Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's werke, Volume 2G. Fleischer, 1815 |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Parole e frasi comuni
Absicht Aristoteles Begriffe Bestimmungen Bewußtseyn beyden blos bloß bloße Daseyn David Hume denken dern Despotismus dieſe dieß Dinge durchaus eben einander Empfindung Erkenntniß Erscheinungen erst être feine fich find folglich frey Freyheit ganze Gefühl Gegenstand Geist Gewalt gewiß giebt Glauben Gott Grunde heißt Idealismus Illuminaten irgend iſt Kant Kantischen könnte Kraft laſſen läßt Lehre Leibniz Leidenschaften lich machen mais Mann Menschen menschlichen Meynung Montesquieu muß müſſen Natur nemlich nothwendig nunft objective offenbar Philosophie Platon Princip qu'il qu'on raison recht Rede Religion Sache schlechterdings Schluffe Schrift Seele sehen ſeine ſelbſt Sensualismus seyn ſich ſie ſind Sinne Sinnlichkeit Sokrates ſondern Spinoza Stande Theile Theismus Thiere thun tout transscendentalen Traume Tugend überall Ueberzeugung Unendliche Ursache Urtheile verknüpft Vermögen Vernunft Verstand viel vollkommen Vorstellungen wahre wahrhaft Wahrheit Wahrnehmung wåre Weise weiß Welt Wesen wider willkührliche wirklich Wirkung Wiſſen Wissenschaft wohl wollen Wort zuleht zwey zweyten
Brani popolari
Pagina 174 - It follows, therefore, that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure.
Pagina 170 - It seems evident that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses ; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe which depends not on our perception, but would exist though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated.
Pagina 175 - ... imagination to conceive that object which is usually conjoined to it; and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this consists the whole nature of belief. For, as there is no matter of fact which we believe so firmly, that we cannot conceive the contrary, there would be no difference between the conception assented to, and that which is rejected, were it not for some sentiment which distinguishes the one from the other.
Pagina 175 - Belief is the true and proper name of this feeling ; and no one is ever at a loss to know the meaning of that term, because every man is every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it.
Pagina 174 - NOTHING is more free than the imagination of man; and though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision. It can feign a train of events, with all the appearance of reality, ascribe to them a particular time and place, conceive them as existent, and paint them out to itself with every circumstance, that belongs to any historical...
Pagina 66 - Wilkins' forty Summa Genera, to the head of quantity alone, so as to make Mathematics and Logic, Natural History and Civil History, Natural Philosophy and philosophy of all other kinds, coincide omni ex parte.
Pagina 175 - I see a billiardball moving towards another on a smooth table, I can easily conceive it to stop upon contact. This conception implies no contradiction ; but still it feels very differently from that conception by which I represent to myself the impulse and the communication of motion from one ball to another.
Pagina 221 - De plus, par le moyen de l'âme ou de la forme, il ya une véritable unité qui répond à ce qu'on appelle moi en nous ; ce qui ne saurait avoir lieu ni dans les machines de l'art ni dans la simple masse de la matière, quelque organisée qu'elle puisse être, qu'on ne peut considérer que comme une armée ou un troupeau, ou comme un étang plein de poissons, ou comme une montre composée de ressorts et de roues.
Pagina 174 - We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horse ; but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed.
Pagina 175 - I say, then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain.