nor historical, but constructive throughout. This method of construction through criticism is the one which I have instinctively followed in everything I have written. I do not claim that it is the best method; I simply desire that its nature be recognized. In the present case, when contemporary discussion on the fundamental questions of philosophy and religion is peculiarly active, the necessity is almost imposed upon a writer of defining his own position by reference to divergent views and other forms of statement. And I venture to think that the value of his work is thereby increased; for only by such mutual criticism, and the resulting definition of the points of difference, can we advance towards a common understanding. Readers of this volume will note the prominence given to Professor Bosanquet's impressive statement of the Idealistic position in the two volumes of his Gifford Lectures in the University of Edinburgh. I found it especially instructive, from time to time, to make Professor Bosanquet's treatment my point of departure, because, along with the large amount of general agreement, there was at certain points a difference of emphasis, to say the least, in our ways of holding the Idealistic creed. The lecture on The Criterion of Value' and the two lectures on 'The Absolute and the Finite Individual' may be mentioned as examples of what I mean. It is possible that some readers may think that I have drawn too frequently upon the poets. That is perhaps a question of temperament. But my procedure was, at any rate, quite deliberate, for I accept Wordsworth's description of poetry as 'the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge', and I am even ready to be persuaded by Mr. Yeats that 'whatever of philosophy has been made poetry is alone permanent'. In concluding this preface, I desire to thank the Senatus of the University of Aberdeen for the honour they did me in appointing me to the Lectureship. It has enabled me to bring together the reflections of many years, and I have striven, in return, to give them of my best. To my brother, Professor James Seth, who read the lectures in manuscript, and to Professor H. R. Mackintosh, of New College, Edinburgh, and Mr. H. F. Hallett, M.A., who read the whole in proof, my warm thanks are also due for their ready help and valuable suggestions. UNIVERSITY OF Edinburgh, Reasons for beginning with Hume The importance attached to the Dialogues' by Hume himself The question debated is not 'the Being but only the Nature of Concentration of the discussion on the argument from design The criticisms of Philo and his anticipation of modern points Contrast between the order of nature and the record of human Hypothesis of a finite God suggested but set aside Surrender of the moral attributes. Insignificant character of the conclusion Hume's conclusion determined by the restricted nature of 38 The protest of 'the heart' against the reason . The Kantian separation between Knowledge and Belief Lange's History of Materialism and the flight to the ideal' Lotze's protest against materialistic dogmatism: Spencer's Unknowable as the reconciliation of religion and Mr. Balfour's argument: its sceptical and constructive aspects Relatedness versus Relativity Comte's phenomenalism depends on a false idea of metaphysics |