that he had God's own authority to say and promise this to mankind. Upon the faith and trust of this promise, we know that we shall rise again. All are equally assured of it, from the highest to the lowest. Wise and learned men thought indeed the same thing before: they concluded it to be so from probable argument and reasonings; but this was not like having it, as we have it, from God himself; or, what is just the same thing, from the mouth of a person, to whom God gave witness by signs and wonders and mighty deeds. They were far far short of our certainty, who studied it most deeply. There were but few who could study or comprehend it at all. Blessed be God, we are all informed, we are all, from the most learned to the most ignorant, made sure and certain of it.

Having then this great doctrine secured, that we shall all come again into a new world and a new life; the next great point, which every serious mind will turn to, the second grand question to be asked, is, who are to be happy, and who will be miserable in that other state? The text satisfies us completely upon this head. You ask, who shall come to the resurrection of life? The text replies, they that have done good. Observe well, and never forget this answer. It is not the wise, the learned, the great, the honoured, the professor of this or that doctrine, the member of this church, or the maintainer of that article of faith, but he that doeth good; he, of whatever quality or condition, who strives honestly to make his life of service to those about him; to be useful in his calling, and to his generation; to his family, to his neighbourhood, and, according to his ability, to his country and to mankind; "he that doeth good." All the rest, without this, goes for nothing: though he understand the things of religion ever so well, or believe ever so rightly-though he cry, "Lord, Lord!"-be he ever so constant and devout in his prayers, or talk ever so much, or so well, or so earnestly for religion-unless he do good; unless his actions, and dealings, and behaviour come up to his knowledge and his discourse; correspond with his outward profession and belief, it will avail him nothing; he is not the man, to whom Jesus Christ hath promised in the text, that he shall come to the resurrection of life. The issue of life and death is put upon our conduct and behaviour; that is made the test we are to be tried by.

Again; when we read in Scripture, when we know from

positive and undoubted authority, that misery and destruction, ruin, torment, and damnation are reserved for some, it is surely the most natural, the most interesting of all inquiries, to know for whom. The text tells us, "for them that have done evil." Here let the timorous conscience take courage. It is not any man's errors, or ignorance; his want of understanding, or education, or ability, that will be laid to his charge at the day of judgement, or that will bring him into danger of the damnation which the Gospel threatens; it is having done evil; having wilfully gone about to disobey what he knew to be the will and command of his Creator, by committing mischief, and doing wrong and injury to his fellow-creatures.

Let the bold and presumptuous sinner hear this text with fear and trembling. Let him, who cares not what misery he occasions, what evil and harm he does, if he can but compass his purpose, carry his own end, or serve his wicked lusts and pleasures; let him, I say, be given to understand what he has to look for: "He that doeth evil shall come to the resurrection of damnation." This is absolute, final, and peremptory; here is no exception, no excuse, no respect of person or condition.

They that have done good shall come again unto the resurrection of life. But, alas! I hear you say, What good can I do? my means and my opportunities are too small and straitened to think of doing good. You do not sufficiently reflect what doing good is. You are apt to confine the notion of it to giving to others, and giving liberally. This, no doubt, is right and meritorious but it is certainly not in every man's power; comparatively speaking, it is, indeed, in the power of very few. But doing good is of a much more general nature, and is, in a greater or less degree, practicable by all. For whenever we make one human creature happier or better than he would have been without our help, then we do good. And when we do this from a proper motive, that is, with a sense and a desire of pleasing God by doing it, then we do good in the true sense of the text, and of God's gracious promise. Now let every one in particular reflect, whether in this sense he has not some good in his power; some within his own doors, to his family, his children, his kindred; by his labour, his authority, his example, by bringing them up, and keeping them in the way of passing their lives honestly and quietly, and usefully. What good more import ant, more practicable than this is? Again, something may be

done beyond our own household, by acts of tenderness and kindness, of help and compassion to our neighbours. Not a particle of this will be lost. It is all set down in the book of life; and happy are they who have much there! And again, if any of us be really sorry that we have not so much in our power as we would desire, let us remember this short rule-that since we can do little good, to take care that we do no harm. Let us show our sincerity by our innocence: that, at least, is always in our power.

Finally let us reflect, that in the habitations of life are many mansions;-rewards of various orders and degrees, proportioned to our various degrees of virtue and exertion here." He that soweth plenteously shall reap plenteously." We can never do too much,-never be too earnest in doing good; because every good action here will, we are certain, be an addition of happiness hereafter; will advance us to a better condition in the life to come, whatever be our lot or success in this. God will not fail of his promise. He hath commissioned his beloved Son to tell us, that they that have done good shall enter into the resurrection of life. Let us humbly and thankfully accept his gracious offer. We have but one business in this world-it is to strive to make us worthy of a better. Whatever this trial may cost us; how long, how earnestly, how patiently soever, through whatever difficulties, by whatever toils we endeavour to obey and please our Maker, we are supported in them by the solid and never-ceasing consolation-"that our labour is not in vain in the Lord."

XXX.

DIFFERENT DEGREES OF FUTURE REWARDS AND

PUNISHMENTS.

JOHN V. 29.

"They that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation."

THERE is a difference introduced into religion of this sort. From the text-from the mention made of separation merely, and placing one sort on the right hand and the other on the leftfrom the familiar notions and method of speaking of heaven and

hell, of salvation and perdition, we are led to imagine that the human species at the day of judgement will be divided into two kinds-that the one will be advanced in heaven to supreme happiness; that the other will be consigned in hell to extreme misery. This is a way of thinking we may easily and naturally fall into; but when we come to consider it further, there are two or three principal difficulties attending this opinion on the subject.

First; it seems a defect in the Christian religion, that it nowhere points out the precise quantity of innocence or virtue sufficient for our salvation, or necessary to entitle us to admission into heaven.

Secondly; that there is no encouragement, according to this account, to go beyond, or strive after a superior degree of holi

ness.

Thirdly; that we cannot easily comprehend how it should be a just dispensation of Providence to advance one part of mankind to supreme happiness, and commit the other to extreme misery, when there cannot be much to choose between the worst of the one sort, and the best of the other-between the best who are excluded from heaven, and the worst who are received into it.

Now for the satisfaction of these several doubts and difficulties, I shall endeavour to show, that it is most agreeable to our conception of divine justice, and also consonant to the language of Scripture, to suppose that there are prepared for us rewards and punishments of all possible degrees and varieties, from the most exalted happiness down to extreme misery; upon which plan satisfactory answers may be given to all the difficulties just now stated.

First; that it is in its nature impossible, and upon this plan needless, to ascertain the precise quantity of virtue necessary to salvation.

Secondly; that upon this plan our labour is never in vainthat we have encouragement to proceed from virtue to virtue, from one degree of goodness to another, till we attain the utmost which our ability and opportunity admit of.

Thirdly; that this plan totally subverts all objection to the divine economy, in not adapting the degrees of reward and punishment, to the degrees of virtue and vice.

These points I shall speak to distinctly, and in their order.

It is most agreeable to our natural conceptions of justice to suppose that there are prepared for us rewards and punishments of every possible degree. It is hardly necessary to contend that there exists an almost infinite variety of virtue and vice, of merit and demerit, in different persons. The conduct of any great number of persons is seldom alike, or the same, though they may be all virtuous, or all innocent, or all vicious; but that is not the whole. The same conduct is capable of very different degrees of virtue or guilt, according to the abilities, the opportunities, and the temptations. In acts of goodness, the merit will be proportionably increased, as the abilities to perform them are less, and as greater acts of self-denial and exertion are requisite. The opportunities, which happen to different men of doing good, are also very various, and constitute a proportionable variety in the character; for every opportunity neglected becomes a vice. In estimating the guilt of criminal actions, it would be extremely unfair to have no consideration by which the criminal was urged. A man who steals for want is wrong, but it would be hard to place the crime upon a level with his who steals to support his vices, to indulge his vanity, to supply his pleasures. Now the actual conduct of different persons being different, and the same conduct differing in merit and demerit, according to the daily opportunity and temptation which the agent experienced, all which circumstances are subject to a multiplied variety; it must follow, that guilt and virtue in different individuals differ in every possible degree-that whatever reason there is to expect from the Divine Being that he will reward virtue and punish vice at all, we have the same reason to expect, as far as the light of nature goes, that he will adapt his rewards and punishments in exact proportion to the virtue or guilt of those who stand at his judgement seat. Very true, it is not thus in human judicature. The same punishment is inflicted upon crimes of very different colour and malignancy; and crimes of the same denomination have very different guilt in different persons and different circumstances. But this is a defect in human laws, and proceeds from a defect of power. We have no knowledge of each other's motives and circumstances, to be able to ascertain with precision our mutual merit or guilt; or, if we could, there exists not within the compass of human treatment that precise gradation of punishment which is necessary to a perfect retribution of so