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A. D. 987-1313

the King and prayed him to reveal them. "I was wonder- CHAP. VIII ing," said Philip, "whether, on some future day, God would ever think fit to bestow on me, or some other king of the Franks, this favor, the restoration of the realm of France to its former position, to the extent and renown which it once enjoyed in the days of Charles the Great." With such an ambition in his heart, it was impossible for Philip Augustus to look with favor upon any vassal greater than himself.

While Henry II did not hesitate to do homage to Philip, the proud young prince did not shrink from conspiring with Henry's sons against him, and finally provoked him to open war. In the last months of Henry's life, the King of France defeated his army and imposed upon him all his demands. Two days before his death, Henry II again did homage as a vassal to the triumphant king.

France

Although Philip of France and Henry's son, Richard The fall of Coeur de Lion, pledged to each other perpetual friendship the Angevin power in when, in 1190, they started together for the crusade in the Holy Land,1 when Philip returned he at once began his encroachments upon his great vassal's feudal rights. While Richard was a captive in Germany, his brother John eagerly received as Philip's vassal all of Richard's continental lands. When Richard was released from captivity, war was promptly declared against the King of France; for Philip had already made great progress in his schemes. But, in 1199, Johnthe weakest and least able of the Plantagenets- succeeded to the throne of England and the rights he had previously usurped. Another claimant, Arthur of Brittany, was now put forward for the estates of Anjou, and John was ordered to surrender his French fiefs to his less formidable rival. Upon refusal, in March, 1202, the King of England was summoned to appear in France and answer charges brought against him.

1 The agreement between Philip Augustus and Richard Coeur de Lion was made in 1189 and may be found in Rymer, Foedera, I, p. 20.

CHAP. VIII

A. D. 987-1813

In the year 1200, Philip had chartered the University of Paris, and had thereby attached the French lawyers to the cause of royalty. He now proposed to assert his claims to the Angevin possessions before his own royal court. The King of England naturally declined to appear for judgment before the "peers of France"; and was, therefore, sentenced, in default, to be divested of all his fiefs held under the French crown.

The "disappearance" of Arthur of Brittany, a few months later, only promoted the triumph of the King of France. Being already forfeited in law, it only remained for the King to execute the sentence, in order to possess the Angevin lands. One after another, the castles fell into Philip's power. But the progress of the royal armies was not accomplished by military force alone. New charters to the cities and new privileges to the citizens won for him the adhesion of the towns. In three years, more than fifty grants of confiscated lands added friends to the royal cause. Finally Normandy was won, Anjou and Touraine were in Philip's hands, and only Aquitaine - the inheritance of Queen Elwas left. By the Queen's death this great duchy was also declared to be forfeited, and John "Lackland" was without legal possessions on the continent.

eanor

But Philip Augustus was not yet master of France. A great struggle awaited him, in which the odds appeared for a time to be on the side of his enemies. By an alliance with the Emperor, Otto IV of Germany, and the Count of Flanders, John appeared to have formed a powerful coalition against him. The Emperor, as we have already seen, hoped to revive his fortunes by a victory over the French and to weaken the rising cause of young Frederick II, to whom Philip Augustus had offered his friendship. The battle of Bouvines, fought on July 27, 1214, displayed the military genius of the King of France. In determining the future of the kingdom, it was, perhaps, the most decisive victory ever won by a French army. At one stroke it raised the monarchy to a place of proud pre-eminence; but its chief im

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A. D. 987-1313

portance lay in its effect upon the national sentiment of CHAP. VIII France. The triumphal march to Paris and the joyful demonstrations there proved that a great nation had been born. Thenceforth Philip Augustus was, in reality, King of France. Flanders, Normandy, Touraine, Anjou, Maine, and Poitou were all united in his grasp. Only Aquitaine was left to be taken from his English vassal.

of 1259

In striking contrast with the strength of the French mon- The Peace archy, was the disordered state of England. Years of foreign war, added to the dissensions of king and people over the Great Charter, had left the monarchy enfeebled. But England as well as France had profited by the misfortunes of King John; for, while France had advanced in territorial growth, England had wrung from the hand of the enfeebled king the charter of her liberties.1

Although John's successor, Henry III, was a light-minded ruler, he was not disposed to sacrifice his continental rights, nor to submit them to the sentence of the " peers of France." During his minority the regents vainly endeavored to reconquer his lost dominions. In 1225, Magna Charta had received its final form and definitive confirmation, and Henry, having composed his internal troubles, made a new attempt in 1232 to regain Normandy, Maine, and Anjou; but the effort again proved futile. In 1242, the defeat of his army was followed by a truce, which during twelve years was repeatedly renewed. Finally, in 1254, he made a journey to Paris for the purpose of conferring with Louis IX, who had just returned from the Holy Land, regarding the confiscation of his French fiefs. The great crusader was favorably disposed to a reconciliation, and even to a restoration of a part of Henry's lands; but his principal nobles endeavored to dissuade him by saying that, if the proposed restitution was inspired by delicacy of conscience, he might be at ease;" for the confiscations made by Philip Augustus were due to the felony of John Lackland, who had refused

1 For the Great Charter, see Stubbs, Select Charters, p. 296 et seq.; and Henderson, Select Documents, p. 135 et seq.

A. D.

987-1313

CHAP. VIII to present himself before the court of peers." To this, Louis IX replied that "he did not doubt the legitimacy of his possessions, but wished to establish a solid peace between the two crowns; and that, if he restored certain provinces, it was to assure the undisturbed enjoyment of those whose cession he demanded."

The real nature of

the peace

Although the barons retarded the decision of the King, on October 9, 1259, Louis IX concluded a treaty with Henry III, in which peace was established by granting to the King of England his inheritance in Aquitaine, — including Li-, mousin, Quercy, and Perigord, together with Bordeaux, Bayonne, and the rest of Gascony, as well as the Norman islands, all to be held by Henry and his successors in fief to the crown of France. The King of England was to pay an annual tribute sufficient to maintain five hundred horsemen; Prince Edward was required to join his father in the renunciation of all their rights to Normandy, Anjou, Maine, Touraine, and Poitou; and Henry III became a peer of France, with the title "Duke of Guyenne." Thus, the King of England, by a new vassalage, practically legalized the confiscations of Philip Augustus, publicly did homage to the King of France, and, on December 4, 1259, took an oath of fidelity to him.

By this transaction France acquired by cession an immense seaboard and an extent of territory which gave to the King a vast preponderance over any of his vassals; but it had laid the foundation for a quarrel which was not to terminate until nearly two hundred years of strife had exhausted both contestants. On neither side of the Channel was the arrangement popular. The English complained of the shameful sale of hereditary rights, but even more bitterly of the new servitude. By promising that his own direct vassals would assume fidelity to France, the King of England had released them from loyalty to himself, if England and France should ever be at war. The French were, however,

1 See the complaint of John Peckham, Archbishop of Canterbury, in Rymer, Foedera, I, Part IV, p. 80.

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987-1313

as little satisfied as the English; for they considered that, CHAP. VIII in leaving England a foothold on the continent, Louis IX had paid too high a price for the vassalage of the English king. Only the two principals were happy over their bargain: Henry III, because he had closed an open breach and concluded peace; Louis IX, because, as he coolly observed, Henry was not my vassal, but he has voluntarily become

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one!"

But time was to disclose the keen perspicacity of the King of France. A saint in the estimation of his age, the wisdom of the serpent was concealed in the heart of his humility. His ambition to render Henry his confessed vassal was far from being the deepest current of his guile. His problem was to force the English entirely out of France. Instead of attempting it by war, which would probably have proved beyond his strength, he chose to accomplish it by strategy.

The Treaty of Paris of 1259 was a perfect web of conditions and restrictions. Its tangle of provisions not only made the King of England the vassal of France, but enmeshed him in all the intricacies of feudal law, of which the suzerain had become the judge as well as the interpreter. The victim was placed in a position where he had either to submit to a gradual but inevitable dismemberment, or resort to force, and thereby justify the conquest of that which he still possessed. The process of confiscation was thus wholly in the hands' of France, left free to choose its times and occasions of spoliation.

With farsighted wisdom, Louis IX not only secured to France the advantage which the vassalage of the English kings afforded in the task of territorial expansion, but he foresaw the struggle with the Papacy in which the monarchy was later to be engaged, and forearmed France against it. By the Pragmatic Sanction of 1269,1 he laid down the

1 See Leibnitz, Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus, Hanover, 1693. In this document Louis IX put an end to the exactions of money by the Holy See by which the kingdom had been reduced to a state of misery. See also Flassan, Histoire, pp. 125, 126.

The policy

and influence

of Louis IX

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