of Saint Luke sets forth the complacency with which God receives returning sinners in a variety of forms; it is with the satisfaction with which a father receives a miserable and repenting child-"Verily I say unto you, there is joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth."

The last branch of divine goodness we consider is his mercy -mercy, in the common and general sense of the text, comprehends all those benevolent qualities which we have noticed. It is another name for his goodness. But there is one particular instance and exercise of mercy which is all I need name; and this is his tenderness and compassion to our infirmities, and the disadvantages of our state and condition: "Like as a father pitieth his own children," saith the psalmist, "so the Lord pitieth them that fear him; for he knoweth our frame, he remembereth that we are but dust." Saint Paul, in the 2d chapter of the Ephesians, describes the future condition, both of himself, and of those whom he wrote to before their call and conversion to Christianity. Among whom we all had our conversation in times past in the lusts of the flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind; but God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ."

Upon the whole, therefore, here is Almighty God described in the words which he himself, and his Holy Spirit, dictate and authorize. He is described as supremely good; and if any one asks what his goodness consists in, we answer that the Scripture teaches us to place it in justice to his rational creatures, in dealing with every one according to his deserts, punishing the impenitent and unrighteous, remembering and rewarding our works and labours of love-in loving the whole creation (for, throughout the whole world, there is not a corner in which some instance of kind contrivance and provision for their happiness is not found)-in fidelity to his word, his promises and threats -in patience and long-suffering with our sins and provocation -in placability, or a disposition to pardon, whenever pardon is consistent with the end and support of his moral government; and lastly, in compassion and mercy to our infirmities and feelings, in condescension to the difficulties and defects under which we labour-in accepting and remembering our struggles with temptation, our feeble endeavours, if they are sincere, after

amendment-our progress, though but very imperfect, in obedience and reformation.

XXXVI.

THE ILLS OF LIFE DO NOT CONTRADICT THE
GOODNESS OF GOD.

ROM. X. 23.

"And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God." A CHILD, if it reflects, will often be at a loss to account for the behaviour of its parents towards it; and a peevish and perverse child will often murmur and complain; yet the same child, when it becomes a man, and looks back upon its youth and infancy, will see nothing in its parents' treatment of it but the greatest prudence and affection-will then discover the reason and the justice of what it once complained of, and discern the end and meaning of many things which at that time appeared so intricate and unaccountable. This hereafter may be our case, and probably will be so. We must wait for the great day of Christ's coming again, for the further enlargement of our understandings and more perfect comprehension of these subjects. In the mean time, nevertheless, many considerations which may conduce to set us at ease, and inspire us with trust and confidence in God's providence and goodness, are fit to be known and attended to. To proceed, therefore: many of the complaints which we make against Providence are of such a nature as, one may say, can never be satisfied, and are therefore manifestly unreasonable; as, for instance, when we complain of the want of greater strength than we have, or of superior knowledge, or longer life, or immortality, or that we cannot move ourselves with greater speed, or get through our work in less time or with less trouble-what is this but, in other words, to wish that we had been created angels; which is all one as if a brute, a horse, for instance, or a dog, should murmur that it was not born a The absurdity of this we see immediately. In like manner, a superior being, or an angel, might as well complain that it was not formed an archangel; and the archangel itself would have the same reason to complain that it was inferior to the supreme Being who made it. Now all these complaints are of a

man.

kind, as I said before, never to be satisfied: for so long as there is any thing above us, which there always must be; any perfection we do not possess-any, however, that we can form a notion of, there would be the same reason for these complaints. Suppose a brute to complain that it has not the faculties or reason of a man-in other words, that it is not a man: suppose its own complaint gratified, suppose it to succeed, and the brute to become a man-would it cease to complain? might it not still answer that it was without the properties and perfections of an angel?—at least, it would have the same reason for its murmuring that we have. The evils then, complained of, are called by divines the evils of imperfection: and it is agreed, I think, by all, that they are to be laid out of the case, as conveying no possible imputation upon the divine wisdom or goodness for a complaint which cannot be satisfied, and which you must go on for ever with, must evidently be groundless and unreasonable in its principle. So then, the defects and imperfections of our nature are what Providence, so far as we can judge, must permit, and should never be repined at, nor any of the consequences of them; which will take in a great part of our complaints, for many of them may be traced up to this.

The next consideration I shall propose, which makes a very material part of the subject, is this-that God thinks fit, and very wisely too, as we can in some measure understand, to govern the world by general rules and laws, which however, like all general rules, must sometimes press hard upon individuals, and produce particular inconveniences. I will explain, as well as I can, what I mean by these general rules. There are, first, what we call laws of nature, which are in general observed to take place without interruption or regard to each particular effect that they may produce. Thus, by the law of nature, the sun rises and shines, though he shine perhaps on the fields of the wicked as well as the good. By the same law a certain state of the air, which also is brought on by other regular causes, produces rain; rain, when it falls, swells the rivers; the rivers, when they swell, may overflow and damage or lay waste the neighbouring fields; and this falls equally on the virtuous and the sinner. All this comes to pass in consequence of the regular course of nature being suffered to take place; and God does not see fit to interrupt or suspend this course for the particular prejudice that it may occasion to individuals. In like

manner, the tide ebbs and flows according to the constant order of its nature, though it may thereby obstruct, perhaps, the ships of the good and virtuous merchant, or carry safe into port the wealth and property of those who little deserve it. We perceive then reason in such things as are constant and regular; as the flowing of the tides, the return of the seasons, and the like; but do not see resemblances of it in the more varied parts of nature, as winds and storms, hail and thunder and lightning; though there is the same reason for it, because these as much depend upon their causes, and are as much governed by a law, though unknown to us, as the other. Now although great particular inconveniences may sometimes arise from these general laws of nature, yet I think it will be found to be for the common benefit of the world that they should be permitted to prevail; and for this reason amongst others, that it is upon their prevailing, that is, upon the course of nature going regularly on, that all the foresight we have of future events depends. We act, and determine, we prepare, we provide, in the expectation of those laws of nature going on as they have done; nor is it conceivable how we could act, prepare, or provide, if it was otherwise. How would the mariner, for instance, order his navigation, or settle his voyage, if the flowing of the tide or blowing of the wind was to depend upon the convenience of the good and virtuous? How would the husbandman sow or plough either in hope or safety, if the rain must fall and sun shine only when it suited the grounds of the righteous and good? It is easy to imagine what confusion must arise from so much irregularity and uncertainty. It is evidently to the advantage of the whole, that such a general order of things should be appointed and maintained in the world that in what concerns our conduct and subsistence, we may look forward to, and form a judgement of, futurity. Though here we must speak with caution-we intend not to say but that God can control and suspend the ordinary course of nature, direct the winds and storms, give or withhold the rain when he pleases, and as he pleases; nor do we dispute but that he often does so-sometimes openly, oftener when we do not know it. We may say, that he has appointed general rules, and regular courses of things, and permits it to a certain degree, so as to answer some beneficial purpose at least ; thus enabling us to form a judgement of the future. There may be other, and perhaps stronger, reasons for God's adhering, if we may say so,

to general rules; and who can say how far general rules extend? May we not refer to them, for example, diseases of body and weakness of mind? for these have their causes, and follow their causes as much as the tide does the moon.

God can, no doubt, remove these causes, or hinder them from operating; but it is by the same power that he can hinder the tide from flowing, or the moon from drawing it: a power which, in this latter instance, we do not expect he should exert often, nor perhaps without good cause, in either case. Upon the whole, then, can a single person-one out of many millions-an atom, compared with the universe—can he wonder that he should be suffered to labour under difficulties and inconveniences, rather than break in upon those general rules, upon the operation of which the happiness of the rest, of the whole, may in a great degree depend? Thus it appears to be in the natural world: and the same respect to regularity in the effects and consequences of things may hold probably in the moral world; that is, the actions and behaviour of men to one another. Thus one manby luxury or extravagance, reduces himself to beggary: his poverty involves others in distress who are connected with him: and yet it is still both fitting and necessary that luxury and extravagance should be followed by poverty, and that there should subsist those intercourses and communications between one man and another that make their fortunes dependent upon one another. This is the natural constitution of the world; and is not to be departed from, because it will now and then produce inconveniences to those who do not deserve to suffer them. In short, what we call the course of nature, that is, the ordinary train of cause and effect, is all we have to direct us in the conduct of life; and though the upholding it often presses hard upon innocent individuals, yet it is necessary for the good of the whole, and therefore perfectly consistent with divine wisdom and goodness, that it should, in general, however, be maintained and upheld.

But thirdly; part of our difficulties are owing to this to our expecting too much; more than we have any reason or authority to expect.

If we find in ourselves any merit or virtue more than in others, we instantly count upon being rewarded by Providence with riches, and grandeur, and honour, and high station. Now this is nowhere promised. Our Saviour indeed says, "If ye