Policy Competition and Policy Cooperation in a Monetary UnionSpringer Science & Business Media, 23 feb 2004 - 288 pagine This book studies the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies in the Euro area. The policy makers are the union central bank, the German government, the French government and other governments. The policy targets are price stability in the union, full employment in Germany, full employment in France, etc. The policy instruments are union money supply, German government purchases, French government purchases, etc. As a rule, the spillovers of fiscal policy are negative. The policy makers follow either cold-turkey or gradualist strategies. The policy decisions are taken sequentially or simultaneously. Policy expectations are adaptive or rational. This book carefully discusses the case for central bank independence and fiscal cooperation. |
Sommario
Monetary Policy in the Union | 10 |
2 Some numerical examples | 11 |
Fiscal Competition between Germany and France | 14 |
2 Some Numerical Examples | 20 |
1 Unemployment in Germany equals unemployment in France | 21 |
2 Unemployment in Germany exceeds unemployment in France | 23 |
3 Unemployment in Germany exceeds overemployment in France | 27 |
4 Unemployment in Germany equals overemployment in France | 28 |
Gradualist Policies Sequential Decisions | 146 |
2 A Numerical Example | 151 |
Gradualist Policies Simultaneous Decisions | 154 |
2 A Numerical Example | 160 |
Monetary Fiscal and Wage Competition | 164 |
1 The government closes the output gap by 100 percent the labour union closes the output gap by 100 percent | 165 |
2 The government closes the output gap by 40 percent the labour union closes the output gap by 40 percent | 168 |
3 The government closes the output gap by 20 percent the labour union closes the output gap by 60 percent | 172 |
Fiscal Cooperation between Germany and France | 31 |
2 Some Numerical Examples | 33 |
Competition between the Union Central Bank the German Government and the French Government | 39 |
2 Some Numerical Examples | 40 |
1 Unemployment in Germany and France | 41 |
2 Another interpretation | 44 |
3 Inflation in Germany and France | 46 |
Cooperation between the Union Central Bank the German Government and the French Government | 49 |
2 Some Numerical Examples | 51 |
2 Inflation in Germany and France | 54 |
Independent Central Bank Fiscal Cooperation between Germany and France | 57 |
12 Some Numerical Examples | 60 |
2 Inflation in Germany and France | 64 |
22 Some Numerical Examples | 66 |
A Synopsis of the Basic Models | 71 |
The Monetary Union of Two Countries Intermediate Models | 75 |
Fiscal Competition A General Model | 76 |
The Union Countries Differ in Size | 80 |
2 Fiscal Competition between Germany and France | 83 |
The Union Countries Differ in Behaviour | 86 |
2 Fiscal Competition between Germany and France | 88 |
Simultaneous and Independent Decisions | 92 |
Gradualist Policies | 96 |
Alternative Targets of the Union Central Bank | 100 |
The German Government Targets Overemployment | 108 |
No Spillovers of Fiscal Policy | 112 |
2 Competition between the Union Central Bank the German Government and the French Government | 114 |
Positive Spillovers of Fiscal Policy | 118 |
2 Fiscal Cooperation between Germany and France | 122 |
3 Competition between the Union Central Bank the German Government and the French Government | 124 |
4 Independent Central Bank Fiscal Cooperation between Germany and France | 128 |
The Monetary Union of Two Countries Advanced Models | 131 |
ColdTurkey Policies Sequential Decisions | 132 |
ColdTurkey Policies Simultaneous Decisions | 137 |
2 A Numerical Example | 142 |
4 The government closes the output gap by 60 percent the labour union closes the output gap by 60 percent | 174 |
5 The government closes the output gap by 40 percent the labour union closes the output gap by 80 percent | 175 |
The Monetary Union of n Countries | 179 |
The Monetary Union of Three Countries | 180 |
2 Fiscal Competition between Germany France and Italy | 183 |
3 Fiscal Cooperation between Germany France and Italy | 190 |
4 Monetary and Fiscal Competition | 192 |
5 Independent Central Bank Fiscal Cooperation between Germany France and Italy | 198 |
The Monetary Union of Four Countries | 202 |
Rational Policy Expectations | 205 |
Rational Policy Expectations in Germany and France | 206 |
2 Competition between the Union Central Bank the German Government and the French Government | 210 |
3 Independent Central Bank Fiscal Competition between Germany and France | 212 |
Adaptive Policy Expectations in Germany and France | 218 |
Adaptive Policy Expectations in Germany Rational Policy Expectations in France | 221 |
Conclusion | 229 |
12 Fiscal Competition between Germany and France | 231 |
13 Fiscal Cooperation between Germany and France | 234 |
14 Competition between the Union Central Bank the German Government and the French Government | 235 |
15 Cooperation between the Union Central Bank the German Government and the French Government | 241 |
16 Independent Central Bank Fiscal Cooperation between Germany and France | 244 |
Intermediate Models | 248 |
Advanced Models | 253 |
4 The Monetary Union of Three Countries | 256 |
5 Rational Policy Expectations | 258 |
Result | 261 |
2 Fiscal competition between Germany and France | 262 |
3 Fiscal cooperation between Germany and France | 263 |
5 Cooperation between the union central bank the German government and the French government | 265 |
Symbols | 267 |
A Brief Survey of the Literature | 268 |
The Current Research Project | 271 |
References | 273 |
| 285 | |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Policy Competition and Policy Cooperation in a Monetary Union Michael Carlberg Anteprima limitata - 2012 |
Policy Competition and Policy Cooperation in a Monetary Union Michael Carlberg Anteprima non disponibile - 2004 |
Policy Competition and Policy Cooperation in a Monetary Union Michael Carlberg Anteprima non disponibile - 2012 |
Parole e frasi comuni
According to equation causes a decline causes an increase central bank decides Change in Government close the output decline in French decline in German employment in France employment in Germany fiscal cooperation fiscal policy multiplier France Initial Output French government purchases French output goes gap in France gap in Germany German government purchases German output goes Germany and France Germany exceeds unemployment Germany France Initial Germany is 60 goes from 940 government is full increase in French increase in German increase in union independence and fiscal inflationary gap initial output gap let full-employment output let initial output monetary and fiscal monetary union multiplier in France multiplier in Germany output in France output in Germany output lag output of 30 output of equally purchases of 100 rational expectations reduction in French specific target Step 2 refers targets full employment total increase union central bank union government purchases union money supply Y₁ Y₂