, possessing absolute power, appointed by the consuls, at the instance of the Senate, in times of great public danger. Properly he held office for but six months. The laws of appeal, and other safeguards of individual liberty, had at first no force against this magistrate. In later times (after B.C. 202) dictators were no longer appointed, but instead the Senate, when occasion arose, invested the consuls with dictatorial power.1 Sulla, and afterwards Cæsar, revived the name and authority of the dictatorship; but in their case the office became equivalent to absolute sovereignty, since each of them was appointed dictator for life (perpetuo). The Magister Equitum, appointed by the Dictator, stood next in command to him and also had the imperium.

V. THE COURTS.

Our division of legal business into civil and criminal, though not exactly corresponding to the Roman classification of cases as causae privatae and causae publicae, still affords the most convenient basis for an understanding of the ancient courts.

In CIVIL CASES between individual citizens as well as foreign residents, the jurisdiction, originally belonging to the king, was, on the establishment of the Republic transferred to the consuls, but in the times with which we are especially concerned, it rested with the prætors. The praetor urbanus had charge of all civil cases between Roman citizens; the praetor peregrinus, of all civil suits to which an alien was a party. Civil processes were various and complicated, and, since none of the orations in this edition were spoken in such cases, they may be left out of account here,

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION also originally rested with the king, and, later, with the magistrates (consuls, etc.) who succeeded him. But by the various laws concerning appeal, the trial of all important offences was transferred to the assemblies of the people. In accordance with its origin the jurisdiction of these bodies was always theoretically an appellant jurisdiction. The case was supposed first to be decided by the magistrate, who, having given notice (diem dicere) to the defendant (reus), brought forward a bill (rogatio) enacting the punishment. If the case was a capital one, i.e. involving the life or status of a Roman citizen, it was brought before the comitia centuriata convened by the magistrate for the purpose, and decided ike any other question. It would appear that any curule magistrate as 1 See p. lviii.

well as the tribunes could take such action. If the case involved only a fine, it was tried before the comitia tributa by an ædile or tribune.

These methods of trial were practically superseded after the time of Sulla by the establishment of the standing courts (see below). They were, however, sometimes revived, as in Cicero's own case.

It had always been competent for the people to establish a quaestio or investigation to try persons suspected of crimes (quaestiones extraordinariae). After the analogy of this proceeding, Sulla established standing courts (quaestiones perpetuae) differing from previous quaestiones only in that they were continuous instead of being appointed upon any particular occasion. It was before these that most crimes were tried.1 Examples of such trials are found in Rosc. Am. (p. 1) and Verres (p. 26).

Such a court consisted of a presiding judge, quaesitor (praetor, or judex quæstionis), who caused a jury (judices) to be impanelled and sworn (hence called jurati), varying in number in the different courts and at different times, to try the case under his presidency. These judices were drawn by lot from a standing body (judices selecti), the exact number of which is unknown,2 and a right of challenging existed as with us. This body was originally made up from the Senatorial Order, but a law of C. Gracchus (B.C. 123) provided that the judices should be taken from non-Senators who possessed the equestrian census (see p. lxii, above). From this time the Senators and the Equites contended for the control of the courts. Sulla restored to the Senators the exclusive privilege of sitting as judices (B.C. 80), but the Aurelian Law (B.C. 70) provided that the jurors should be taken, one-third from the Senators and two-thirds from the Equestrian Order, and that one-half of the Equites chosen (i.e. one-third of the whole number of judices) should have held the office of Tribunus Aerarius (i.e. president of one of the thirty-five local tribes, see p. liv, above). This regulation remained in force until the dictatorship of Cæsar, B.C. 45, when this decuria of Tribuni Aerarii was abolished. A majority of the jurors decided the verdict. The president had no vote, nor did he decide the law of the case: he had merely charge of the proceedings as a presiding magistrate. (Cf. Verr. i. 32, for a hint at his powers.) For the method of voting, see note on Defence of Milo, p. 177, l. 19.

1 Sulla's quaestiones perpetuae were eight or ten in number. Six of theseRepetundae (extortion), Ambitus (bribery), Peculatus (embezzlement), Majestas (treason), de Sicariis et Veneficis (murder), and probably Falsi (counterfeiting and fraud) were presided over by six of the eight prætors. For the other two (or four), ex-ædiles (aedilicii) were appointed to preside as judices quaestionis.

2 For cases of extortion the number was specially fixed by the Lex Acilia at four hundred and fifty, from whom fifty were chosen as jurors,