= 66 futuribilia, furnish a Scriptural basis for the theory that God's foreknowledge of conditioned free acts of the future is uncertain. The only passage that seems to support their claim is Jer. XXVI, 3: "si forte [ N = if not perhaps] audiant et convertantur." But this whole passage is manifestly anthropomorphic, as the expression "I may repent me" (ibid.) shows. St. Jerome commentates this verse as follows: "Verbum ambiguum forsitan' maiestati Domini non potest convenire; sed nostro loquitur affectu, ut liberum homini servetur arbitrium, ne ex praescientia eius quasi necessitate vel facere quid vel non facere cogatur." In all the other texts which Ledesma and the Socinians allege, the "ne forte" of the Vulgate is a somewhat too free rendition of the Hebrew = ne, " in order that not," while where the Vulgate has "si forte," the Hebrew text reads DN = si, "if." In neither case does the Hebrew particle connote doubt.67 Where the Vulgate version of the New Testament in such instances has “forte,” the Greek nearly always has av, indicating an impossible condition, as, e. g., Matth. XI, 23; "forte mansissent (μeivev av) usque in hanc diem." Elsewhere the Vulgate employs the word "utique" instead of "forte," or, where the conditional clause is negative, "nunquam," equivalent to the Greek "oux av." 69 Cfr. also Luke VII, 39: "Hic si esset propheta, sciret utique (¿yívwokev av)." From all of which it is quite obvious that Holy 66 This and similar expressions in the Bible are called anthropomorphic, because they represent God under the form of a man (ἄνθρωπος, μορφή). Cfr. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II (2nd ed.), pp. 63 sqq. Petavius, De Deo, II, 1. "68 Scripture does not countenance any doubt as to the infallibility of God's foreknowledge of the futuribilia. b) The Fathers, in their controversies with heretics, expressly recognize the scientia futuribilium and treat it as an undoubted ingredient of the revealed faith. a) To establish their heretical theory of the creation of the universe through the instrumentality of a Demiurge, the Manicheans, the Gnostics, and the Marcionites argued thus: "Either God foresaw that angels and men would sin, or He did not foresee it; if He foresaw it, He is not good; if He did not foresee it, He is not omniscient." In solving this difficulty not one of the Fathers, from Irenæus down to St. John Damascene, dreamed of denying that God foresaw the sin of angels and men in the event of their creation. Their argument is that, although God clearly foresaw that millions of angels would become devils, and that Adam. by transgressing the divine command would involve his entire posterity in original sin, He nevertheless created those particular angels and this particular human race. For, as St. Isidore says: "Sicut praescivit Deus lapsum, ita praescivit, quomodo posset illi subvenire." 10 That the sin of angels and men was a mere futuribile, which did not become a futurum until God had decreed the creation of the universe, is made evident by a consideration of the eternal plan of creation. If God would create these angels and those men, then many of the former would fall away, and all of the latter would sin.71 70 Quoted by Suarez, Opusc. De Scientia Div., II, 2. 71 Ruiz gives numerous Patristic quotations bearing on this topic in B) Thomassin claimed that the scientia futuribilium was an invention of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, and that it was on this account that St. Augustine fought it so bitterly. But this is an altogether gratuitous assertion. Replying to the question, "Why does God not take from this life the just before they fall into sin (which He foresees) ?" the "Doctor of Grace" expressly declares that this omission is not due to nescience. "Respondeant, si possunt, cur illos Deus, cum fideliter et pie viverent, non tunc de vitae huius periculis rapuit, ne malitia mutaret intellectum eorum. .. Utrum hoc in potestate non habuit, an eorum mala futura nescivit? .. Nempe nihil horum nisi perversissime et insanissime dicitur - Let them answer, if they can, why God did not, when these were living faithfully and piously, snatch them from the perils of this life, lest wickedness should change their minds. . . . Had He not this in His power or was He ignorant of their future sins? ... To assert either the one or the other would be most wicked and foolish." 72 And still more clearly in another work: "Certe poterat illos Deus, praesciens esse lapsuros, antequam id fieret, auferre de hac vita -Assuredly God, foreknowing that they would fall, was able to take them away from this life before that fall occurred." 73 Thomassin mistook the point at issue in St. Augustine's controversy with the Semi-Pelagians. Semi-Pelagianism taught that infants who die unbaptized are held responsible by God for the sins they would have committed had they reached maturity; so much so that their dying without the grace of his famous work De Scientia, de Ideis, de Veritate ac de Vita Dei, disp. 65-67. See also Petavius, De Deo, IV, 8. 72 De Corrept. et Grat., cap. 9, n. 19. 73 De Dono Perseverantiae, C. 9, n. 22. Baptism is really a punishment for these hypothetical sins which in reality they had never committed; while on the other hand the salvation of those who were baptized is attributable to the good deeds which God foresaw they would have performed in after life had they continued in this world. Augustine rightly protested against this absurdity. "Unde hoc talibus viris in mentem venerit, nescio, ut futura, quae non sunt futura, puniantur aut honorentur merita parvulorum." " He did not deny God's scientia futuribilium as such, but protested against its being put on the same level with His scientia futurorum. Cfr. De Anima et eius Orig., I, 12, n. 15: "Ipsa exinanitur omnino praescientia, si, quod praescitur, non erit. Quomodo enim recte dicitur praesciri futurum, quod non est futurum?" From Augustine's point of view, therefore, there is, be- . sides the scientia futurorum (= visionis) and the scientia mere possibilium (= simplicis intelligentiae), another intermediate species of Divine Knowledge, namely, the scientia futuribilium, which was later called scientia media by the Molinists. c) The theological argument for our thesis is partly based on the intrinsic perfection of the Divine Knowledge, partly on the indispensableness of the scientia futuribilium for the purposes of providence. To know precisely what circumstances, conditions, and situations the created will can encounter, and how it would conduct itself in each and every possible juncture, is doubtless a wonderful prerogative of the Divine Intellect, which it could not relinquish without ceasing to 74 De Praedest. SS., c. 12, n. 24. be divine. As St. Jerome says: "Cui praescientiam tollis, aufers et divinitatem." In matter of fact nescience of conditionally future acts would entail a woful ignorance of many important truths that are essential to that infinite knowledge which evolves harmony out of confusion. Even a mere doubt as to how free creatures as yet uncreated would deport themselves under all possible combinations of circumstances, would be utterly incompatible with God's Knowledge and destructive of His Providence. If such a doubt were possible, the Creator could not consistently carry out any fixed plan of governing the universe. He would simply have to trust to "good luck," because His creatures, by reason of their free will, would be in a position to disturb all His calculations. Like "the best laid plans of mice and men," His most wise counsels would "gang aft aglee." Unable to provide against unforeseen surprises, Divine Providence would be fated to grope in the dark and to steer an ever-changing zigzag course. The Lord of the universe would be dependent on the moods of mortal men, and-oftentimes could not set the machinery of His omnipotence in motion until it was too late to accomplish His designs. What an utterly unworthy conception of the Deity all this implies! Cicero 75 denied God's foreknowledge, because he saw no other way of preserving the liberty of man. A convinced theist would, on the contrary, sacrifice the doctrine of free-will rather than attenuate the divine omniscience. The Christian Church has always clung to the conviction, so beautifully voiced in her liturgical prayers, that Divine Providence (providere = praevidere) not only knows what will actually happen in the future, but also what would happen if individuals were placed in different circum 75 De Divinat., II, 7. |
