Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western EuropeCUP Archive, 28 ago 1992 - 336 pagine Ellen Immergut vividly demonstrates the tremendous impact political institutions can have on policy in this comparative analysis of the politics of national health insurance in Sweden, France, and Switzerland - three countries where the same legislative proposals have been considered but where the policy result vary widely. In each country, politicians proposed programmes of national health insurance and measures to regulate the economic activities of the medical profession. Although these proposals triggered similar political conflicts and reactions in all three countries, the Swiss, French, and Swedish health systems developed in divergent directions as a result of the specific legislative proposals enacted into law in each country: the Swedish system can be considered the most 'socialized' in Western Europe, the Swiss the most 'privatized', and the French a conflict-ridden compromise between the two. Immergut argues that institutional rules and procedures, and not the demands and resources of social groups, set the terms for political conflicts. By providing distinct opportunites and impediments to both politicians and interest groups, political institutions establish distinct 'rules of the game' that explain the ability of various groups to influence policy making. Political institutions thus play a primary role both in structuring political conflicts and in accounting for divergent policy outcomes. |
Sommario
Role of government in financing medical services | 1 |
The economic and political logic | 34 |
Introduction of major health care programs in Western Europe | 59 |
Health care consumption by financing sector 1975 | 68 |
Limits on private health care provision 43 | 70 |
Costs number of doctors doctors incomes infant mortality | 78 |
Parliament versus executive | 80 |
Physician representation in society in medical associations in parliament | 84 |
The 1911 Sickness and Accident | 148 |
Confirmation of the referendum pattern | 154 |
The 1954 reform attempt | 161 |
Latest reform efforts | 174 |
The Social Democratic model | 189 |
Majority parliamentarism and the postwar settlement | 202 |
The 1950s and 1960s | 210 |
Executiveinduced cooperation and health politics | 223 |
The French political process and the Social Insurance | 97 |
The ineffective Fourth Republic | 106 |
The Debré reform and the Decrees | 113 |
Veto efforts | 120 |
Constitutional rules and health politics | 126 |
The Swiss referendum | 134 |
Union and employee association membership | 139 |
An overview | 141 |
Political arenas and veto points | 230 |
Notes | 245 |
139 | 246 |
230 | 262 |
297 | |
321 | |
325 | |
Parole e frasi comuni
actors administrative allowed Archives argued benefits block called cantons Chamber changes committee Comparative compulsory constitutional conventions costs Councils countries covered critical decisions demands direct doctors economic effects elections electoral employers enacted established example executive federal fees financing France French health system hospital important increased individual influence initiative institutions interest groups introduced issue Italy legislation liberal limited majority Medical Association medical profession medicine ment movement mutual national health insurance negotiations opposed organizations parliament parliamentary particular parties patients payment percent physicians political position practice pressures problems professional programs proposals referendum referred reform regulation reimbursement representatives Republic role rules salary schedule Second sector sickness funds Social Democratic social insurance social security societies specific Studies subsidies successful Sweden Swedish Swiss Switzerland tion unions United veto votes Welfare whereas